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Overview and Hypotheses 
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate the effectiveness of a 5-minute 
online mindfulness practice, and test its applications to social judgements including 
attribution and decision-making. The seven experiments (N = 959) presented in this 
thesis address an important gap in the current literature on mindfulness. Specifically: 
1) the empirical test of the effectiveness of a 5-minute, single-session, online 
mindfulness manipulation and; 2) the impact of a brief mindfulness manipulation on 
social judgements.  
At present, the majority of mindfulness research has focused on multiple 
sessions of practice over a number of weeks as part of a course, usually aimed at 
clinical populations, and at enhancing trait mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
There is evidence that such courses can be effectively delivered online (Allexandre, 
Neuman, Hunter, Morledge, & Roizen, 2012; Krusche, Cyhlarova, King, & 
Williams, 2012; Krusche, Cyhlarova, & Williams, 2013; Morledge et al., 2013) and 
emerging evidence for the use of single-session mindfulness with non-clinical 
samples (Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Heppner et al., 2008; Hong, Lishner, & Han, 
2014; Hooper, Erdogan, Keen, Lawton, & Mchugh, 2015a; Jordan, Wang, Donatoni, 
& Meier, 2014; Kiken & Shook, 2011; Papies, Barsalou, & Custers, 2012; Weger, 
Hooper, Meier, & Hopthrow, 2012) that aims to increase state mindfulness (Bishop 
et al., 2004; Lau et al., 2006). In addition, although mindfulness exercises are readily 
available online and via smartphone apps, there has yet to be an empirical 
investigation of the effectiveness of self-help online practices, and whether brief, 
single-session practices actually enhance levels of mindfulness.  





Based on evidence that some people prefer to complete such practices in their 
own surroundings (Beattie, Shaw, Kaur, & Kessler, 2009; Cavanagh et al., 2013), 
and that a smartphone app was preferred to an in-person and web-based mindfulness 
practice, it is expected that a short (5-minute) single-session, online mindfulness 
manipulation will effectively increase state mindfulness, measured by the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale (TMS, Lau et al., 2006). 
Mindfulness is thought to be effective in slowing automatic responding 
(Jordan et al., 2014; Kiken & Shook, 2011; Papies et al., 2012) and may reduce 
reliance on previously learnt associations (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000b), allowing 
attention to be refocused on aspects of the environment that usually go unnoticed. As 
such, it has the potential to reduce errors in attribution. Reliance on automatic 
processes in social judgements can be detrimental for social harmony.  For example, 
the mindless use of heuristics and stereotypes in person judgement can lead to 
prejudice and discrimination (Abrams, 2010). Furthermore, dysfunctional group 
dynamics can lead to poorly made decisions (Berger & Zelditch, 1998; Larson, 
Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 
1989). With this in mind, the beneficial effects that mindfulness can have on 
interpersonal relationships (e.g. increased empathy; Block-Lerner, Adair, Plumb, 
Rhatigan, & Orsillo, 2007) should also help to improve group decision-making.  
The core aim of this thesis is to test whether a 5-minute, single-session, 
online mindfulness manipulation effectively increases state mindfulness, and then 
apply this to social judgements. Specifically, whether the mindfulness manipulation 
is effective in reducing attribution errors, and improving group decision-making. It is 
expected that after the mindfulness manipulation, participants will be less likely to 






or the cause of a situation based on limited information. Moreover, this is expected 
to improve the social experience of individuals working in groups and therefore 
increase decision-making accuracy.  
This thesis presents seven experiments in which a 5-minute mindfulness 
manipulation is tested in different settings (Chapter 4), applied to two attribution 
errors (Chapters 5 and 6), and used before a group decision-making task (Chapter 7). 
A summary of the findings, and the theoretical and practical implications of the 
findings are presented alongside limitations and avenues for future research in the 
final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 8).  




Chapter 1: Mindfulness: Definitions, Measurement and Application 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on mindfulness. There is a 
particular emphasis on three aspects: 1) differentiating trait from state mindfulness; 
2) exploring measurement tools to assess individual mindfulness levels; and 3) 
considering the potential applications of mindfulness in social psychology. Research 
using mindfulness exercises delivered online is also considered.  
Defining Mindfulness 
As a construct, mindfulness has been examined empirically for over four 
decades (Black, 2011). Despite its origins in Buddhist and other contemplative 
traditions that place significance on conscious attention and awareness (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003), mindfulness research has proliferated the psychology literature in both 
religious and secular terms, particularly for clinical therapies and mental health 
treatments. Whilst the origins of mindfulness lie in contemplative traditions, there is 
a distinction between mindfulness and absorption (Holzel & Ott, 2007), where the 
latter refers to entering a trance like state of consciousness, losing touch with what is 
presently occurring, commonly associated with meditative states (Brown & Ryan, 
2003). Although there are a number of definitions of mindfulness, it is largely 
focussed on present moment awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), and so by definition 
opposes the tenet of absorption.  
Some of the more widely used definitions of mindfulness include the 
following aspects: facets of consciousness, defined as enhanced attention and 
moment-by-moment awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Walsh, Balint, Smolira, David, 
Fredericksen, & Madsen, 2009), a heightened state of involvement, wakefulness and 




being in the present (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000a). Here, attention refers to the 
process of focussing conscious awareness and providing heightened sensitivity to a 
limited range of experience (Westen, 1996). As well as this, mindfulness definitions 
include maintaining open and non-judgemental consciousness of self and 
environment, by being in touch with what is occurring (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
Langer and Moldoveanu (2000b) suggest that this also encompasses greater 
VHQVLWLYLW\WRRQH¶VHQYLURQPHQWRSHQQHVVWRQHZLQIRUPDWLRQWKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZ
categories for structuring perception, and enhanced awareness of multiple 
perspectives.  
Despite the variety of definitions, there are common elements to almost all 
definitions of mindfulness. These include: enhanced attention to present moment 
awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000a); maintenance of an 
open and non-judgemental consciousness of self and environment, whilst being in 
touch with what is occurring in that moment (Brown & Ryan, 2003); and observing 
thoughts and feelings without over-identifying with them in an automatic, reactive 
ZD\7KHODVWRIWKHVHIDFHWVLQYROYHVLQWURGXFLQJDµVSDFH¶EHWZHHQRQH¶VRZQ
perception and response (Bishop et al., 2004). Mindfulness is also considered an 
acceptance strategy, in that individuals higher in mindfulness are more open and 
receptive to ideas and emotions; a contrast to the idea of refusing to acknowledge or 
attend to a thought, feeling or emotion, known as mindlessness (Brown & Ryan, 
2003).  
Mindlessness and Mind-Wandering 
Although seemingly antithetical to mindfulness, it is important to note some 
of the key features of mindlessness. This allows for a better understanding of how 




the two constructs differ, what is particularly unique about mindfulness, and whether 
being mindful is merely the same as not being mindless. As mentioned above, Brown 
and Ryan (2003) define mindlessness as an absence of mindfulness. That is, a 
blunted form of consciousness that is characterised by habitual or automatic 
functioning; and attention that is taken away from the present (i.e. in rumination, 
absorption and concern with the past or future); similar to mind-wandering (Mrazek, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). Both are in direct opposition with the definition of 
mindfulness given above, which emphasises openness to new experiences and non-
judgemental attention to thoughts and experiences. Mindlessness, on the other hand, 
would be more closely associated with refusal or rejection of certain thoughts and 
emotions, for example unpleasant or painful thoughts.  
Mrazek, Smallwood and Schooler (2012) tested the hypothesis that 
mindfulness and mindlessness are opposing features of attention, and found that 
participants who reported more mindfulness also reported less daydreaming and less 
mind-wandering (less task unrelated thoughts). This suggested that mindfulness and 
mind-wandering are inversely related, and as such, detrimental effects of mind-
wandering could be reduced through mindfulness practice. Mrazek, Phillips, 
Franklin, Broadway, and Schooler (2013) found that this was the case, and 
mindfulness training improved performance on measures of working memory 
capacity and graduate academic exams (GRE scores), as mediated by reduced mind-
wandering.  
Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz (1978) suggested that many social 
psychological theories assume that individuals process current incoming 
information, but in fact, much cognitive processing may be based on previously 




learned or habitual information. Langer's (1989) definition of mindlessness refers to 
not paying attention to relevant information that would allow for the successful 
resolution of a problem, so when novel information is included, for which habit does 
not suffice, more thoughtful responding is required. In this respect, mindlessness is 
characterised by a lack of attention to details and regarding information as if it had 
only one meaning, for example, learning one solution to a problem and then having 
difficulty seeing alternative solutions (Langer & Piper, 1987).  
Across three studies Langer et al. (1978) made requests to participants that 
either included relevant or placebic information, or varied the congruence of the 
request to the participant. The results showed that regardless of whether information 
was semantically sound or senseless, if the communication method is congruent with 
past experience an individual is more likely to respond in a mindless way. For 
example, participants approached at a photocopier were equally likely to let the 
UHVHDUFKHUMXPSDKHDGRIWKHPZKHQWKHUHDVRQVWDWHGZDVWKDWWKH\³QHHGHGWRPDNH
FRSLHV´DVZKHQWKHUHDVRQZDVEHFDXVHWKH\ZHUH³LQDUXVK´%RWKUHTXHVWVHOLFLWHG
more compliance than merely asking to jump ahead, despite the former request 
adding no new information, the inclusion of a reason was sufficient for participants 
to respond mindlessly, suggesting they had not processed the reason and had just 
responded automatically.  
In an attempt to overcome mindless responding, Langer and Piper (1987), 
conducted a series of experiments in which participants were shown objects that 
were described in absolute ways (this is an X) or conditional ways (this could be an 
X). The simple manipulation of the description was thought to draw attention to the 
novel aspects of the objects, and following the previous experiments by Langer et al. 




(1978), it was assumed that the linguistic command used in the description would 
alter the participants¶ mindful responding. In support of their hypotheses, the 
researchers found that participants in the conditional description groups were more 
likely to generate mindful responses to potential uses of the objects outside of their 
generic use (e.g. using a rubber band or dog chew toy as an eraser). That is, when 
other alternatives were not available but the need arose, participants who were given 
conditional descriptions were more able to realise the potential flexibility in use of 
the objects than participants who were given absolute descriptions of the objects. 
Langer and Piper (1987), argue that this cognitive flexibility means that participants 
are likely to be more mindful and less mindlessly relying on rigid, pre-learned 
categories and uses for the objects.   
Langer argues that reliance on pre-existing categories is fixed in the past, and 
is therefore also a form of mindless responding; the view that re-categorisation 
brings attention back to the present and is more mindful differs somewhat from the 
definition of mindfulness that stems from traditional Buddhist contemplative 
WUDGLWLRQV$V6LQJKQRWHVGHILQLWLRQVRIPLQGIXOQHVV³UHDOO\GHSHQGRQZKHWKHUWKH
interest is from a social psychological, clinical or spiritual context; and whether the 
SHUVSHFWLYHLVRIDUHVHDUFKHUSUDFWLWLRQHURUFOLQLFLDQ´(Singh, Lancioni, Wahler, 
Winton, & Singh, 2008, p. 661).  
In a slightly different view, Baird et al. (2012), argue that mind-wandering 
(thinking about task unrelated thoughts) increases creative thinking on unusual uses 
tasks. These tasks are similar to that used by Langer and Piper (1987), and ask 
participants to list as many unusual uses for each stimulus object. Baird et al. (2012) 
found that participants engaged in an undemanding task experienced greater levels of 




mind-wandering than those engaged in a demanding task, and that this difference 
was also predictive of improved performance on the unusual uses task. There was 
also a positive correlation between individuals¶ creativity and propensity to mind-
wander in daily life. Zedelius and Schooler (2015) found that being mindful was 
negatively correlated with creative problem solving. The researchers argue that this 
provides preliminary evidence for a positive use for mindless thought, in respect that 
it is not present moment or task- focused, and that mind-wandering may be useful 
under certain circumstances. There is also evidence to suggest that mind-wandering 
can be beneficial for autobiographical planning (prospective, self-related, plans or 
goals) (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). 
However, the evidence that mind-wandering or mindlessness can be 
damaging outweighs that which suggests it is beneficial. Research has therefore 
focused on efforts to reduce the propensity for mindlessness, or increase 
mindfulness. For example, experiencing stereotype threat increased propensity for 
mind-wandering, which in turn impaired performance on maths tests (Mrazek et al., 
2011), fear-then-relief (a sudden retraction of the external source of fear) also 
induced a state of mindlessness which increased participants compliance and reduced 
cognitive functions (Dolinski, Ciszek, Godlewski, & Zawadzki, 2002). Therefore, 
whilst reducing mindless thought could reduce creativity and creative problem 
solving (Baird et al., 2012), increasing mindfulness should have a number of 
beneficial effects (e.g. on cognitive processing or in health related outcomes), and 
developing techniques for different situations would be optimal (Schooler et al., 
2014).  




There have been a number of attempts to offer a conclusive explanation of 
what mindfulness is, and the process by which it affects individual cognition (Bishop 
et al., 2004; Erisman & Roemer, 2012; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006) 
which will be discussed throughout this chapter. However, as noted above, the 
context and chosen definition greatly impact how mindfulness is viewed and used in 
psychology research. For the purpose of this thesis, the definition of mindfulness 
used includes present moment, non-judgemental awareness. Mindfulness is 
considered a secular form of the traditional meditative approaches that originated in 
Buddhist philosophy. With this in mind, there are a number of distinctions made 
throughout this chapter which highlight the specific use of mindfulness for the 
experiments that are described in the following chapters. First, it is important to note 
that mindfulness can be viewed as both a disposition and a state. That is, it can be a 
relatively stable trait in individuals¶ daily life (Anicha, Ode, Moeller, & Robinson, 
2012; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Reb, Narayanan, & Chaturvedi, 2014), or as a process, 
skill or state (Bishop et al., 2004) that can be elicited or enhanced by practice.  
Trait vs. State Mindfulness 
Trait Mindfulness 
Brown and Ryan (2003) argue that mindfulness is a naturally occurring 
attribute that varies both between, and within individuals. It is inherently a state of 
consciousness and individuals may differ in the frequency with which they deploy 
attention and awareness, but that there may also be intra-individual differences in the 
capability to do so (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Shao and Skarlicki (2009) also view 
mindfulness as an individual difference variable, represented by the extent to which 
an individual is in the present moment. In addition, Thompson and Waltz (2007) 




UHIHUWRµHYHU\GD\PLQGIXOQHVV¶LQZKLFK individuals maintain an open, accepting 
and non-judgemental focus on the present, in day-to-day activities. All of these, 
despite minor variations, refer to mindfulness as a dispositional trait that perhaps lies 
on a continuum from being highly mindful, whereby one exhibits mindfulness in 
high frequencies, daily and in all tasks, to highly mindless, where individuals 
behaves in an automatic, non-aware way, showing less frequent mindful states over 
time. 
Measuring Trait Mindfulness 
The varying definitions of mindfulness make it difficult to measure the extent 
to which an individual is mindful, whether this is as a trait or a state, and the chosen 
definition plays a part in the development of the measurement tool. There are a 
number of trait measures of mindfulness, some comprising of a single construct like 
the Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) and 
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI; Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmüller, 
Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006), two factors (awareness and acceptance) like the 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & 
Farrow, 2008), four factors as in the Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale-
Revised (CAMS-R; Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 2007) and the 
Kentucky Mindfulness Inventory (KIMS; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) as well as a 
five factor structure in the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006).  
The MAAS was developed to measure variations in awareness of, and 
attention to, actions, interpersonal communication, thoughts, emotions, and physical 
states. That is, the day-to-day fluctuations in levels of mindfulness, or the frequency 




of mindful states throughout an individual¶s day, it measures mindfulness as an 
individual difference variable (Brown & Ryan, 2003). The scale items focus on 
mindless situations, which the authors argue are more accessible to the general 
population since engaging in mindless activity is far more common than mindful 
activity (McIntosh, 1997). In order to assess the usefulness of the MAAS, Brown 
and Ryan (2003) compared scores of regular meditators with a matched sample of 
non-meditators. They found a significant difference in scores, with the group of 
meditators scores reflecting significantly more mindfulness. This was more 
pronounced when comparing those actively meditating with their matched sample. 
They also found that scores correlated with the extent to which the meditators felt 
that they brought their practice into daily life, and with years of practice.  
A key facet of the construct of mindfulness is the capacity for self-awareness. 
It is expected that highly mindful individuals will be more attentive and aware of 
internal constructions, events, and processes (Brown and Ryan, 2003). To test this 
assumption, the researchers compared scores of implicit and explicit emotional 
states, hypothesising that concordant scores on these two measures indicate a greater 
level of self-awareness. The research found evidence for this, in that those scoring 
higher on the MAAS also showed more self-awareness and awareness of their 
implicit emotional state, which was then reflected in the explicit self-descriptions. 
The MAAS also correlated with various measures of self-regulation and indicators of 
psychological well-being (Brown & Ryan, 2003) which have since been investigated 
in other studies of the effectiveness of mindfulness in maintaining positive mental 
health. These are discussed below.  





By contrast, other researchers view mindfulness as a state (Bishop et al., 
2004; Lau et al., 2006; Tanay & Bernstein, 2013; Weger et al., 2012), or a 
psychological process that can be developed with practice (Bishop et al., 2004). In 
this way, Bishop and colleagues argue that mindfulness is maintained only as long as 
attention is brought purposefully to the experience. This suggests that once an 
individual has learnt how to focus his/her attention on the present moment, he/she 
can then elicit a mindful state as and when desired; the individual can choose to 
become mindful in that moment (Lau et al., 2006).  
Brown and Ryan (2003) view state mindfulness differently. As mentioned 
above, they suggest that there may be differences in the individual level of 
mindfulness, which fluctuates above and below the average level of mindfulness (or 
the day-to-day level of mindfulness, as a trait). From this point of view, state 
mindfulness is the level of mindfulness at any given time point, or momentary 
mindfulness, as predicted by the individuals¶ trait level mindfulness. This suggests 
that mindfulness as a state is the ability to become mindful at a given time point, 
rather than the extent to which individuals are purposefully maintaining attention at a 
given time point.  
Measuring State Mindfulness 
Bishop et al. (2004) proposed an operational definition of mindfulness as a 
state. This measures the extent to which individuals become mindful at a given time, 
and the extent to which they maintain the mindful state as long as they are actively 
cultivating their present moment awareness. Lau et al. (2006) developed the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale (TMS) as a means of measuring mindfulness in this manner. The 




TMS, a self-report measure, is aimed at retrospectively assessing individuals¶ level 
of mindfulness immediately following practice (Lau et al., 2006). The TMS is 
comprised of two subscales, decentering and curiosity. Curiosity is defined as 
UHIOHFWLQJ³DZDUHQHVVRISUHVHQWPRPHQWH[SHULHQFHZLWKDTXDOLW\RIFXULRVLW\´/DX
et al., 2006, p1452). Decentering relates WRDZDUHQHVVRIRQH¶VRZQH[SHULHQFHZLWK
distance and dis-identification, without being carried away or personally identifying 
with thoughts and emotions (see also Teasdale et al., 2002). Both curiosity and 
decentering were suggested to be related to the second component in the definition 
offered by Bishop et al. (2004). 
Following a slightly different definition of mindfulness, Tanay and Bernstein 
(2013) developed the State Mindfulness Scale (SMS), which is context specific and 
incorporates the Buddhist origins of mindfulness, including bodily sensations. The 
SMS is divided into two subscales, mindfulness of body and mindfulness of mind, 
both of which correlate with the TMS subscales, decentering and curiosity. The SMS 
was used to measure mindfulness after a 60 minute guided practice carried out 
weekly by participants who were enrolled on a four week programme (Tanay & 
Bernstein, 2013). However, the four week course also asked participants to practice 
mindfulness at home as well as giving them additional information about 
mindfulness practice and its benefits. The researchers found that this also increased 
trait mindfulness over the course. So it is possible that, whilst the SMS shows raised 
scores after each session, the continued practice was in fact increasing trait 
mindfulness, which in turn increased the ability of the participants to elicit a mindful 
state during the guided practice. This best suits the definition of state mindfulness 
proposed by Brown and Ryan (2003). Additionally, the view that state mindfulness 
measures should measure both mind and body sensations is not supported by 




Desbordes et al. (2015), who suggest that although traditional Buddhist practice 
involves some aspects of bodily awareness, mindfulness is more focussed on 
sensory, affective and cognitive experiences which relate to the mind, and an 
awareness of inner experience rather than physical sensation.   
Brown and Ryan (2003) also adjusted the MAAS to measure state 
mindfulness as the ability to become mindful at a given time. Since they theorised 
that mindfulness is inherently a state, they argued that state effects identify 
V\VWHPDWLFIOXFWXDWLRQVDERYHDQGEHORZHDFKSHUVRQ¶VDYHUDJHOHYHORIPLQGIXOQHVV
In order to measure this, they asked participants to state what they were mainly 
doing at a specified time in the study, and to state the extent to which they were 
having the experiences they outlined in the previous question. Participants then 
answered five, slightly rephrased items from the original MAAS measure of trait 
mindfulness. They found that the effects of state and trait mindfulness were 
independent. Having higher levels of trait mindfulness had beneficial effects on self-
regulated activity and emotional well-being, but so did momentary experiences, 
independent of disposition. Results showed that mindful individuals were acting 
autonomously, in ways that were concordant with their own values and interests. 
Brown and Ryan, however, do not go on to disentangle the potential difference 
between state and trait mindfulness. They posited that those scoring higher for trait 
mindfulness were more likely to show higher levels of state mindfulness as well, but 
by their definitions, this would seem intuitive, since if an individual scores higher for 
trait mindfulness, then they should also experience more momentary mindfulness. 




Do trait and state mindfulness influence each other?  
Differing views of mindfulness have recently led researchers to empirically 
investigate the relationship between state and trait mindfulness. Kiken, Garland, 
Bluth, Palsson, and Gaylord (2015) argue that increases in state mindfulness over 
repeated sessions contribute to increases in trait mindfulness, which opposes the 
view outlined above, that more trait mindfulness predicts a greater propensity for 
brief states of mindfulness. The researchers tested the notion that repeated practice 
(during an eight-week course) increases individuals¶ level of state mindfulness, 
which in turn increased their trait level mindfulness. State mindfulness was induced 
with a 10-minute practice after each weekly class, and the TMS was used to measure 
state mindfulness. State mindfulness was found to increase linearly over the seven 
weekly assessments, and predicted post-intervention trait mindfulness. Baseline trait 
mindfulness did not predict the increases in state mindfulness. This suggests that 
state mindfulness may act as a top-up or means of enhancing trait levels of 
mindfulness, but that trait mindfulness is not necessarily indicative of a greater 
ability to evoke a mindful state.  
In developing a measure of state mindfulness, Tanay and Berstein (2013) also 
found that, over a 6-week period, increases in state mindfulness predicted 
development of dispositional mindfulness. However, in their study participants were 
VSHFLILFDOO\DVNHGWR³PRQLWor how mindful they were in their daily activities and to 
LQWHJUDWHPLQGIXODWWHQWLRQDQGDZDUHQHVVDVDZD\RIEHLQJLQWRWKHLUGDLO\OLYHV´
(Tanay & Bernstein, 2013, p1294), so they were asked to continue the practice 
outside of any intervention or state mindfulness practice. The effects of each type of 
mindfulness on the other could have been confounded by the instructions that 




encouraged the participants to increase their trait level of mindfulness. In addition, 
the questions on the MAAS measure ask participants to consider day-to-day 
activities and general aspects of mindfulness, and so they may have induced demand 
characteristics.   
7KHRSSRVLWHHIIHFWZDVSRLQWHGWRLQ%URZQDQG5\DQ¶VVWXGLHVWKDW
explored the relationship between trait mindfulness and affect, and used measures 
adapted from the MAAS measure of trait mindfulness. The results, although 
correlational, did indicate that being momentarily mindful was more likely among 
participants who reported higher levels of trait mindfulness.  However, states of 
mindfulness were not induced, so this only suggested that this was seen among 
people who were more mindful at that moment, which is likely in those with a more 
mindful disposition.  
Similarly, Garland, Hanley, Farb, and Froeliger (2013) measured trait 
mindfulness at the start of a study in which participants completed a 13-minute 
mindfulness induction in the lab and were then asked to repeat it twice more during a 
week long period, immediately followed by the TMS measure of state mindfulness. 
Participants then completed the trait measure again. The results showed that trait 
mindfulness at Time 1 was positively associated with state measures of mindfulness 
during the week-long induction. However practicing the state induction for the week 
had no effect on trait mindfulness at Time 2. This contradicts the research outlined 
above; suggesting that individuals with a greater propensity for dispositional 
mindfulness are more likely to show higher levels of state mindfulness, but that 
practicing mindfulness (state inductions) does not necessarily increase the trait level.  




The extant literature is therefore mixed, and more investigation is required to 
understand whether trait and state mindfulness are separate constructs or reliable 
predictors of each other. There is a general notion in research on mindfulness that the 
two influence each other, and many studies include trait mindfulness as a covariate 
when investigating state mindfulness. However, most research considers the two 
separately, and focuses on one or the other. In this thesis, the primary focus is on 
state mindfulness, and how mindfulness inductions influence social judgements.  
Models/Processes of Mindfulness 
As outlined previously, the different definitions of mindfulness, and whether 
it is viewed as a state or trait, have prompted researchers to consider how 
mindfulness works, and the processes by which outcome effects are elicited. Below, 
the three axiom model (Shapiro et al., 2006) is described, and the process by which 
decentering elicits mindfulness effects is discussed along with an alternative view of 
mindfulness as a social process (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000a; Langer, 1989).  
Three axiom model 
Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, and Freedman (2006) described a model of 
mindfulness that accounts for Intention, Attention, and Attitude (3 axiom model). 
This, fits with the Kabat-Zinn, (1990) definition of mindfulness: ³SD\LQJDWWHQWLRQ
(attention) in a particular way (attitude): on purpose (intention), in the present 
moment, and non-MXGJHPHQWDOO\DWWLWXGH´7KLVPRGHOSRVWXODWHVWKDWDVWDWHRI
mindfulness arises when intentions, attitudes and attention are cultivated 
simultaneously.  
,QWHQWLRQVUHODWHWRWKHµZK\¶RISUDFWLFLQJPLQGIXOQHVVDQGare taken from 
the original Buddhist definitions of mindfulness meditation which emphasise an 




intention to reach enlightenment and compassion (Shapiro et al., 2006). In 
mindfulness based interventions, intentions may relate to reducing clinical 
symptoms, or to changing the way emotions are interpreted. This highlights the 
relevance of context in the practice of mindfulness, as Dorjee (2010) suggested, 
mindfulness training may take different forms, depending on the context in which it 
is practiced. Gethin (2011) also suggested that the adaptation of Buddhist practice 
into the modern, secular use of mindfulness as treatment will depend on the context 
and perspective of the practitioner. Together this suggests that the context of 
mindfulness practice is key in understanding its process and outcomes.  
Attention is a key aspect of mindfulness, relating to the ability to pay 
attention to the present moment without over-identifying with thoughts, feelings or 
emotions. This is a particular kind of attention specific to mindfulness (Shapiro et 
al., 2006). In addition, attitude, the third axiom of this model, refers to how attention 
is used. The researchers suggest that a person can learn to attend to their own internal 
and external experiences, without evaluation or interpretation. This would lead to the 
practice of acceptance and openness, even when what is occurring in the field of 
experience is contrary to deeply held expectations. That is, when practicing 
mindfulness one is impartial and non-judgmental of what is being experienced at the 
present moment (Shonin & Gordon, 2014), and one LVQRWµWUDSSHGE\FDWHJRULHV¶
As Langer (1989) described, thinking mindfully allows for the creation of new 
categories by which to define phenomena, rather than relying on previously held 
ideologies. 
Being free from rigid categories is also linked to the shift in perspective that 
Shapiro et al. (2006) term reperceiving. They argue that reperceiving is an outcome 




of mindfulness practice in which a process of dis-identification occurs. Dissociation 
takes place, from RQH¶VRZQWKRXJKWVRUHPRWLRQV, and the moment-by-moment 
experiences are viewed with greater objectivity (Shapiro et al., 2006). This process is 
similar to decentering (Safran & Segal, 1996) or de-automatisation (Kang, Gruber, & 
Gray, 2012)7KLVLVWKRXJKWWREHWKHDELOLW\WRVWHSRXWVLGHRIRQH¶VLPPHGLDWH
experience and thereby change the nature of the experience, or the undoing of 
automatic processes that control perception. In other words, the shift in perception is 
from subjective to objective. The greater the extent we are able to observe our 
thoughts, the less we are embedded in or attached to the content- it is this process of 
dis-identifying with our own thoughts, feelings or emotions and simply noticing 
them, but not being defined by them, that is thought to enable to positive effects of 
therapy such as MBSR (Dorjee, 2010; Gecht et al., 2014). 
Gecht et al. (2014) argued that mindfulness and decentering (or reperceiving) 
are two distinct, rather than overlapping, constructs. Carmody, Baer, Lykins and 
Olendzki (2010) suggested that mindfulness and decentering are the same because of 
their high overlap. However, Hayes-Skelton and Graham (2014) suggest that 
decentering reflects a mechanism underlying the effects of mindfulness. They found, 
across two studies, that both mindfulness and decentering were negatively correlated 
with good psychological well-being. Correlations between mindfulness and 
decentering were not strong enough to consider them a one-dimensional construct. 
This suggests that decentering actually acts as the process by which mindfulness 
works. The authors found indirect effects of mindfulness on reports of depressive 
symptoms, via decentering. However, Gecht and colleagues did not use a 
mindfulness practice in this study. They measured trait mindfulness using the KIMS, 
and measured depression amongst undergraduate students, making it difficult to 




assess whether these results are a true representation of the effects of mindfulness. 
Context is an important aspect of mindfulness practice, and this study lacks the 
context to make the mindfulness practice relevant.  
Social Mindfulness 
An alternative view to mindfulness as a Buddhist technique is that of social 
mindfulness (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000; Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van Lange, 
2013). Langer and Moldoveanu (2000b) proposed a definition of mindfulness that 
related to drawing novel distinctions between known categories. Langer (1989) 
argued that being mindless was characterised by thoughts trapped by categories, 
automatic behaviour and acting from a single perspective. That is, ideologies are 
used to justify and rationalise thoughts, but these are based on previously learnt 
categories or habits, and are accepted as if there are no alternatives. This leads to 
narrow, unquestioning and automatic behaviour that Langer described as 
mindlessness. In order to overcome this, and to behave in a more mindful way, 
Langer and Moldoveanu (2000b) suggested that creating novel distinctions between 
categories keeps individuals focussed on the present and makes then more aware of 
the context of their actions and more open to new information. This seems to fall in 
line with the previously described definitions of Buddhist type mindfulness, but is 
much more specific to the context of social interactions. They argued that 
mindlessness may be the cause of a number of human errors in complex situations 
such as prejudice and stereotyping since negative intergroup attitudes may be the 
result of mindless categorisation. 
One area considered within the health domain is aging and control.  
Perceived control is seen to be positively related to reduced stress and health. When 




a person behaves mindlessly, perception of control is not possible. Langer and 
colleagues found that increasing elderly people¶s control over things like their 
schedule had positive effects and that increased mindfulness led to reduced health 
problems such as pain, and increased longevity. In work settings, mindfulness has 
been associated with increased creativity, decreased burnout, and increased 
productivity (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000b). Mindlessly relying on previously 
learnt behaviour when new systems are introduced could lead to negative or 
damaging consequences. Within education changes to language, such as saying 
µFRXOGEHRUSHUKDSV¶KDYHEHHQOLQked to increases in creative uses for ordinary 
REMHFWVPRUHVRWKDQZKHQFRQFUHWHWHUPVVXFKDVµWKLVLVor can only be¶DUHXVHG
$GGLWLRQDOO\µPLQGIXOO\QRWLFLQJQHZWKLQJV¶UDWKHUWKDQIRFXVRQRQHVSHFLILF
(small) aspect of a task or stimulus, was found to increase attention, liking for the 
task, and improve memory.  Consideration of multiple perspectives in learning was 
also found to increase the effectiveness with which students learnt new information, 
even though they had to learn more information.  
In a similar vein, Van Doesum, Van Lange and Van Lange (2013) suggest 
that social mindfulness is allowing other people control over their own behavioural 
options in an interpersonal interaction. This is in line with prosocial behaviour and 
being other-oriented, as opposed to self-oriented. In a computer generated social 
decision-making task, participants were offered the choice of three objects, two 
identical and one unique object. Participants were told that they would have first 
FKRLFHDQGWKHLU³SDUWQHU´ZRXOGWKHQFKRRVHEHWZHHQWhe two items they had left. 
The researchers argued that individuals who chose one of the identical objects, and 
thus left their partner the choice between two different objects, were expressing 
greater social mindfulness. This seems to fit well with the notion of perspective 




taking and context dependent mindfulness, but is distinct from the more traditional 
focus on present moment awareness. As outlined above, the differences in 
definitions of mindfulness can create confusion in what exactly is being investigated, 
but as Singh et al. (2008) pointed out, the definition is relevant to the context in 
which mindfulness is being researched. In the case of this thesis, and from the 
perspective of a social psychological intervention, the definition preferred is that 
mindfulness is a skill or inherent ability which can be maintained or cultivated over 
time. This is in relation to attentional awareness and consciousness.  
Outcomes of mindfulness practice 
There has been great interest in the beneficial outcomes of mindfulness for 
stress, depression and anxiety, especially courses such as Mindfulness Based Stress 
Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; for reviews 
see: Bishop, 2002; Bohlmeijer, Prenger, Taal, & Cuijpers, 2010; Carmody et al., 
2010; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Khoury et al., 2013; Piet & Hougaard, 2011; Piet, Würtzen, 
& Zachariae, 2012). In addition to these mental health benefits, mindfulness practice 
has also been investigated in relation to, but not limited to, aggression and anger 
(Heppner et al., 2008; Singh, Wahler, Adkins, & Myers, 2003), stereotype threat 
(Weger et al., 2012), negative attributions (Hafenbrack, Kinias, & Barsade, 2014) 
and individual academic performance in adults (Shao & Skarlicki, 2009) and 
children (Bakosh, Snow, Tobias, Houlihan, & Barbosa-Leiker, 2016). 
As outlined above, the chosen definition of mindfulness will dictate the 
measurement used in research. For example, Shao and Skarlicki (2009) used a 
definition similar to that of Brown and Ryan (2003) that mindfulness is an individual 
GLIIHUHQFHYDULDEOHDQGVRXVHGWKH0$$6WRPHDVXUHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VOHYHOVRI




mindfulness in everyday activities. This assumed that mindfulness is inherent and 
measured the individual variations in mindful activity. They found that trait 
mindfulness interacted with gender to predict performance, whereby this association 
was stronger for women than men. Similarly, Hafenbrack, Kinias and Barsade 
(2014) found that a trait measure of mindfulness predicted a greater resistance to the 
sunk-cost bias (a tendency to continue an endeavour once an investment in money, 
effort, or time has been made).  
These correlational studies show support for the notion that mindfulness may 
be a trait that varies between individuals; however, some studies suggest that the trait 
level of mindfulness can also be increased through practice. Tacón, Caldera and 
Ronaghan (2004) investigated the effect of practicing mindfulness over a period of 
eight weeks, in a similar format to many MBSR and MBCT courses. They found that 
greater practice led to internalisation of control in a sample of female cancer patients, 
which in turn led to a decrease in anxiety. This study did not include a measure of 
mindfulness and so assumed that the act of practicing mindfulness techniques was 
responsible for these changes. This was also the case in a case study where Singh et 
al. (2003) administered a specific mindfulness training technique to an individual 
suffering with learning disabilities, who was also institutionalised for high levels of 
uncontrollable aggression. After learning the mindfulness technique, the individual 
was integrated back into the community and was able to continue practicing the 
technique when feelings of aggression or anger were detected. These studies view 
mindfulness as a disposition, but also consider it to be stable once practiced. 
A shorter mindfulness course (3 days) was shown to reduce experimentally 
induced pain (Zeidan, Gordon, Merchant, & Goolkasian, 2010). In this research, 




participants completed three days of mindfulness training, a math distraction task or 
a relaxation exercise. The mindfulness training included 20 minutes of meditation 
per day, which participants were then asked to use to practice mindfulness for 13-
minutes in the testing session. Participants experienced electrical stimulations at pre-
determined high vs. low intensities, and were found to experience less pain after 
meditation compared to the math distraction and the relaxation conditions, as 
measured by subjective pain ratings and pain sensitivity. The researchers argue that 
mindfulness may have the same analgesic effects after only brief practice as has been 
shown for experienced meditators (Grant & Rainville, 2009).   
As a means to investigate differences in dispositional and induced 
mindfulness, one study compared experienced meditators with naïve, first-time 
meditators and found that experienced meditators showed significantly less cognitive 
rigidity. That is they were able to disengage from their previous experience and more 
easily find a novel solution to a problem. Similarly, after an 8-week course, those 
with meditation training performed significantly better at the problem solving tasks 
than a wait list control group (Greenberg, Reiner, & Meiran, 2012).  
In a slightly different view other research has considered the impact of trait 
mindfulness on the outcomes of naïve samples. Heppner et al. (2008) found that 
higher mindfulness, measured with and without a mindfulness practice, leads to less 
aggressive behaviour, both in general and specifically following a social rejection. 
Kabat-Zinn (1990) defines an aspect of mindfulness that enhances openness to 
experience the present in a non-evaluative manner, allowing both positive and 
QHJDWLYHH[SHULHQFHVWREHWDNHQDWµIDFHYDOXH¶DQGQRWDWWDFKHGWRWKHVHQVHRIVHOI
and as outlined above, mindfulness is thought to elicit decentering (Shapiro et al., 




2006). That is, positive and negative emotions can be experienced without the weight 
RIVRFLDOYDOXHDWWDFKHGWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOI-esteem and can pass through 
consciousness without being anchored to the self. Since research suggests that a 
major instigator of aggressive behaviour is threats to self-esteem, such as personal 
insults or social rejection (Baron & Richardson, 1994) it is possible that mindfulness 
worked here to detach the insults from the self. Although in this study mindfulness 
was manipulated, the researchers adopted the definition of trait mindfulness that the 
practice of mindfulness increases the frequency of mindful behaviours. In other 
words, it increases the trait level of mindfulness. 
Petter, McGrath, Chambers, and Dick (2014) also considered the impact of 
trait mindfulness on the outcomes of brief mindfulness practice. They found that 
adolescents taking part in the cold pressor task, who completed a 10-minute 
mindfulness induction, scored lower on pain intensity only if they were regular 
meditators. For naïve meditators who completed the 10-minute induction there were 
no differences on perceived pain intensity compared to the control group. This 
suggested that the brief mindfulness induction was only effective for those who 
already practiced mindfulness regularly and therefore were more likely to have 
higher levels of trait mindfulness before the induction.  
This has also been tested in relation to eating behaviour and calorie 
consumption (Jordan et al., 2014). The researchers first established that trait 
mindfulness was negatively correlated with uncontrolled eating. That is, individuals 
who showed higher levels of dispositional mindfulness were less likely to report 
uncontrolled eating than those with lower dispositional mindfulness. Following this, 
the researchers used a 15-minute mindfulness induction, compared to a relaxation 




task, and then asked participants to taste any of three food items. Those who 
completed the mindfulness task consumed significantly fewer calories than those in 
the relaxation condition, indicating that increased mindfulness leads to reduced 
calorie intake. In an attempt to establish the process by which this change occurred, 
the researchers carried out a study in which participants completed a self-control 
depletion task before being offered a snack of fruit or sweets. Despite the prediction 
that mindfulness would counter the effect of self-control depletion, the researchers 
did not find any effect of self-control between the mindfulness groups. However, this 
study relied on measures of self-reported trait mindfulness, rather than using the 
induction. Using a state mindfulness practice would provide more control over the 
mindfulness level and may be better in predicting whether mindfulness attenuates the 
effects of self-control depletion.  
Other research has shown that after two weeks of practice, elementary and 
secondary school teachers reported a reduction in perpetrated ostracising behaviours. 
When mindfulness was then manipulated in the lab by using a 5-minute raisin eating 
task, the research showed that mindful participants were less likely to ostracise 
during an online ball-tossing game, but not during team picking for the game 
(Ramsey & Jones, 2015). This suggests that the longer practice of mindfulness was 
effective in the field (within a teaching environment), but was only partially effective 
in the lab with just 5-minutes of practice. Perhaps this was due to the length of 
mindfulness practice, or the difference in the context of the outcome measures. For 
example, Ostafin and Kassman (2012) found that trait mindfulness predicted 
improved problem solving for problems requiring a creative response, but not for 
logic problems. They then replicated this finding with participants who completed a 
10-minute mindful breathing exercise. Similarly to previous research the relationship 




was not explained by trait levels of mindfulness (Kiken & Shook, 2011), suggesting 
that the brief mindfulness practice was responsible for the improvement in creative 
problem solving.  
Although this may be due to the longer mindfulness practice having a greater 
effect, it is also possible that the familiarity of the problem solving context to 
students helped to maintain the positive effects of the mindfulness practice. In the 
ostracism example above, the cyberball team picking may have been too abstract or 
unfamiliar to participants and increased cognitive load, countering the effects of the 
mindfulness practice. For the main part of the game, it would have been interesting 
WRDFFRXQWIRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶XVHRIRQOLQHJDPHVWRVHHZKHWKHUWKHFRQWHxt impacted 
the results.   
Taken together these studies might stand to suggest that only through longer 
mindfulness practices, such as courses, or with greater dispositional mindfulness are 
any real positive outcomes found. Some of the studies suggest that brief mindfulness 
practices are only effective when combined with ongoing practice or for regular 
meditators and those with greater dispositional mindfulness. That is, that state and 
trait mindfulness must go hand-in-hand to achieve any changes in behaviour. 
However, correlational research has shown that there is little relationship between 
measures of trait (MAAS, CAMS-R and FFMQ) and state mindfulness (TMS) 
(Thompson & Waltz, 2007). In fact, the only relationship found was between the 
observe facet of the FFMQ and the TMS in naïve meditators. The relationship was 
non-significant even for experienced meditators, although caution is taken when 
viewing these results as the sample of experienced meditators was very small (N=31) 
and comprised of students with prior experience of Buddhist meditation or current 




practice of meditation. In addition, a growing body of literature is emerging which 
suggests that even one session of mindfulness practice alone can have some positive 
behavioural outcomes.  
Single-session mindfulness 
From the perspective that mindfulness is a state that can be induced 
momentarily and is maintained only with purposeful attention (Bishop et al., 2004), 
some research has considered whether a single-session of mindfulness can also be 
effective in the same way that courses are. Johnson, Gur, David, and Currier (2013) 
compared 25-minutes of mindfulness meditation, 25-minutes of sham meditation 
(less detailed) and a book reading control, and found that only in the meditation 
group ratings of tension, anger, fatigue and confusion were reduced. However, in this 
study, the researchers found that scores on the TMS measure of state mindfulness did 
not differ between sham and mindfulness meditation, and that only the mindfulness 
meditation group scored higher for decentering than the control group. This may 
have been due to the similarity of the instructions between the two meditation 
conditions. There may not have been any real difference in what the participants 
were experiencing between the mindfulness and sham meditation groups, and thus 
the outcomes on the mood scales would need further investigation.  
Mindfulness has been found to reduce the negativity bias; or the tendency to 
weight negative information more heavily than positive, including moods and 
emotions. Kiken and Shook (2011) found that a 15-minute mindfulness practice may 
reduce this bias and increase positivity. The researchers measured participants trait 
mindfulness using the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) to ensure that trait mindfulness 
did not account for the between group differences. The scores did not differ across 




conditions, suggesting that the 15-minute induction was responsible for the between 
group differences. Mindfulness was seen to attenuate the negativity bias and elicit 
increased accuracy in positive responding compared to the control condition. This 
was tested using an objective measure of negativity bias, the BeanFest. This is a 
computerised categorising task which requires participants to associate the beans 
appearance with a positive or negative outcome. In a different study, similar results 
were obtained for memory of positive and negative valence words, wherein 
participants recalled significantly fewer negative words after a 12-minute 
mindfulness practice compared to a control group. Although the difference was not 
significant for positive words this does suggest a reduction in negativity bias as seen 
LQ.LNHQDQG6KRRN¶VH[SHULPHQW (Alberts & Thewissen, 2011).  
Mindfulness was also a significant predictor of increased optimism, but not a 
decrease in pessimism, indicating a reframing of responses in a less habitual way 
(Kiken & Shook, 2011). This corresponGVWR/DQJHU¶VWKHRU\WKDW
mindlessness results from automatic responding. The researchers postulate that this 
may be due to mindfulness freeing cognitive resources to notice information that 
would normally be missed due to habitual responding. However, this was a self-
report measure and more objective measures of attitudinal response may be more 
useful.  
Physiological markers of stress may be a more objective way to assess the 
real impact of mindfulness. These have been shown to decrease when meditation is 
practiced before or after a stressor, such as a stressful computer game (Mohan, 
Sharma, & Bijlani, 2011). The mindfulness practice in this research differed from 
many single-session mindfulness inductions as a trained instructor was used to guide 




the mindfulness practice. Whilst it appears that this had an improved effect on the 
outcome measures compared to the previous study, the problem with this is the 
feasibility of applying this. It is not likely that a trained meditator can be available in 
stressful situations, and therefore the value in positive outcomes from single-session 
practice that can be done individually must not be downplayed. In addition, this 
study used only a very small sample of adolescent males who were asked to play a 
stressful computer game. It is important to consider the context in mindfulness 
research and therefore this may be unique to this very specific context and not 
applicable to other stressful situations.  
Even very brief mindfulness practices have been shown to elicit positive 
outcomes. Ten minutes of mindful eating practice was found to increase enjoyment 
in sampling unpleasant foods compared to a non-mindful group (Hong et al., 2014). 
As mentioned above, context is also important in the usefulness of mindfulness in 
reducing negative behaviours. With this in mind, a different type of mindfulness 
induction was shown to reduce mindless impulses towards attractive vs. neutral 
foods (Papies et al., 2012). Participants were asked to view a series of pictures, 
including five of attractive foods and five of neutral foods, to which they would 
experience different emotions, and were instructed to observe their thoughts as 
transient states of mind which was designed to induce a state of mindfulness. 
Compared to a control condition, participants who were more mindful showed less 
spontaneous approach reactions to attractive foods on an implicit approach bias 
measure. The finding was also found to persist after a 5-minute distraction period 
and when accounting for participants dieting goals. Although this may suggest that 
being mindful reduces automatic approach bias to food stimuli, it is important to 
QRWHWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶OHYHOVRIPLQGIXOQHVVZHUHQRWPHDVXUHG 




Hooper, Davies, Davies and McHugh (2011) used a 9-minute focussed 
breathing exercise to induce mindfulness and found that this was more successful 
than thought suppression in reducing fear of spiders. However, a 13-minute 
induction was not more effective in increasing cognitive reappraisal than thought 
suppression or mind-wandering (Garland et al., 2013). Although, this may be due to 
the measure of cognitive reappraisal which was a dispositional level asking 
participants to rate general reappraisal rather than in relation to a specific outcome as 
above (spider fear). A 10-minute mindful breathing exercise was found to enhance 
positive affect and reduce negative affect immediately after positive and affectively 
mixed film clips (Erisman & Roemer, 2010). A similar 10-minute mindful breathing 
exercise was found to intensify the relationship between disgust and network size in 
a bowel health context, but did not affect the behavioural outcomes or disgust 
scenario decisions of healthy participants (Reynolds, Lin, Zhou, & Consedine, 
2015). Furthermore, research has shown that a 10-minute mindfulness exercise 
LQFUHDVHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWLPHUHODWLYHWRDQDXGLRERRNOLVWHQLQJFRQWURO
group. That is, in a temporal bisection task, mindful participants were more likely to 
classify duration as more similar to a long than a short stimulus (R.S. S. Kramer, 
Weger, & Sharma, 2013).  
Other researchers have used a 5-minute raisin eating task (Heppner et al., 
2008; Hopthrow, Hooper, Mahmood, Meier, & Weger, 2016; Weger et al., 2012) 
which is designed to focus attention on the present moment experience of eating the 
raisin (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Following this task, Weger et al (2012) measured state 
mindfulness using the TMS and found that an increase in state mindfulness reduced 
WKHQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRIVWHUHRW\SHWKUHDWRQIHPDOHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQD
maths test. Similarly to the idea outlined above, that mindfulness is successful in 




reducing aggressive behaviours, the researchers here suggested that these effects 
may be a result of refocusing attention away from the threat, which reduces the drain 
on cognitive resources and thus does not impair performance. However, the process 
by which mindfulness elicits its positive effects has yet to be empirically tested.  
These studies show that the outcomes of brief mindfulness practice are 
mixed, with some producing expected positive results, and others showing 
unexpected differences or a lack of positive change. They also highlight the 
importance of the definition and context chosen for the study of mindfulness and the 
outcomes of practice. Trait mindfulness is viewed as a stable, enduring disposition, 
which in some cases is measured as an individual difference, or is seen to be inherent 
and thus increased through regular practice. On the other hand, there is the view that 
mindfulness can be induced momentarily and is therefore a state of conscious 
awareness that can be manipulated. Despite these differences, research has shown 
that the practice of mindfulness has an array of positive outcomes. It is, however, 
important to continue the investigation of these differences with the aim of 
understanding the process by which mindfulness works, and in turn how it can best 
be utilised in different social situations. A further step in this investigation is the use 
of computer mediated mindfulness practice. 
Online mindfulness practice 
Traditional mindfulness courses have been adapted to meet the needs of 
certain clinical populations (e.g. sufferers of MS who cannot sit for long periods, 
Bogosian, 2014; Hope, n.d.; Fibromyalgia patients who may not be able to leave 
their own homes, Davis & Zautra, 2013), in order to try and meet the needs of as 
many individuals as possible, whilst keeping costs down. This has led to a number of 




courses becoming available online to treat the symptoms of depression, anxiety and 
stress (Beattie et al., 2009; Christensen, Griffiths, Mackinnin, & Brittliffe, 2006; M. 
C. Davis & Zautra, 2013; Kemper & Yun, 2015; Krusche et al., 2012, 2013; 
Proudfoot et al., 2004) or via smartphone applications (Chittaro & Vianello, 2014). 
An online version has also been trialled in the workplace as a means to achieve the 
therapeutic positive outcomes, such as stress reduction, but without requiring 
employees to commit so much time to the course (Aikens et al., 2014).  
Online courses tend to follow a similar format to the traditional face-to-face 
courses and include learning about the principles of mindfulness and meditation, 
reading additional material to supplement practice, and undertaking various forms of 
meditation practice over the period of the course (Boettcher et al., 2014; Krusche et 
al., 2013; Morledge et al., 2013). The outcomes of online courses have been 
compared to the traditional courses and have been found to produce similar positive 
effects. Evaluations of online courses have found that participants who are more 
familiar with computers, more comfortable in their surroundings and prefer therapy 
to be anonymous seem to benefit most from online courses (Beattie et al., 2009; 
Christensen et al., 2006).  
Beattie et al. (2009) surveyed participants of an online CBT course and found 
that participants who accessed the CBT in other settings than their own home (e.g. 
relatives pc, at work, local library) found it harder to engage with due to concerns 
about privacy and being interrupted, but that face-to-IDFHWKHUDS\FDQEHµWRR
LQWHQVH¶DQGVRWKHDQRQ\PLW\RIIHUHGE\RQOLQHWKHUDS\PD\EHXVHIXOCavanagh et 
al. (2013) suggest that this may be of particular relevance to the younger, computer-
literate population. In addition, Chittaro and Vianello (2014) found that the 




smartphone application was perceived to be more pleasant, and less difficult to use 
WKDQWZRRWKHUFRPSDUDEOHWKRXJKWGLVWDQFLQJWDVNVµFORXGLPDJHU\¶DQGµFDUG-
WRVVLQJ¶$OOWKUHHWDVNVZHUHVLPLlar in practice, asking students to record three 
worries they have, and then to either imagine them attached to clouds floating away, 
write them on cards to then throw away or using the app to visually watch the 
thought disappear on a simulated parchment in water. The smartphone app was 
perceived to be enjoyable to use, and thought to be easy due to the ability to 
concretely manipulate the worries (i.e. see them disappear). However this was a one-
off practice, and a within participants design, so participants completed all three of 
the tasks in the 45-minute session.  
Online courses are not without problems though. Although they would seem 
to reduce attrition rates compared to traditional courses, online courses also face high 
attrition. In a two-week online mindfulness course, Cavanagh et al. (2013) reported 
that 50% of their participants completed pre- and post-intervention questionnaires, 
and that only 42.6% of their intervention group completed the whole course and 
post-intervention questionnaire. Shorter courses (5-module open access) experienced 
0.5% completion, and longer courses (12-weeks) were completed by 1% of 
participants, as well as frequency and continuation of online materials declining 
sharply after 12 months (see Eysenbach, 2005 for review). This suggests that the 
length of the course did not greatly affect the rate of completion, but that there may 
be a need to reconsider the time commitment involved in courses. This creates an 
opportunity to test whether single-session online mindfulness practice elicits the 
same beneficial outcomes as longer practices.  





This review of the literature highlights the number of approaches to 
mindfulness that exist within psychology research. Whilst many researchers focus on 
distinguishing between trait (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and state (Bishop et al., 2004) 
mindfulness, others have focused on uncovering the underlying processes that lead 
mindfulness to affect change, and others have focused on different contexts for 
mindfulness ranging from traditional Buddhist meditation (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), to 
social categorisation (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000a). Depending on the approach 
taken, outcomes of mindfulness include reduced reliance on pre-existing social 
categories (Langer & Piper, 1987), decreased stress and anxiety (Bohlmeijer et al., 
2010; Carmody et al., 2009; Khoury et al., 2013), reduced anger (Heppner et al., 
2008; Singh et al., 2003) and increased performance (Shao & Skarlicki, 2009). 
However, many of these investigations have relied on the use of mindfulness 
courses.  
The development of measurement scales to assess state mindfulness (e.g. 
TMS, Lau et al., 2006) means that it is possible to deliver a single-session of 
mindfulness practice and directly test any changes iQLQGLYLGXDOV¶ level of 
mindfulness at that time. In addition, it allows for a more rigorous investigation of 
whether positive outcomes following single-session mindfulness practice can be 
attributed to the practice itself, rather than assuming that practice definitively leads 
to increased mindfulness and therefore affects changes in behaviour (e.g. Johnson et 
al., 2013; Jordan et al., 2014; Weger et al., 2012). Emerging evidence for the use of 
online mindfulness courses suggests that these can be as effective as face-to-face 
courses, but may be more popular for service users who prefer anonymity (Beattie et 




al., 2009) and more practical for patients who are unable to attend face-to-face 
sessions (Bogosian, 2014; M. C. Davis & Zautra, 2013). To date, there is little 
evidence to suggest that these approaches, combined, effectively induce a state of 
mindfulness and then can be applied to social contexts.  
The first three experiments in this thesis are designed to establish a reliable 
method of manipulating state mindfulness in a quick and online single-session. The 
following four experiments apply this practice in social contexts such as attributions 
DQGPDNLQJLQIHUHQFHVDERXWRWKHUV¶EHKDYLRXU and group decision-making. The 
following chapter will review the literature in this area, detailing theoretical areas in 
which mindfulness is expected to change individual and group performance.  




Chapter 2: Social Judgements: Attribution Theory and Decision-Making 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on social judgements, 
specifically focussing on attribution and decision-making. This discussion focusses 
on four key areas: 1) the automatic processes that feed into social judgements, 2) 
attribution errors, specifically the Correspondence Bias (CB) and the Fundamental 
Attribution Error (FAE), 3) correcting attribution errors, considering the role of 
perspective taking and locus of control, and 4) group decision-making. Attribution 
and decision-making form the focus of the review of social judgement literature, 
since there is good reason to believe that mindfulness could impact outcomes in 
these domains. An emerging body of research has begun to consider the applications 
of mindfulness practice outside of clinical populations, but very little, as yet, has 
focussed on social judgements and whether mindfulness could be used as a tool to 
improve social relations. Some research, which shows that mindfulness slows 
automatic and habitual responding (Jordan et al., 2014; Kiken & Shook, 2011; 
Mohan et al., 2011; Papies et al., 2012), suggests that mindfulness could be useful in 
the context of automatic attributions by reducing the automatic response in favour of 
a more deliberative one. Furthermore, there is a limited amount of research that 
shows mindfulness has a positive impact on individual (Hafenbrack et al., 2014; 
Shao & Skarlicki, 2009) and group (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015) decision-making, but 
little is known about the role of the social context in this relationship.  
Social Judgements 
Errors in social judgment have become the focal point of social judgement 
research, likely because misjudgements are often the basis of prejudice and 
discrimination or other detrimental outcomes for human interaction (Funder, 1987). 




Social judgment is how we perceive people, form impressions of others, and think 
about social interactions. For example, people perceive and evaluate others 
according to social categories such as gender or race (M. B. Brewer, 1988). The 
cognitive processes leading to social judgement are mostly automatic and 
XQFRQVFLRXVDQGRIWHQUHVXOWLQµHUURUV¶RIVRFLDOMXGJHPHQWBruner (1957) proposes 
that the process of perception involves other practices, such as inference, 
FDWHJRULVDWLRQMXGJPHQWDQGSUHGLFWLRQ$QLQGLYLGXDOµNQRZV¶WKHZRUOGRQO\LQ
terms of previously formed categories or concepts. In particular, this chapter focuses 
on the reliance on heuristics and the automatic processes of categorisation and 
stereotyping in producing judgemental errors in attribution (correspondence bias and 
fundamental attribution error) and in influencing decision-making.  
Categorisation 
Social schemas are cognitive structures that contain knowledge of the social 
world that individuals have learned though experience and socialisation, and which 
allow individuals to organise experiences to simplify the complexity of the social 
world. Schemas guide what we attend to, remember and infer (Augoustinos & 
Walker, 1995).  Social schemas often consist of information about people or 
situations such as social roles, how to behave in different contexts and expectations 
about the behaviour of others. New information is categorised by similarity to the 
existing knowledge in these schemas, allowing for some level of prediction (of 
behaviour), simplification and control over the social world (McGarty, Mavor, & 
Skorich, 2015). This means that individuals have quickly accessible mental short 
cuts to help organise and make sense of an otherwise overwhelming amount of 
incoming sensory information (Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2008).  




Categorisation is functional in that it allows categorisation of objects (e.g. 
knowing the use of objects) or social roles (e.g. uniforms to indicate members of 
emergency services). In addition, categorisation applies to people, including 
ourselves. That is, our sense of self is derived from how we categorise our own and 
others group membership, and where there are similarities and differences between 
ourselves and others (Banaji, Lemm & Carpenter, 2004; McGarty et al., 2015), and 
categorisation with identities shifts from one situation to another. Categorisation is a 
two-way process, whereby others and outgroups can influence judgements of the 
self, and self-evaluation can influence views of others (M. B. Brewer & Hewstone, 
2004). Self-schemas derive from experience (Markus, 1977), whereas trait 
prototypes, or person schemas (about others) are first categorised and then fit to 
existing schemas (Cantor & Mischel, 1979) which carry affective information to 
DOORZWKHMXGJHPHQWRUHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHµRWKHU¶ (M. B. Brewer & Hewstone, 2004; 
Haddock & Zanna, 1993).  
Categorisation of both objects and social stimuli is centred on prototypical 
objects or members. That is, some stimuli are more representative of the category 
than others, and those that are more prototypical are more easily and quickly 
identified (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Within social categorisation, intergroup dynamics 
affect the use of prototypicality in categorisation in that outgroups are seen as more 
homogeneous than ingroups (Brauer, 2001; Judd & Park, 1988; Messick & Mackie, 
1989; Park & Rothbart, 1982). This means that members of outgroups are seen as 
being very similar to one another and all typical of that group. By contrast, ingroup 
members are viewed as more individual and prototypicality varies more. 
Categorisation therefore provides a reference point, or a quick and easy way to 
decide if another person is friend or foe, how to anticipate their behaviour and 




interact with them, based on group membership. Attribution is also affected by 
perceptions of outgroup homogeneity (Quattrone & Jones, 1980) as well as group 
decision-making, where shared category membership and increased identity lead to 
more cooperative outcomes in negotiation tasks (Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 
1993) and dilemma situations (Dawes, Van De Kragt, & Orbell, 1988; Kramer & 
Brewer, 1984). 
Associations between categories are often so well learned that they are 
automatically activated when encountering members of these groups (Devine, 1989; 
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). Categorisation 
is therefore a relatively effortless process that is thought to be the default way of 
processing information if humans are cognitive misers (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) and to 
avoid cognitive overload from the amount of incoming information (Van Bavel & 
Cunningham, 2008). Individuation, on the other hand, is a more effortful process that 
UHTXLUHVDSHUFHLYHUWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHWDUJHW¶VLQGLYLGXDOOHYHOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
rather than group memberships when making an evaluation of them (McGarty et al., 
2015). On a continuum, categorisation anchors one end as an effortless, automatic 
process, and the other end is anchored by individuation, requiring effortful thought 
and deeper processing. Cognitive load results in reliance on the effortless process of 
categorisation and stereotypes for informing judgment (McGarty et al., 2015). This is 
one area where mindfulness may be particularly helpful - managing cognitive load in 
order to allow for a less automatic evaluation of others (Mrazek et al., 2015; van 
Vugt & Jha, 2011).  
Allport (1979) emphasised the role of categorisation in the development and 
maintenance of stereotypes, where the category enables us to quickly identify a 




related object. Stereotypes are schemas or mental representations that organise 
information about different social groups and its members (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). 
Schemas about people, social roles (role schemas), and objects provide a default 
solution to missing information or ambiguity. This can be problematic, especially in 
the case of stereotypes, which are specific schemas about social categories 
(Augoustinos & Walker, 1995).  
Stereotypes 
Stereotypes place individuals in categories according to some easily 
identifiable, salient characteristic such as gender, race or age; and then attribute to 
them qualities that have become subjectively associated with that group/category (M. 
B. Brewer & Hewstone, 2004; Pettigrew, 1979; Tajfel, 1969). Race, in particular, 
affects categorisation within milliseconds (Ito & Urland, 2003) and is highly salient 
and difficult to suppress (Park & Rothbart, 1982). Attempts to suppress racial bias 
often lead to mental exhaustion (Richeson & Shelton, 2003) and an increased use of 
stereotypes (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994) creating a loop in 
behaviour whereby trying to reduce reliance on heuristics about race, actually 
increases the use of heuristics. 
As well as serving descriptive functions, automatic categorisation and 
stereotypes can become prescriptive and lead to discrimination (for review of how 
categorisation leads to discrimination see Abrams, 2010). For example, people who 
hold strong automatic racial bias are also more likely to engage in discriminatory 
behaviour (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Stereotypes 
associated with a particular group lead to labelling of all members of that group, 
despite individual differences. For example, stereotypes typically associated with 




Black people include being impulsive and disposed to crime and violence (Duncan, 
1976), this influences the judgements of Black individuals, regardless of their 
behaviour. Duncan (1976) showed this through attribution error (reviewed below); 
where it was found that the threshold for labelling an act as violent was lower when 
viewing a Black person than a White person doing the same act.  
Category associations can be enhanced by the fact that schema or stereotype 
consistent behaviour is expected, and therefore is not processed at a deep level, it is 
processed automatically (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). This means that exposure to 
Black criminal or impulsive behaviour (e.g. through news and media) is processed 
shallowly using stereotypes, and individuals are more likely to accept information at 
face value rather than evaluate it more carefully.  
Personnel decision-making is a key area where the ambiguity and uncertainty 
of the situation leads to a heavy reliance on stereotypes and heuristic processing. 
OccupDWLRQDOVWHUHRW\SLQJVSHFLILFDOO\UHIHUVWR³DSUHFRQFHLYHGDWWLWXGHDERXWD
SDUWLFXODURFFXSDWLRQRUSHRSOHHPSOR\HGLQWKDWRFFXSDWLRQ´/LSWRQ2¶&RQQRU
Terry, & Bellamy, 1991, p.129). In this respect, stereotypes about certain groups can 
bias the selection process, and influence the attribution of competence and ability to 
perform in a role (King, Madera, Hebl, Knight, & Mendoza, 2006). Status 
characteristics theory suggests that expectations of others competence are formed 
based on the societal status assigned to that group (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; 
Wagner & Berger, 1993). This means that certain jobs will be more readily 
associated with certain groups, for example, management roles associated with 
White men.  




Race has been of particular interest in research because Black individuals are 
hired at a rate lower than Caucasian individuals (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003).  A 
study in the UK labour market found that CVs sent out to real job advertisements 
were significantly more likely to receive a positive response when the applicant had 
a White sounding name, compared to a name associated with a BME group. This 
effect was found across higher and lower status occupations almost equally (Wood, 
Hales, Purdon, Sejersen, & Hayllar, 2009)$VLPLODUHYDOXDWLRQRI&9¶VFRQGXFWHG
in a laboratory setting in America, showed that White participants evaluated a Black 
applicant negatively, regardless of strong credentials and judged Black applicants as 
most suitable for low status jobs (King et al., 2006). Further research with a similar 
design showed that ambiguous information negatively affected Black candidates 
success, but not White candidates (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1995), suggesting that 
ambiguous information has a detrimental impact for an already stereotyped group. A 
similar association will be tested in this thesis, using race as a group category and 
unemployment as a stereotypical anchor for judgement (Experiment 5 and 6), 
whereby mindfulness would be expected to reduce the reliance on the stereotype.   
Heuristics 
Heuristics can be described as mental shortcuts that people use to assess 
probability in solving complex problems (in decision-making) and making 
judgements. People employ a limited number of heuristics to reduce judgements to 
simpler ones, and they manifest due to relative neglect of possible alternatives 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Tversky and Kahneman (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973a) investigated a number of heuristics including representativeness, availability 




and judgement heuristics, which are discussed below in relation to attributions and 
decision-making.  
The representativeness heuristic refers to judging an event probable to the 
extent that it represents the essential, salient features of the more general category. It 
is a too heavy reliance on predictor variables (e.g. stereotypes of a group or 
individual) and not enough to the average in the population of that group (Ross, 
Greene, & House, 1977). Likely or common occurrences are more easily imagined 
than unlikely ones, and associative connections are strengthened when two events 
often co-occur. For example, both naïve (undergraduates with little knowledge or 
training in probability and statistics) and trained (PhD students with advanced 
knowledge of probability, statistics and decision theory) participants were equally 
likely to evaluate the probability that an individual would have a certain occupation 
by the degree to which they appeared representative of the stereotype of that 
occupation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).   
The availability heuristic is similar to the representativeness heuristic in that 
it refers to judging behaviours that are easily recalled, common or easy to imagine 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973a). For example, RQH¶V own actions may be thought of 
as typical of others, and using the availability heuristic would then lead to unrealistic 
H[SHFWDWLRQVIRUWKHEHKDYLRXURIRWKHUV,ZRXOGQ¶WGRLWVR,H[SHFWPRVWRWKHUV
ZRXOGQ¶WHLWKHU/HSSHU*UHHQH	1Lsbett (1973) found that children overestimated 
the influence of rewards on their decision to play with certain toys, thereby 
underestimating their dispositional interest in the toy. Similarly, Strickland (1958) 
found that participants overestimated the extent to which a watchful supervisor was 




responsible for an HPSOR\HH¶VKRQHVWSHUIRUPDQFHDQG>PLVWDNHQO\@XQGHUHVWLPDWHG
WKHHPSOR\HH¶VGLVSRVLWLRQDOKRQHVW\ 
The representativeness and availability heuristic can lead to an error known 
as the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), in which people tend to 
believe that a conjunction is more probably than its constituents. For example, given 
WKHVWDWHPHQW³(OL]DEHWKEX\VJURFHULHVDWWKHIDUPHUVPDUNHWLQFOXGLQJWRIX
YHJHWDEOHVDQGPHDWOHVVODVDJQH´ZKDWLVPRUHOLNHO\"$(OL]DEHWKLVDZRPHQRU
B) Elizabeth is a women and a vegetarian? With such limited information, it is most 
probable that A is definitely true, Elizabeth is most likely to be the name of a 
woman. It is not possible to say whether B is also true, but the additional information 
given draws us to the conclusion that Elizabeth must be a vegetarian as well, and 
thus that B is probably true. We tend to assume that the additional information is 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHSHUVRQ¶VGLVSRVLWLRQDQGZHFDQHDVLO\MRLQWKHIRRGFKRLFHV
with the notion of being vegetarian. This type of fallacy can also hinder decision-
making, but may be mitigated by decisions made in groups 2¶/HDU\.  
Another similar heuristic is the judgmental heuristic. This is used to evaluate 
the frequency or probability of events by the relative ease with which it comes to 
mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973b). Judgmental heuristics can lead to systematic 
bias since a judgement or decision is made without careful consideration of 
alternative options, but rather by reliance on salient categories and easily accessible 
stereotypes. In this respect it is more aligned with person judgement, but may also 
affect decision-making where there is a solution that appears suitable, and thus 
alternatives are not considered. A particular type of heuristic process that affects 




judgements of others is attribution. This is the automatic process of inferring 
behaviour based on personality or environment (Heider, 1958).  
Attribution Theory 
When we see a person act, we immediately reach conclusions far beyond 
sensory information (Griffin, 1994). Individuals will try to identify causes of 
behaviour that they witness in order to increase their understanding of the behaviour, 
and increase their ability to predict future instances of behaviours; they will then 
expect similar behaviour under similar conditions (Ross, 1977; Shaver, 1975). This 
process, known as attribution, is the drawing of inferences, for example on human 
behaviour to try to simplify incoming stimulus. Heider (1958) defined attribution as 
an effort to predict and control the world by assigning momentary behaviours to 
relatively unchanging/stable dispositions. Attributions are often based on moral 
blame, or whether the individual should have been acting in such a way. This form 
of perception is an act of categorization (Bruner, 1957), often influenced by 
stereotypes and automatic processing. Intergroup behaviour becomes associated with 
a causal locus, which helps individuals to attribute causes and consequences of 
behaviours based on quickly accessible schemas. Judging and categorising occurs 
via the process that requires least effort (heuristics and stereotypes; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2005) and thus may be linked to mindlessness (Langer et al., 1978). 
Shaver (1975) suggested that attribution is a three-step process in which we 
assume that a person is how they behave.  First, we perceive an act or behaviour; 
second, the act is judged as either intentional or unintentional; finally, through 
inferential processing the act is attributed to disposition. For example, if we witness 
a person speeding through traffic we perceive the behaviour and judge whether it 




was intentional, often assuming that the person driving knew the speed limit and was 
aware they were breaking it. We therefore attribute their actions to a disposition for 
carelessness or dangerous driving, rather than the possibility that there may be a 
contextual explanation such as an emergency or external factor causing the person to 
speed. There is a quick jump from a possible external cause of the behaviour, to a 
probable internal causality.  
$SHUVRQ¶VEHKDYLRXUFDQEHSUHGLFWHGLQODUJHSDUWE\NQRZOHGJHRIWKH
social circumstances in which it occurs (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).  When people 
observe behaviour more extreme than the situation leads them to expect, they tend to 
make dispositional attributions. In addition, behaviour that directly affects, or has 
consequences for, the perceiver is more likely to be attributed to dispositions than 
actions that do not personally affect the attributer, and perceivers are more likely to 
attribute negative behaviours to dispositions (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 
1973). This is more pronounced for group attributions.  
Group attribution  
Allison and Messick (1985) found that the attitudes of group members are 
LQIHUUHGEDVHGRQWKHJURXS¶VGHFLVLRQ-making. That is, individuals assume that the 
attitudes of group members primarily influence WKHJURXS¶VGHFLVLRQ-making, 
ignoring the impact of decision-making rules and group norms. A particularly 
important distinction that Allison and Messick (1985) made was that this effect was 
amplified for outgroups compared to ingroups. This highlights the different 
approaches taken to making judgements of situations and actions, depending on the 
target of the judgement.  




The process of separating and categorising human groups is enough to trigger 
the psychological processes that lead to intergroup prejudice (Allport, 1979). 
Therefore, the attributions made to members of outgroups compared to ingroups is 
likely to be motivated by different factors. For example, participants in Northern 
Ireland who were shown news footage of intergroup violence between Catholics and 
Protestants attributed the cause of the violence differently depending on their own 
group membership. Catholics rated Catholic violence towards Protestants as 
situational, but Protestant violence towards Catholics as dispositional. The opposite 
was found for Protestant participants (Hunter, Stringer, & Watson, 1992). Similar 
patterns of results have also been observed in relation to media coverage of violent 
conflicts between other groups (Israeli-Arab; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985), 
evaluations of evidence on capital punishment (Lord et al., 1979) and between 
supporters of football teams (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). Furthermore, attributions are 
generalised from a group member to the whole group when the group is seen as more 
homogenous, as is the case for ingroup members perceptions of outgroups 
(Quattrone & Jones, 1980). 
In addition, race is a particularly pervasive intergroup category that informs 
attributions. Duncan (1976) questioned whether individuals would attach more or 
less weight to dispositions than situational factors when attributing the behaviour of 
Black and WKLWHRWKHUV7KHUHVXOWVVKRZHGWKDWDQDPELJXRXVµVKRYH¶was labelled 
more violent when performed by a Black person than by a White person. Situation 
attributions were preferred when the harm-doer was White, and 
personal/dispositional attributions were used when the harm-doer was Black, 
suggesting that violence was more accessible when thinking about a Black than a 
White perpetrator. More recent research has shown that White participants high in 




implicit prejudice were more prone to categorise a racially ambiguous angry face as 
Black than those low in implicit prejudice (Hutchings & Haddock, 2008). This 
highlights the association between race and a negative emotion, fuelled by implicit 
prejudice.   
In addition, status characteristics of the target affect attributions, and race is 
associated with status. Thibaut and Riecken (1955) found that a high status targets 
choice to comply in an influence task was attributed to dispositions, compared to a 
low status individual whose decision was attributed externally. That is, the high 
status target was considered to comply out of choice, and the low status target was 
considered to have succumbed to force. Race and class status were also found to 
influence attribution.  Howard and Pike (1986) asked students to read transcribed 
interviews about a man who had been arrested for disorderly conduct, and a man 
who was unemployed and unable to obtain work. In both cases the lower status 
target (Black or working class) was attributed with more blame and more negative 
evaluations than the higher status target (White or middle class). Furthermore, race 
was more important to the evaluations in the arrest scenario, and social class was 
more important in the unemployment scenario, suggesting that status may interact 
with the situation to affect attribution. This also supports the findings that race 
categorisations are associated with certain behaviours, in particular crime or violence 
and lower socio-economic class (Berger et al., 1972; Duncan, 1976; King et al., 
2006; Wagner & Berger, 1993), and provides a context in which to examine the use 
of mindfulness to buffer against these automatic associations. 
$VPHQWLRQHGDERYHRQH¶VRZQJURup membership also affects how 
outgroups are viewed. For example, public opinion research after Hurricane Katrina 




revealed that 71% of African-Americans, compared to 32% of White Americans felt 
that the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina highlighted the existence of racial 
inequality. Furthermore, 17% of African-Americans thought that the job market was 
equal, compared to 53% of White Americans (Plaut, 2010). This highlights how 
different perceptions of ingroup vs. outgroup advantage and disadvantage are viewed 
depending on own group membership, which in-turn, can influence attribution 
through assignment of status and category membership. Using such categories, 
heuristics and mental short cuts to attribute behaviour often leads to errors or 
misattributions where there is an incorrect balance made between the extent that the 
SHUVRQ¶VGLVSRVLWLRQRUWKHLUHQYLURQPHQWFDQEHKHOGUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHLU
experiences or behaviours.  
Attribution bias and Misattribution 
In attribution theory, there is a distinction between overestimating and 
ignoring the role of dispositions in explaining behaviour. The Fundamental 
Attribution Error (FAE; Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977) postulates that perceivers tend to 
overestimate dispositional factors, and underestimate the role of the situation in 
controlling or explaining behaviours. In contrast to the FAE, the Correspondence 
%LDV&%UHIHUVWRDWHQGHQF\WRLQIHUDSHUVRQ¶VGLVSRVLWLRQVIURPWKHir behaviour, 
even when the behaviour is entirely constrained by the situation (Gawronski, 2004; 
Gilbert & Malone, 1995). That is, ignoring the role of the situation and assuming that 
the observed behaviour is distinctive of features of the targets enduring personality 
traits. Perceivers tend to draw the same correspondent dispositional inferences 
regardless of whether the observed behaviour is constrained by situational factors or 




not (Gawronski, 2004). Both types of attributional error are investigated in this thesis 
(see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
The correspondence bias is a robust and replicable finding in social 
psychology. Bauman and Skitka (2010) showed that the effect was not unique to 
student samples and was in fact generalisable to the U.S population, across 
demographics. Although, a minority of their sample also exhibited no bias, in fact, 
exhibiting the opposite of the CB and attributing the opposite attitude to essay 
valence. Importantly, this shows that individual differences can affect the prevalence 
of the CB. Gilbert & Malone, (1995) highlighted that the person-situation distinction 
is central to attribution theory. Although the terms FAE and CB are often used 
interchangeably, Ross (1977) suggests that the FAE is the outcome of 
underestimating situational influences whilst overestimating dispositional influences 
and misbalancing the cause of behaviour, rather than ignoring situational factors 
completely. In both cases, the outcome is often a misattribution or an error in 
judgement.  
The FAE and the CB are therefore qualitatively different, and usually 
measured in different ways within research. For example, in this thesis, Chapter 5 
measures the CB using the attitude-attribution paradigm, which asks participants to 
infer a targets attitude based on the content of an essay ostensibly written by the 
target with no choice of topic. This paradigm gives participants the situational 
information required to avoid the CB, and thus assumes that those who make the CB 
have ignored the situational information. In Chapter 6, the FAE is measured by 
asking participants the extent that they believe a target is responsible (dispositional 
attribution) for their position or not (situational factors influenced their position). In 




this respect, participants estimate the degree with which they feel the targets 
circumstances were influenced by situational or dispositional factors, without giving 
concrete information about either factors.  
The attitude-attribution paradigm was developed to test the boundary 
conditions of attribution (Jones & Harris, 1967). Jones and Harris (1967) postulated 
that under conditions of free choice participants who chose a certain view would be 
perceived as more likely to hold that view, and thus attribution of their attitude to 
disposition was expected. However, a consistent finding in attribution research is 
that even when participants are fully aware that the writer had no choice in their 
position, they still tend to attribute their attitude to dispositions, and ignore the 
situational constraints.  
Jones and Harris (1967) investigated this by asking participants to read an 
essay that was either in support of, or opposed to, a topic on which participants were 
H[SHFWHGWRKDYHVWURQJRSLQLRQV&DVWUR¶V&XEDDQG6HJUHJDWLRQLQWKH86,Q
addition, the topics were expected to evoke a prior probability evaluation of the other 
person. That is, participants would expect another person to hold certain views (e.g. 
that an American citizen would be anti-Castro, or that someone from a Southern state 
would be more in favour of segregation than someone from a Northern state- see 
availability heuristics above). Participants were told that the writer of the essay was 
assigned by an authority figure (no choice), or was free to choose their position (free 
choice). The findings consistently showed that whilst participants were aware of the 
choice conditions, there was still a tendency to attribute the attitude of the essay 
writer dispositionally, ignoring the influence of the situational factor of choice.  




The false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977) may, in part, account for this. 
The false consensus effect is that perceivers view their own opinions on a subject as 
relatively common among their peers, and this perception of commonness can 
influence their attributions of others. Ross et al. (1977) asked students on a 
university campus to walk around for half an hour wearing a sandwich board 
HQFRXUDJLQJSHRSOHWR³(DWDW-RH¶V´)RUW\-eight of the 80 participants asked agreed. 
They then asked those participants to estimate the proportion of other people they 
thought was accept or decline the request. The results showed that those who 
declined thought that around two thirds of others would also decline. Likewise, those 
who accepted thought that around two thirds of others would accept. Counter-
normative behaviour also led participants to make stronger dispositional inferences 
about the other. That is, those who agreed to wear the sign made stronger trait 
inferences about another person who declined, and those who declined made 
stronger trait inferences about another person who agreed. This suggests that 
perceivers use their own views on a topic as a measure of the views of others, which 
leads to an assumption about the disposition of the other, even when the targets 
behaviour is constrained (Alicke, Zerbst, & LoSchiavo, 1996). That is, the tendency 
to attribute our own behaviour to situations, but attribute the behaviour of others to 
stable dispositions. Ross et al. (1977) argued that attitude-attribution biases in part, 
PLJKWEHWKHFDXVHRISHUFHLYHUV¶PLVFRQFHSWLRQVDERXWWKHGegree to which their 
own response aligns with the response of peers. Therefore, consensus estimates can 
be used as covariates to assess whether perceivers own opinion influences their 
ratings of the target. 
Another possible factor that influences attribution is the persuasiveness of the 
essay content. Snyder and Jones (1974) investigated whether dispositional inferences 




were artefacts of the essay being standardised and written by the researchers (e.g. 
high persuasiveness). They used a similar methodology to Jones and Harris (1967), 
using assigned or chosen essays on topics such as free medical care (in the US), 
legalisation of marijuana and abortion laws. In order to make the choice conditions 
more salient and to emphasise the role of situational factors, participants completed 
the task of essay writing themselves before reading another participants essay and 
evaluating the writer. Despite experiencing the same conditions of essay assignment, 
participants ZHUHVWLOOPRUHOLNHO\WRDWWULEXWHWKHZULWHU¶VUHDODWWLWXGHWR
dispositions, ignoring the influence of the situation (Snyder & Jones, 1974). This 
confirmed that the attributional bias was not a feature of the essay, but more likely a 
systematic bias. 
It seems logical that participants may have inferred the disposition of the 
essay writer based on the persuasiveness of the essay; assuming that a persuasive 
essay could only have been written by a person with expert knowledge of, or a keen 
interest in, the topic (Gawronski, 2003). Highly persuasive essays have high 
diagnostic value for inferring a corresponding attitude, whereas low persuasive 
essays have low diagnostic value. However, studies using authentic essays showed 
that participants were unable to detect the true attitude of the author (Miller, Ashton, 
& Mishal, 1990), suggesting that perceivers XQGHUHVWLPDWHSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRZULWHD
counter-attitudinal essay, and overestimate the causal influence of assignment 
conditions on the resulting quality of the essay.  
Quattrone (1982) was able to reverse this effect by asking participants to 
judge the strength of situational factors rather than infer the personal attitude of the 
author. Participants were given information about the attitude of the author with an 




opinion questionnaire ostensibly completed by the writer. Even with clear 
information about the attitude of the author, participants attributed free choice essays 
WKDWZHUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHZULWHUV¶DWWLWXGHWRVLWXDWLRQDOIDFWRUVUDWKHUWKDQWKH
personal attitude of the author. In other words, the attribution error diminished. This 
suggests that is it possible to reduce or reverse attribution errors.   
Correcting attribution errors 
There are a number of alternative routes to correcting attribution errors, 
including awareness and cognitive capacity, perspective taking and locus of control.  
Awareness and Cognitive Capacity 
Gilbert and Malone (1995) categorise lack of awareness in two ways, a 
situational constraint and a construal problem. As a situational constraint, lack of 
awareness refers to invisibility of the situational factors. The perceiver is unable to 
see the situation as influential and so does not notice subtle cues in the environment 
that lead to behaviour. As a construal problem, the perceiver does not consider the 
magnitude of the situational factors as the actor does, and cannot see the situation 
IURPWKHDFWRUV¶SRLQWRIYLHZ0RUHRYHUWKHSHUFHLYHUPD\QRWEHDZDUHRIWKH
existence of situational factors (Gawronski, 2004). This is particularly important for 
invisible factors like social roles or psychological constraints (Jones, 1990), and 
those with low salience (Gawronski, 2004). Although perceivers must be aware that 
the situational factor exists, they must also consider the situational factors a 
precondition for the behaviour in order to apply situational theory to the observed 
behaviour. That is, they must consider the situation an important factor in 
influencing the behaviour, or else they will not adjust their judgement. This suggests 
that if participants are aware of constraints, they should be able to correct before 




making a judgement. This thesis postulates that mindfulness would enhance 
awareness of the present situation, thus enhancing the situational constraints and 
LQFUHDVHWKHDELOLW\WRFRQVLGHUWKHVLWXDWLRQIURPWKHWDUJHW¶VSHUVSHFWLYH As well as 
being aware of situational factors, attribution error is more easily corrected when the 
situational information is made salient to the perceiver, and when the perceiver is 
able to focus on the task, without distraction (Trope & Gaunt, 2000). Reduced 
cognitive capacity attenuated the application of situational factors, only when the 
salience of situational factors was low but not when it was high. Weary, Vaughn, 
Stewart, and Edwards (2006) supported the notion that perceivers can correct 
attribution errors when they have the cognitive resources to do so.  They found that 
people with high causal uncertainty had a greater focus on individuating factors, 
relying less on stereotypes in person judgements, only if they had the cognitive 
resources to do so. In one study the researchers found that regardless of causal 
uncertainty scores, participants under cognitive load (carrying out a competing task 
during the experiment) committed the CB, however without cognitive load, only 
those low in causal uncertainty made the CB, whereas higher scorers corrected the 
bias. In a second study, the researchers also manipulated the strength of the 
situational constraint information and found that when situational constraint 
information was weak participants made the CB regardless of their casual 
uncertainty score. However, with strong situational constraint information (a 
compelling alternative to a dispositional cause), only low causal uncertainty scorers 
made the CB.  
Gilbert (1989) suggested that dispositional inference follows a three-step 
process: behavioural categorisation, dispositional characterisation and situational 
correction. In other words, the perceiver categorises the behaviour, decides what 




disposition the behaviour suggests and then infers what situational constraints might 
influence the behaviour. Whilst categorisation and characterisation are thought to be 
automatic processes, situational correction requires effortful thought and evaluation 
of the possible situational alternatives. Therefore, the correspondence bias is more 
likely when a perceiver lacks the cognitive capacity to carry out the third and final 
step in this process. This is supported by findings that suggest those higher in need 
for cognition, that is those who enjoy engaging in effortful thought, are less likely to 
make the CB, but cognitive busyness (through multitasking) increased the CB 
'¶$JRVWLQR	)LQFKHU-kiefer, 1992). The effect of reduced cognitive capacity also 
increases reliance on stereotypes and heuristic processing in order to free up 
cognitive resources to complete the other tasks (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 
1994).  
In addition, research into the effects of mood on cognitive capacity has 
shown that participants assigned a negative mood induction before engaging in an 
attitude-attribution task were less likely to make the CB than participants assigned a 
positive or neutral mood induction (Forgas, 1998). This indicated that the increased 
levels of cognitive processing associated with a negative (versus a positive or 
neutral) mood reduced the CB. This can also impact decision-making, where 
inducing a negative mood in people leads to deeper and more complex processing of 
information, and less reliance on heuristics (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strach, 
1990; Sinclair, 1988). The opposite effect occurs for people induced into a positive 
mood (Isen & Means, 1983).  





&KDQJLQJWKHIRFXVRIDWWHQWLRQRURQH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHtoward or away from 
the self and thereby increasing objective self-awareness can affect attribution. For 
example, perspective taking can increase the salience of situational factors that 
participants are exposed to, increasing the likelihood that they correct for situational 
factors (Storms, 1973). Perspective taking ability is an individual difference variable 
- some people are better able to take another perspective and may even have a 
greater capacity to do so, which is known as dispositional empathy (Davis, 1983), 
but is something that may be enhanced by mindfulness practice (Block-Lerner et al., 
2007). Perspective taking has been shown to de-bias social thought; increasing 
positive evaluations of others, and decreasing use and accessibility of stereotypes 
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). This occurs due to an increase in self-other overlap, 
facilitated by increased perspective taking. Self-other overlap involves changing 
representations of the other (or group) to be more like the self, as well as seeing the 
self as more like the other and increasing the number of features that the self and 
other have in common (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 
2000). Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) found that group based judgements of an 
outgroup (the elderly) by the ingroup (students) improved even when stereotypes 
about the outgroup were unknown. Since accessibility of the stereotypic content is 
reduced, it is less likely to influence perception and judgement, therefore making it a 
useful tool in reducing attribution error.  
A slightly different view of perspective taking is changing the orientation 
through which a situation or target is viewed which may also alter the attribution. 
Duval and Wicklund (1973) found that when engaged in an unrelated task, and under 




conditions of reduced objective self-awareness (less focus on the self), participants 
were less likely to attribute blame to themselves in hypothetical, negative situations. 
Under conditions of heightened objective self-DZDUHQHVVE\ORRNLQJDWRQH¶VRZQ
reflection, participants were more likely to attribute blame to the self, regardless of 
whether the hypothetical situations were positive or negative. This suggests that the 
valence of the situation is not as important a factor in determining the locus of 
DWWULEXWLRQDVWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶IRFXVRIDWWHQWLRQWRZDUGRUDZD\IURPWKHVHOf.  
Similarly, this type of attention re-orientation has been found to affect first 
offer effects in negotiator dyads (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). A negotiator who 
made a first offer benefitted from going first in the outcome, however this anchoring 
HIIHFWZDVDWWHQXDWHGZKHQWKHRSSRQHQW¶VDWWHQWLRQZDVGLUHFWHGWRZDUGVWKHILUVW
negotiators lower bound reservation price, but not when attention was directed to 
WKHLURXWFRPH7KLVKLJKOLJKWHGWKDWZKHQWKHRSSRQHQW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHZDVIRFXVHGRQ
inconsistent information the first negotiator did not always benefit from a greater 
outcome.   
Furthermore, Storms (1973) showed that reorienting participants visual 
perspective so that they viewed themselves, rather than the other participants (the 
original view) on a video of the experiment were more likely to attribute the actors 
behaviour to situational than dispositional factors, compared to no video, or a video 
from their original perspective. This supports the research above by Duval and 
Wicklund (1973) that reorienting self-awareness impacts attribution, and suggests 
that altered perspectives influence attribution of person-situation factors. In a similar 
ZD\DSHUVRQ¶VRZQORFXVRIFRQWUROFDQDIIHFWDWWULEXWLRQ 




Locus of Control 
People with an external locus of control tend to attribute the behaviour of 
others to external factors, and vice versa for internal locus of control (Shaver, 1975). 
That is, those who believe they have little control over actions and believe fate is 
responsible for their situation are more likely to attribute the behaviour and situation 
faced by others to external influences such as fate. Those with an internal locus of 
control believe far more that they are responsible for their own situation and thus 
believe others are for theirs. We generalise from our own circumstances and assume 
that others have similar control over their lives as we do over our own (Shaver, 
/RFXVRIFRQWUROWKHUHIRUHFDQPHDVXUHWKHGLUHFWLRQRIRQH¶VDWWULEXWLRQDO
tendency.  
However, there is a propensity to attribute own success to personal 
disposition whilst attributing own failure to environmental factors, more than 
observers of the behaviour do (Beckmann, 1970; Ross, 1977). ,QµRWKHU¶SHUFHSWLRQ
it is more likely that a target will be held more personally responsible for acts that 
lead to negative outcomes. This means that negative behaviours are attributed to a 
targets disposition, or to internal factors, and positive behaviours are attributed to 
luck, chance or other external causes (Griffin, 1994). This self-serving bias preserves 
self-esteem. However, when a target is a member of the ingroup or someone with 
whom we strongly identify, it is more likely that self-serving attributions will be 
made. For example, Shtudiner, Klein and Kantor (2016) found that just after the 
2015 Israeli national elections participants who identified with the ruling government 
attributed blame for socio-HFRQRPLFSUREOHPVRQH[WHUQDORUµRWKHU¶FDXVHVKRZHYHU




those who did not identify with the ruling party were significantly more likely to 
blame the socio-economic problems on the prime minster and the ruling party.  
The interplay of categorisation and intergroup dynamics is evident in other 
social judgements such as decision-making. In particular, the automatic processes 
detailed above affect group decision-making. Mindfulness is expected to improve 
the social experience of group members in a decision-making group, which would 
lead to an improved outcome on the decision task itself. This forms the focus of the 
remaining discussion of social judgements and provides the basis for Experiment 7 
in this thesis.  
Decision-making 
Group decision-making shares some of the features of social judgements, for 
example, evaluating group members to assess effectiveness may rely on processes 
such as categorisation and attribution, and relying on heuristics to make a decision 
(Azar, 2014; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Messick & Schell, 1992). However, 
there is an important difference. Whereas person judgements are primarily automatic 
processes, outside of conscious awareness, most decision-making is a mainly 
conscious, deliberative and non-automatic process that requires effortful thought. 
The process of making a decision requires a number of stages, including defining the 
problem, weighing alternatives, considering the advantages and disadvantages of a 
course of action and reaching a conclusion (Johnson & Johnson, 2003). Nonetheless, 
automatic processes may still underlie the non-automatic process of decision-
making, especially in group decisions, where group dynamics are also at play.  
Decision-making groups do not have to be true groups, which is often not the 
case in person judgement. This means that the typical features of the group (e.g. 




norms, Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985; social identity and accountability, 
Kramer, Pommerenke & Newton, 1993) are not necessarily present. For example, 
nominal group decision-making uses minimal groups, or a collection of people 
brought together specifically to make a decision. Some researchers believe that 
temporary or ad-hoc decision-making groups do not have time to develop enough 
maturity to function with full effectiveness. Kramer & Brewer (1986) suggest that 
increased group identity facilitates effective decision-making, which arguably 
minimal groups do not have.  
Although, even minimal groups can quickly create a group identity, which 
tends to elicit ingroup bias (rather than outgroup derogation) (M. B. Brewer, 1979). 
Even temporary, or arbitrarily formed groups develop a sense of identity, but this 
creates a feeling of ingroup positivity rather than outgroup negativity which may 
foster cooperative decision-making. This may be due to the need to perceive 
themselves as a group, and the nature of the group relying on interaction and 
achieving a shared goal (Baron & Kerr, 2003). However, this is based on the process 
of categorising and evaluating the other group members, and thus the automatic 
processes detailed above influence this in the minimal group context. Despite this, 
nominal group decision-making has been found effective due to requiring less time 
to set up the group, and reducing pressure to conform because the group has not had 
time to create a sense of identity (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975).  
Psychology research has investigated the difference between individual and 
group performance on decision-making and problem-solving tasks. This has shown 
that groups often outperform individuals, depending on features of the group and the 




ZHUHPRUHVXFFHVVIXOWKDQLQGLYLGXDOVDWVROYLQJµeureka WDVNV¶DSX]]OHZKHUH once 
the correct answer is made apparent, it is immediately clear that it is the solution, 
Lorge et al., 1958). Laughlin, Bonner and Miner (2002) found that groups perform 
better than their best individuals on highly intellective problem-solving tasks, and at 
the level of the best of an equivalent number of individuals on tasks where they are 
given detailed information to help solve the problem (Laughlin, VanderStoep, & 
Hollingshead, 1991).  
In two different types of economic judgement task, Blinder and Morgan 
(2000) found that five person groups did not make slower decisions than individuals, 
but were able to make better quality decisions than individuals. They also found that 
WKHDYHUDJHPHGLDQDQGEHVWJURXSPHPEHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFHGLGQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\
predict the group performance, suggesting that the group performed better than the 
sum of its parts. In different decision-PDNLQJSUREOHPV2¶/HDU\(2011) showed that 
groups were less likely than individuals to make probability fallacies, and 
outperformed individuals on decision-making tasks by pooling the knowledge of the 
members, rather than reaching a consensus. What has concerned researchers more 
recently is why, and under what conditions, groups perform better than individuals 
(for a review see Hill, 1982).  
Features of the group 
One possible explanation is that groups benefit from process gain (Johnson, 
Skon, & Johnson, 1980; Skon, Johnson, & Johnson, 1981) through the ability to pool 
resources, share ideas, insights and strategies and build upon ideas through 
GLVFXVVLRQVXSSRUWHGE\2¶/HDU\+RZHYHUWKLVUHOLHVRQFRPSOLPHQWDU\
member resources. These are the knowledge, ability and skills that each member of 




the group can contribute, which allow groups to process more information than 
individuals, particularly for complex tasks (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). 
Bottger & Yetten (1988) found that groups performed better when they utilised their 
members task knowledge, especially if two or more members held high quality 
knowledge (know the correct solution or insightful information about the problem). 
In the study detailed above 2¶/HDU\ participants all had an advanced 
knowledge of the subject, which would then have meant that the individual groups 
members all had the ability to effectively solve the problem, and this may account 
for the superior performance of the group. In other group situations, the level of 
ability and knowledge of members may vary.  
The mere presence of others can impact individual and group decision-
making differently. In groups, shared identity and cohesion provide higher 
motivation to achieve (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), whereas for individuals the presence 
of others may increase competition, fear of embarrassment and evaluation 
apprehension. This is particularly problematic for complex tasks (Bond & Titus, 
1983). In groups, the presence of similar others encourages motivation gain, 
facilitation through arousal (Zajonc, 1965) and heightens self-consciousness, making 
self-aware group members try harder to project a positive image to other group 
members (Duval & Wicklund, 1973). Groups are thought to moderate arousal 
produced by the presence of others, reducing the negative affects others have on 
individuals, such as reduced competitiveness (because everyone is working towards 
the same goal), reduced evaluation apprehension and less fear of embarrassment. 
Additionally, facilitation should occur in competitive or evaluative situations due to 
stronger association with reward and punishment in the past.  




A significant hindrance to most groups performing optimally is something 
Steiner (1972) WHUPHGµSURFHVVORVV¶7KLVUHIHUVWRDJURXS¶V failure to act in the 
most efficient, or potentially productive, way. Steiner argued that this generally 
occurred due to coordination loss, where the group did not organise their efforts 
optimally, and motivation loss, where members did not work as hard in a group as 
when alone. One example of coordination loss is the sharing of information. 
Decision-making groups are more likely to focus on shared information, and 
overlook novel or unshared information (Stasser et al., 1989). In addition, groups are 
less likely to repeat and recall unshared information (Larson et al., 1998).  Further, if 
one group member does have a solution, or key skills to help the group achieve the 
correct solution, then that group member must share the information, and the group 
must accept that information as useful.  
A problem that occurs in groups is that the group member that has the best 
information is not always heard, or does not feel able to contribute. Low status and a 
lack of confidence in their solution can amplify this problem. Low status group 
members may not feel able to share their ideas, and those who do may not be taken 
seriously (Berger & Zelditch, 1998). A lack of confidence in the answer can lead to 
groups with members who know the correct solution, still making an incorrect 
answer, where the member who knows the solution is unable to convincingly 
persuade the rest of the group. This may be particularly relevant in tasks that fall 
between the purely intellective and judgement based since those with the relevant 
knowledge would be required to not only put forward the correct solution, but also to 
defend it and refute counter-arguments.  This suggests the potential benefit of 
improving the social experience of group members to facilitate effective group 
decision-making, which is the key hypothesis of Experiment 7.  




Nature of the task 
As well as features of the group and the individuals that make up the group, 
WKHWDVNLWVHOIFDQLPSDFWDJURXS¶VDELOLW\WRSURGXFHDQHIIHFWLYHVROXWLRQGHFLVLRQ
Research has suggested that decision tasks lie on a continuum ranging from highly 
cognitive (e.g. math problems) to physical (e.g. moving furniture). Furthermore, 
tasks can be defined as ranging from competitive (e.g. negotiation) to cooperative, 
with collective choice or group decisions falling somewhere in the middle of this 
(Baron & Kerr, 2003). Another distinction that can be made is between intellective 
(tasks with a demonstrably correct answer) and judgement (tasks with no clear 
demonstrable answer) tasks. A task falls somewhere between these anchors 
depending on the demonstrability of correctness of the task solution (Laughlin & 
Ellis, 1986). Task structure can be defined as whether the task can be subdivided 
(divisible) or not (unitary); whether the outcome is maximising, and success is 
measured by how much is achieved versus optimising, where the outcome is a 
function of achieving a correct or optimal solution; and by how the member 
contributions are used (disjunctive, conjunctive, additive or discretionary, Baron & 
Kerr, 2003).  
Survival tasks have been used to investigate a variety of decision-making 
contexts (Bottger & Yetten, 1988; Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015; Haslam et al., 1998; 
Sundstrom, Busby, & Bobrow, 1997), and ask participants to imagine themselves in 
a survival situation with a limited number of resources. Participants are asked to rank 
order the items in order of importance to their survival, and then compare the 
ranking to the order of a survival expert, whereby lower scores are indicative of a 
better decision. This type of task then, has a demonstrably correct solution, but 




requires a judgement of the items use, placing survival tasks somewhere between 
intellective and judgement tasks. They are useful in measuring decision quality, 
EHFDXVHWKHUHLVDµFRUUHFW¶VROXWLRQDJDLQVWZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOVDQGJURXSV¶ solutions 
can be compared, and since a correct answer is the main aim, they can be described 
as optimising. They are cognitive (rather than physical) and require greater 
cooperation within groups than competition between groups. The overall task 
requires the group members to work together to decide the ranking of the items and 
thus means the task is unitary, and additive. Taken together this suggests that a group 
should perform better on survival tasks than individuals by pooling the resources of 
each individual and is thus ideal for testing the hypothesis that improving the social 
experience of the group would lead to better group decisions (Experiment 7).   
Decision-making methods 
Johnson and Johnson (2003) detail ten methods of reaching a decision, the 
most effective of which is consensus. This is where groups arrive at a decision 
through discussion. Discussion happens under conditions that permit 
communications to be sufficiently open, and supportive enough for all members to 
feel able to contribute and have a fair chance of influencing the decision. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, consensus is the most time consuming decision-making method. The 
most commonly used method for group decision-making is vote or majority rule 
(Fujishin, 2008; Johnson & Johnson, 2003). This quite simply relies on the group 
using the decision with the support of most of its members, determined through vote. 
However, this type of decision-making process may split the group and lead to 
either/or, us/them, type thinking, encouraging less rational discussion (Johnson & 
Johnson, 2003). In many decision-making groups, individual ratings can be averaged 




and a compromise made in order to reach a decision. An alternative is the use of 
nominal group decision-making. This requires the group to make an individual 
decision, share the answers with the group, then discuss the possible decisions as a 
group before ranking them to decide which decision the group will make.  
In reaching consensus or group decision, Social Interaction Sequence (SIS) 
views uncertain participants as potential converts, but for those who are certain more 
effort is needed to change their mind (Stasser & Davis, 1981). This may be 
particularly relevant in judgment or survival tasks since those who are more certain 
are not necessarily correct and those who have greater status in the group or 
confidence in their ability may be able to change the mind of a more knowledgeable 
other.  
Summary 
Automatic processes underlie social judgements such as attributions. In fact, 
category membership and intergroup processes can also influence non-automatic 
processes, like decision-making, in certain contexts (e.g. groups). Categories and 
stereotypes provide easily accessible information about people and situations that is 
accepted at face value and is not processed deeply. Using such heuristics to make 
judgements of others or to make decisions often leads to neglecting alternative 
options (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), which in turn leads to errors or 
misattributions.  
Errors in judgement can be reduced through increasing awareness 
(Gawronski, 2004), increasing cognitive capacity (Trope & Gaunt, 2000; Weary et 
al., 2006) altering a perceivers perspective (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and 
understanding perceivers locus of control (Shaver, 1975). Decision-making accuracy 




may be improved by better understanding the features of the group (e.g. group 
members and their relationships) and nature of the task. The focus in this thesis is on 
two particular attribution errors: the Fundamental Attribution Error (Chapter 6) 
(Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977) and the Correspondence Bias (Chapter 5) (Gawronski, 
2004; Gilbert & Malone, 1995) and on decision-making in groups (Chapter 7). 
Chapter 3 draws together the theory discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 to provide a 
framework for the current research presented in this thesis, detailing the aims and 
hypotheses. 




Chapter 3: Framework for the current research 
This chapter explicitly develops and links the aims of the thesis. First, the 
rationale is laid out for the development of a single-session, online mindfulness 
manipulation. A connection is made between the emerging evidence for 
PLQGIXOQHVV¶VDOXWDU\HIIHFWVRQFRJQLWLYHSURFHVVLQJDQGWKHSRWHQWial benefits this 
may have for social judgements in terms of automatic responding. On the basis of 
the analysis of evidence in Chapters 1 and 2, hypotheses are put forward regarding 
the potential usefulness of mindfulness specifically for attributions and decision-
making.  
The experiments presented in this thesis address an important gap in the 
current literature on mindfulness. They are the first to empirically test the 
effectiveness of brief, single-session, online mindfulness, and then apply this in the 
area of social judgement. Although there is research to suggest that mindfulness has 
positive effects with non-clinical populations, very few have directly tested the 
effectiveness of the mindfulness manipulation. Furthermore, the research that has 
applied mindfulness in social contexts has not considered attributions and has not 
used such a brief mindfulness manipulation to affect change. This is important 
because: 1) mindfulness practices can be easily accessed online so anyone is able to 
carry out a mindfulness task, 2) if positive outcomes can be obtained from as little as 
5-minutes of mindfulness there are a number of practical applications of the 
manipulation, and 3) having positive effects in the areas of attribution and group 
decision-making may have positive ramifications for social cohesion and reducing 
negative judgements.  




Single-session, online mindfulness practice 
Despite a body of research focusing on the benefits of mindfulness courses, 
there is a developing interest in single-session mindfulness and whether the same 
benefits can be achieved with only a fraction of the time commitment. Single-session 
practice in research ranges from 5-minutes (Weger et al., 2012) up to (and 
sometimes above) 30-minutes (Johnson et al., 2013). In many of these studies, 
mindfulness is either measured at the end of the study (Hopthrow et al., 2016; Weger 
et al., 2012), or is not measured at all (Frewen, Lundberg, MacKinley, & Wrath, 
2011; Mohan et al., 2011; Mrazek et al., 2013). Therefore, changes in mindfulness 
levels from pre- to post- practice have not yet been assessed. The experiments 
presented in this thesis are the first to empirically investigate whether mindfulness 
increases from pre- to post-mindfulness in a brief, single-session manipulation. 
In a similar way to single-session practice, online mindfulness practice has 
begun to proliferate. The majority of the literature has focused on online courses that 
provide an effective alternative for people who are unable to commit to face-to-face 
courses (e.g. Aikens et al., 2014; Davis & Zautra, 2013). Evaluations of online 
courses suggest that they are more effective for people who seek anonymous 
therapy, and are more familiar with computers (Beattie et al., 2009; Christensen et 
al., 2006). However, such courses still require some level of effort and commitment 
by both participants and clinicians. This, combined with the ease of access to self-
help meditation and mindfulness practice in books (for adults e.g. Chaskalson, 2014; 
Orsillo & Roemer, 2011; Williams & Penman, 2011, and children e.g. Kluge, 2014), 
flashcards (for children e.g. Rudd, Rudd, & Wilson, 2013) and websites or mobile 




phone apps (e.g. Headspace) has increased interest in whether non-practitioner 
guided practice is effective.  
Chittaro and Vianello (2014) compared mindfulness practice via a 
smartphone app with two different types of practice; an imagination practice and a 
physical practice. They found that the smartphone app was rated as more enjoyable 
and easier to use than the other two types of practice. Although, mindfulness was not 
measured in this study, seven questions, taken from the TMS, measured decentering. 
This showed that participants¶ decentering scores were higher after using the app and 
after carrying out an imagination mindfulness task compared to a physical 
mindfulness practice. This suggests that practitioner input may not necessarily be 
essential for participants to practice mindfulness effectively, and adds support to the 
notion that single-session, online practice may be a viable alternative to courses. 
However, participants completed the mindfulness practice in laboratory settings, 
which still leaves the question of whether a brief practice delivered entirely online 
would be as effective.  
A further question that remains unanswered is whether online and single-
session practice can be combined. The research presented in Chapter 4 will directly 
address these questions by delivering a 5-minute mindfulness practice entirely online 
with no other information, no input from a practitioner and no follow-up practice. 
The experiment will also measure state mindfulness just before and immediately 
after the mindfulness practice in order to ascertain whether such a brief, single-
session, online practice effectively increases individuals state mindfulness.  




Mindfulness and automatic responding 
As explained in Chapter 2, many social judgements are underpinned by 
automatic associations. In particular, the categorisation of objects and people to pre-
existing schemas or stereotypes of behaviour is an automatic process that helps 
people to effortlessly make sense of incoming sensory information. Categorisation is 
thought to lie at the opposite end of a continuum from individuation, a more effortful 
process that considers individual level characteristics rather than group membership 
in making judgements (McGarty et al., 2015).  
&DWHJRULVDWLRQDQGLQGLYLGXDWLRQILWZHOOZLWK/DQJHUDQG0ROGRYHDQX¶V
(2000a) definition of mindfulness and mindlessness. That is, mindless behaviour 
characterised by not paying attention to relevant information and ignoring novel 
information that would require more effortful analysis, corresponding to 
categorisation or stereotyping (Langer, 1989). By contrast, mindful behaviour 
includes creation of new categories for structuring perception and enhanced 
awareness of multiple perspectives, akin to individuation.   
Furthermore, mindfulness as a form of present-moment awareness, or 
attention on the here and now, reduces rumination on the past which in turn reduces 
clinical symptoms such as depression and anxiety (Baer, 2003; Brown & Ryan, 
2004; Diaz, 2011). In addition, mindful focus on the present moment has also been 
found to reduce attentional focus on the past and future which also reduces negative 
affect, and in turn reduced susceptibility to the sunk cost bias (Hafenbrack et al., 
2014). In a social context, reduced focus on the past may reduce reliance on 
previously learnt associations and therefore reduce reliance on heuristics, thereby 
reducing judgemental errors.  




In addition, the view of mindfulness as a form of attentional awareness that is 
characterised by moment by moment awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), and 
maintenance of open and non-judgemental consciousness (Brown & Ryan, 2003) 
suggests paying attention to features of the environment that are usually not noticed. 
For example, Kiken and Shook (2011) found that mindfulness significantly predicted 
increased optimism, but not decreased pessimism that indicated a reframing of 
responses in a less habitual way.  This was thought to be the result of mindfulness 
freeing cognitive resources that allowed participants to notice novel information that 
would usually be missed in habitual responding.  
Another process that is thought to moderate the relationship between 
mindfulness and positive outcomes is cognitive capacity and attention. In order to 
carry out the more effortful process of evaluating various aspects of the person-
situation context, individuals need sufficient cognitive resources. Gilbert and Hixon 
(1991) found that cognitive busyness prevented the activation of stereotypes, but 
when a stereotype was already activated, cognitive busyness led to greater reliance 
on that stereotype. This suggests that cognitive load may increase the reliance on 
automatic processes when there is not enough capacity to carry out the more effortful 
process. This effect was also evident in attributions, where multi-tasking participants 
were more prone to making the correspondence bias (Weary et al., 2006).  
In addition, individual differences in need for cognition were found to affect 
judgements of others who were described in terms of warmth and competence 
(Aquino, Haddock, Maio, Wolf, & Alparone, 2016). Individuals with higher need for 
cognition were more positive towards targets described in terms of competence 




compared to warmth. Higher need for cognition also reduces the propensity to make 
the correspondence bias '¶$JRVWLQR	)LQFKHU-kiefer, 1992).  
Mindfulness training has been found to increase working memory capacity, 
which in turn has positive effects on attention and cognitive capacity (Chambers, Lo, 
& Allen, 2008; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Mrazek et al., 2013). To date, a 
limited amount of evidence has considered this impact in a social psychology 
context. Weger et al. (2012) suggest that increased working memory capacity after 
mindfulness practice may be responsible for their findings that showed a decrease in 
GHWULPHQWDOLPSDFWVRIVWHUHRW\SHWKUHDWRQZRPHQ¶VPDth performance, but little 
further research has been undertaken in this area. 
A key hypothesis of this thesis is that mindfulness will have a positive effect 
on evaluations of others by slowing the processes associated with responses to 
categorisation and stereotyping that lead to attribution errors. Well-learned category 
associations are processed automatically and are difficult to suppress, such as for 
race (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Ito & Urland, 2003; Park & Rothbart, 1982). 
Therefore, this thesis will use group membership as a social context in which 
attributions and decisions are made. Chapters 5 and 6 present experiments in which 
mindfulness is applied to attributions as a means to reduce errors in person 
judgement. Specifically, the present research investigates the use of mindfulness to 
alter perceptions of the person-situation interaction in the correspondence bias and 
the fundamental attribution error.  
Mindfulness, groups, and non-automatic processes 
In a similar vein to automatic associations, non-automatic processes such as 
decision-making rely on cognitive capacity and flexibility. Particularly within group 




situations, dividing attention between the group and the task can hinder performance 
by increasing stress and arousal (Baron, Moore, & Sanders, 1978). Shao and 
Skarlicki (2009) suggest that mindfulness attenuates arousal by increasing emotional 
regulation, which they found translated into better individual academic performance 
for women. This could therefore be applied to the arousal produced within group 
decision settings, enhancing the performance of the group.  
Furthermore, mindfulness is thought to enhance empathy and perspective 
taking (Block-Lerner et al., 2007), but has yet to be empirically tested. Increased 
perspective taking reduces attributional errors by increasing focus on the situation 
(Regan & Totten, 1975; Storms, 1973; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003), and 
improved judgements of outgroups (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) by increasing 
self-other overlap (Galinsky et al., 2005). Increasing positive relations within and 
between groups may also enhance group cohesion. Mindfulness has also been found 
to increase group cohesion (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015), and therefore is a viable 
strategy to improve group performance.  
For decision tasks that require creative solutions mindfulness may be 
beneficial in reducing cognitive rigidity. Greenberg, Reiner and Meiran (2012) found 
that experienced meditators showed significantly less cognitive rigidity than naïve 
meditators. The experienced meditators were more able to disengage from their 
habitual responses in order to find novel solutions to problems, which was increased 
among naïve meditators after an 8-week course compared to a control group. This 
suggests that mindfulness practice may increase cognitive flexibility. This may also 
enable individuals to overcome some of the negative outcomes of automatic 
behaviours (e.g. eating behaviour, Jordan, Wang, Donatoni & Meier, 2014). 




Although not the focus of their research, this may have been a mediating 
IDFWRULQ&OHLULJKDQG*UHDQH\¶VILQGLQJVWKDWPLQGIXOQHVVSUDFWLFH
significantly improved group performance on a survival-type decision-making task. 
This type of decision-making task requires both cooperation among group members 
and flexible thinking in order to develop a rank order of item uses in a survival 
situation. The experiment showed that mindful groups were significantly better at 
this task than control groups, and that mindful groups were more cohesive (Cleirigh 
& Greaney, 2015). 
Taken together, research suggests that mindfulness is a potentially useful 
intervention to improve group dynamics and intergroup evaluations, in particular for 
group decision-making where group cohesion and flexible thinking is a requirement 
of superior performance.  Chapter 7 presents an experiment in which participants 
work in groups to complete a survival decision-making task after practicing a 5-
minute mindfulness induction. The expectation is that mindful groups will make 
better decisions than non-mindful groups.  
Conclusions 
The research presented within this thesis links various theoretical aspects of 
previous research on mindfulness and social judgements. Taking mindfulness as a 
form of present moment, non-judgemental awareness, the experiments within this 
thesis are among the first to test whether this type of attentional focus influences the 
person-situation interaction and apply this to group decision-making.  
Previous research on social judgements expresses the importance of attention, 
cognition and empathy in reducing attributional errors '¶$JRVWLQR	)LQFKHU-
kiefer, 1992; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Weary et al., 2006). Mindfulness has been 




shown to increase empathy and cognitive capacity and refocus attention (Chambers 
et al., 2008; Jha et al., 2007; Mrazek et al., 2013; Weger et al., 2012) and the 
research within this thesis combines these two theoretical standpoints to develop this 
area of research.  
This chapter provides a link between the research on mindfulness and that on 
attribution and decision-making. The thesis aims to develop this research further, 
first, by testing the effectiveness of the 5-minute mindfulness task, which has not 
been done before, and then applying this manipulation to attribution errors, and 
group decision-making. Specifically, the aim is to investigate whether the brief 
mindfulness manipulation will reduce the likelihood of attribution errors being made, 
and improve the social experience of group members who are tasked with making a 
decision. The hypotheses have been outlined, and will be tested in each of the 
empirical studies presented within this thesis. The final chapter summarises the 
findings in terms of the central hypotheses and concludes by specifying limitations 
of the present research and suggestions for future research directions.  




Chapter 4: Brief, single-session mindfulness increases state mindfulness 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter reports the initial studies set up to develop a reliable and short 
online method of manipulating state mindfulness. Three experiments1 tested the use 
of a 5-minute, computer-mediated mindfulness manipulation in increasing levels of 
state mindfulness. In Experiment 1, 54 high school students completed the computer-
mediated mindfulness practice in a lab setting and Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS) 
scores were measured before and after the practice. In Experiment 2 (N = 90) and 
Experiment 3 (N = 61), the mindfulness practice was tested with an entirely online 
sample to test the delivery of the 5-minute mindfulness practice via the internet. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, we found a significant increase in TMS scores in the mindful 
condition, but not in the control condition. These findings highlight the impact of a 
brief, mindfulness practice for single-session, computer-mediated use to increase 
mindfulness as a state.  
Brief, single-session mindfulness increases state mindfulness 
Mindfulness intervention techniques traditionally have been delivered by a 
training program of several sessions, often requiring participants to invest a number 
of hours over the span of several weeks (Singh et al., 2003; Tacón et al., 2004). A 
limitation to this method is that people may be unwilling or unable to invest this 
level of time, and indeed mindfulness may be beneficial in situations that arise 
spontaneously as part of everyday life (e.g., encountering a situation that may elicit 
                                                 
1
 These studies are reported in a manuscript accepted for publication. Mahmood, L. 
Hopthrow, T., & Randsley de Moura, G. (2016). A moment of mindfulness: Computer-mediated 
mindfulness practice increases state mindfulness. PLOS ONE 




stereotype threat, Weger, Hooper, Meier, & Hopthrow, 2012). It would be 
impractical to expect, and unlikely to occur, that everyone who could benefit from 
mindfulness would engage in ongoing mindfulness practice. As such, it is important 
to determine whether a short mindfulness task can provide positive benefits for 
participants. Indeed, recent empirical research has shown positive effects of short 5-
minute style mindfulness tasks on behaviour and attitudes (e.g., Friese, Messner, & 
Schaffner, 2012; Heppner et al., 2008; Hopthrow, Hooper, Mahmood, Meier, & 
Weger, 2016; Weger et al., 2012).  
Previous research has largely focused on the efficacy of mindfulness courses 
and their impact on health outcomes (for reviews see: Bishop et al., 2004; 
Bohlmeijer, Prenger, Taal, & Cuijpers, 2010; Carmody, Baer, Lykins, & Olendzki, 
2010; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Khoury et al., 2013; Piet & Hougaard, 2011; Piet, Würtzen, 
& Zachariae, 2012). Evidence suggests that courses in mindfulness have a positive 
impact on outcomes for mental health, over long periods of time (such as stress, 
anxiety, depression, and aggression; Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011;  Krusche, 
Cyhlarova, King, & Williams, 2012; A. Krusche, Cyhlarova, & Williams, 2013; 
Singh et al., 2003; Tacón et al., 2004), but in some cases there is little or no evidence 
for positive effects (see Goyal et al., 2014). Traditionally, mindfulness based stress 
reduction (MBSR) and mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT) courses have 
been run over 8-weekly, one-hour, face-to-face sessions. They often include the use 
of tutorials and additional materials to guide meditators through practice, and are 
overseen by a professional practitioner (Boettcher et al., 2014; Greenberg et al., 
2012; Krusche et al., 2013; Morledge et al., 2013).  




Although often beneficial, these prolonged sessions are not always feasible, 
and to combat this many courses are now accessible online, recognising that it is 
important to make the positive potential benefits of mindfulness interventions 
accessible to a wider audience and to reduce costs (Aikens et al., 2014; Allexandre et 
al., 2012; Boettcher et al., 2014; Glück & Maercker, 2011; Krusche et al., 2012, 
2013; Wolever et al., 2012). Nonetheless, existing online courses still require a time 
commitment and some form of specialist input from therapists or practitioners. This 
type of practice may not be suitable for everyone, and the level of commitment 
required may not suit all situations. Our research takes a novel approach in that we 
are testing the effect of a 5-minute computer mediated mindfulness practice on state 
mindfulness. 
 Mindfulness is defined as enhanced attention and moment-by-moment 
awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), a heightened state of involvement and wakefulness, 
being in the present (Brown & Ryan, 2003), and maintenance of an open and non-
judgmental consciousness. There are two views of mindfulness; one as a stable 
disposition or trait, which can be seen as an enduring aspect of personality and that 
can be maintained or enhanced through practice (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; 
Hanley et al., 2013; S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006). The other view is mindfulness as a 
skill or state. State mindfulness is viewed as purposeful attention. That is, only 
whilst the individual purposefully brings their attention to the practice of 
mindfulness, are they able to step outside of automated perceptual processing and 
focus their attention on minute details of mental activity that would not be noticed 
usually (Bishop et al., 2004). In other words, a mindful state is only maintained 
while attention is intentionally cultivated, and when attention is no longer regulated 
in this way, the mindful state will cease (Bishop et al., 2004). Although separate 




constructs, it is likely that individuals will have a stable level of trait mindfulness 
and altering levels of state mindfulness (e.g. as is for anxiety, anger etc., Spielberger 
& Sydeman, 1994).  
The TMS (Lau et al., 2006) is based on Bishop et aO¶V(2004) two-
component definition of state mindfulness, comprising of self-regulation of attention 
and orientation to experience. The TMS is a measure of DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VOHYHORI
mindfulness at a single point in time (i.e. the current mindful state) rather than as a 
stable individual difference measure or as the ability to evoke a mindful state (Lau et 
al., 2006). This chapter outlines experiments which test whether a short 5-minute 
mindfulness practice is sufficient to increase levels of state mindfulness using the 
TMS measure, which assesses curiosity and decentering (Lau et al., 2006).  
Single-session mindfulness practice has been applied outside of clinical 
settings, and has been shown to reduce the negative effects of stereotype threat on 
ZRPHQ¶VPDWKHPDWLFVSHUIRUPDQFH(Weger et al., 2012), reduce aggressive 
responses to social threat (Heppner et al., 2008), and reduce the likelihood of 
FRPPLWWLQJWKHFRUUHVSRQGHQFHELDVZKHQMXGJLQJRWKHUSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRur 
(Hopthrow et al., 2016). This suggests that mindfulness practice could be beneficial 
in social settings and have applications beyond clinical and health psychology. With 
the proliferation of accessing mindfulness practice online (including via 
smartphones), it is important to understand whether brief mindfulness practice 
increases levels of state mindfulness, and thus whether such salutary effects are the 
result of mindfulness itself.  
Johnson et al. (2013) highlighted the importance of disentangling the effects 
of one-session mindfulness from those of multiple sessions of mindfulness. They 




outlined that brief mindfulness formats, including three to five sessions of 
mindfulness meditation, can have beneficial effects (Mohan et al., 2011; Tanay, 
Lotan, & Bernstein, 2012; Tang et al., 2007; Zeidan, Gordon, Merchant, & 
Goolkasian, 2010),  but that mindfulness has only been measured once all of the 
mindfulness sessions have been completed (Johnson et al., 2013). In addition, studies 
that have used only one session of brief (< 30 minutes) mindfulness practice either 
measure mindfulness at the end of the study (Hopthrow et al., 2016; Weger et al., 
2012), did not measure state mindfulness at all (Frewen et al., 2011; Mohan et al., 
2011; Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2015) or supplemented practice 
with further information about mindfulness practice and the positive outcomes it can 
elicit (Erisman & Roemer, 2010). Methodologically, this means that there is no pre-
practice baseline marker with which to compare any improvements or changes in 
mindfulness.  It is also not possible to attribute any changes in outcome behaviours, 
or measured mindfulness levels, to the practice itself. There is the potential here that 
these positive outcomes are artifacts of the information participants have learned 
about the benefits of mindfulness, or a result of demand characteristics, rather than 
the practice itself. 
 In order to better understand whether changes in behavioural outcomes are 
likely to be the result of mindfulness, research is required to test whether state 
mindfulness is higher after a brief mindfulness practice delivered via computer 
software, in a short time period, without additional information or support. Here, 
three experiments are reported which test the effect on state mindfulness of a 5-
minute mindfulness practice versus a control, in a laboratory environment (Study 1), 
and via online software (Studies 2 & 3). To address the limitations of previous 
research as detailed above, participants are not given any information about 




mindfulness practice or its effects.  State mindfulness is measured before and 
immediately after practice to show any changes in levels of state mindfulness.  
It is expected that those who completed the mindfulness exercise will report a 
greater increase in scores on the TMS compared to those in the control condition, 




Mindfulness Practice. The mindfulness audio file consisted of a 5-minute 
mindfulness body scan, in which participants were asked to use their breath as an 
anchor to help focus on the present moment (adapted from Mindful, 2012). 
Participants were guided through focusing on the sensations in their body 
sequentLDOO\IURPIRRWWRKHDG)RUH[DPSOH³VKLIWLQJDWWHQWLRQXSIURPWKHUHQRZ
LQWRWKHWRUVREHLQJDZDUHRIWKHEDFNUHJLRQWKHFKHVWWKHDEGRPHQ´ (see 
Appendix B). Similar body scan mindfulness techniques have been used in previous 
research as part of a six to eight week mindfulness course (Aikens et al., 2014; 
Boettcher et al., 2014; Greenberg et al., 2012; Kiken et al., 2015; Morledge et al., 
2013) and in one off laboratory sessions (Cropley, Ussher, & Charitou, 2007; Jordan 
et al., 2014; Kramer et al., 2013; Ostafin & Kassman, 2012). The body scan practices 
used in previous research have typically ranged in length from 10 to 45 minutes.  
Here, a 5-minute version was developed for two reasons. First, we were 
interested in whether as little as 5-minutes of mindfulness practice has any effect on 
levels of state mindfulness. Second, we were interested in developing a practice that 




could be applied as practically as possible to everyday settings such as the classroom 
or workplace, where pausing to practice mindfulness for longer periods may not be 
feasible. The audio was purposefully developed excluding any mention of 
mindfulness. This was to try and avoid any demand characteristics in participants 
who may have some knowledge of the beneficial effects of mindfulness practice.  
In the control condition, participants were asked to take a few deep breaths 
and await further instructions, there was then a 4-minute silence before these 
instructions were repeated and participants were able to continue the questionnaire 
(see Appendix B). This control condition was chosen since it allowed us to control 
the length of the audio files that participants were listening to, and keep the timing as 
similar as possible for all participants. Although Wilson et al. (2014) suggest that 
individuals do not like to be left with their own thoughts, even for short periods of 
time, the authors do also point out that those who were left with nothing to do 
reported a far greater amount of mind-wandering, which may also be inversely 
related to mindfulness (Mrazek et al., 2012). In addition, Hopthrow et al. (2016) 
compared a 5-minute mindfulness practice to the same type of control condition. 
Other research has utilised listening to audio book excerpts as a control condition 
(Cropley et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2013; Kramer et al., 2013), but these are for 
longer periods of time than 5-minutes. We were also particularly interested in 
practical applications of the brief mindfulness practice, and so attempted to use a 
FRQWUROFRQGLWLRQWKDWZRXOGEHFRPSDUDEOHWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶GDLO\H[SHULHQFH- for 
example, being at work and losing focus on the present task for a short period may 
involve doing nothing, but not necessarily listening to an audio book.  




To ensure that all participants experienced as similar conditions as possible, 
the questionnaire software was programmed so that the audio files played for the full 
five minutes and participants were not able to move away from this page until the 
audio was finished. In addition, the audio files for both the mindfulness and control 
conditions in all studies were recorded using the same male voice to ensure 
consistency.  
State Mindfulness Measure. The TMS scale (Lau et al., 2006) was 
presented before and after the mindfulness (vs. control) exercise (see Appendix A). 
All items were randomised to try and reduce the likelihood that participants 
recognised the questionnaire and responded based on their previous answers. All 
items were measured on a 5-point scale (1= not at all, 5= very much), with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of state mindfulness.  
Participants and Design 
An opportunity sample of fifty-four2 students (51 females, two males, and 
one undisclosed, Mage = 17, ranging from 16 to 18 years) from a local high school, 
attending an introductory psychology visit day at the University of Kent, took part in 
the study. Participation was voluntary, and no incentives were given as the students 
were attending demonstrations and lectures as part of the visit.  The TMS was 
measured before and immediately after the mindfulness (vs. control) exercise. 
Participants were allocated randomly to either the mindfulness (N= 27) or control 
(N= 27) conditions, allocation was double blind so neither the participant nor the 
experimenters were aware which condition any participant was in.  
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 The sample size was pre-determined by the number of students attending the open day who 
gave consent to take part. 





Participants were gathered in large computer room and each seated at a 
computer station with headphones. Participants, were seated next to one another with 
no dividers between the computer stations. Participants were told that they would be 
asked to listen to audio files that might contain some pauses of varying lengths, but 
that the survey software was programmed to move to the next page when the audio 
had finished, so participants would be required to keep their headphones on for the 
duration of the study. This also ensured that participants were unaware of the length 
of audio, and both participants and researchers were blind as to who was in which 
condition.  
A brief introduction to the session was given by the researchers, outlining 
what the participants could expect in the study and relevant ethical considerations.  
Once logged into the survey software, participants first received a written 
information sheet and were asked to indicate their consent. The TMS was then 
presented, followed by either the mindfulness or control audio file. After the 5-
minute audio, participants were presented with the TMS again. Participants were 
then given a written debrief and thanked before having the opportunity to ask the 
researchers any questions about the study or methodology. 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics for the TMS at time 1 and time 2 are presented in Table 
1. A 2 (Condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (Time: time 1, time 2) mixed 
ANOVA was run with Time entered as within-participants. There were 27 
participants in each condition.  




Table 1.  
T1 and T2 Mean (SD) scores for the TMS by condition 
 
T1 TMS T2  TMS 
Mindful 2.67 (0.69) 2.87 (0.66) 
Control 2.73 (0.56) 2.67 (0.78) 
 
There were no significant main effects of Condition, F (1, 52) = 0.18, p = .68, 
Ș2<.01, or Time, F (1, 52) = 0.60, p = .44, Ș2=.01. The interaction of Condition x 
Time was non-significant, F (1, 52) = 2.17, p = .15, Ș2=.04.  
Although differences were expected, there were some limitations in 
Experiment 1 which may have impacted the results. Firstly, the full TMS scale was 
completed by participants before and immediately after the mindfulness (vs. control) 
audio files. Therefore, it is possible that participants remembered questions and 
responses at T2 and answered in line with their T1 responses. In addition, the sample 
comprised of students seated in an open-plan space where there was the opportunity 
to distract each other, or for enhanced evaluation apprehension where peers could 
see whether participants had followed instructions, for example to keep their eyes 
closed. The results may have been weakened by extraneous methodological factors.  
Experiment 2 addresses these issues by allowing participants to complete the 
survey in their own choice of surroundings, and by separating the TMS into two 
subscales and counterbalancing the order in which they were completed.  






Participants and Design 
Ninety paUWLFLSDQWVUHFUXLWHGIURP$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN07XUNZKR
were residents of the U.S.A, took part in the study in return for a small monetary 
payment3. This is a suitable recruitment platform as it provides a wider age range 
than student samples (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011). The survey 
software allocated participants randomly to either a mindfulness (N= 51) or control 
condition (N=39) and also randomly to complete either the decentering TMS 
subscale first, followed by the curiosity TMS subscale (N= 35), or the curiosity 
subscale first, followed by the decentering subscale (N= 55).  
Materials and Procedure 
Experiment 2 used the same materials as in Experiment 1, and the procedure 
differed in only two ways. First, Experiment 2 was delivered entirely online, 
meaning that participants were able to log in and complete the survey at any time 
and in any location with internet access. Second, the TMS subscales were separated 
and one was presented before the audio file, and the other after (presentation order 
was counterbalanced), meaning that participants only saw each subscale of the TMS 
at each time point. This was done to ensure that the questions in the TMS subscales 
were not in themselves weakening the effects of the intervention. Separating the 
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 Due to an oversight, participant age was not recorded for Experiment 2, however owing to 
the restrictions in signing up to MTurk, it is assumed that all participants are aged 18 years or older. 




TMS subscales provided a mechanism to reduce the chances that the wording of the 
questions was influencing state mindfulness.   
Results and Discussion 
A 2 (Condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (Presentation Order: decentered 
pre-audio vs. curiosity pre-audio) x 2 (TMS subscale: decentering vs. curiosity) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted, with TMS subscale as a within-participants factor. 
There was no main effect of Presentation Order, F(1, 86)= 0.37, p = .54, Ș2< 
.01. There was no main effect of TMS subscale, F(1, 86)= 3.03, p = .09 Ș2=.03. 
There was a significant main effect of Condition, F(1,86)= 9.85, p =  .002Ș2= .10, 
whereby overall TMS scores from the mindful condition (M = 3.17, SD= 1.10) were 
significantly higher than those in the control condition (M = 2.61, SD= 1.06). None 
of the two way interactions were significant, condition x presentation order: F(1, 
86)= 0.28, p = .60, Ș2< .01; TMS subscale x condition: F(1, 86)= 0.88, p  Ș2< 
.01; TMS subscale x presentation order: F(1, 86)= 2.42, p  Ș2= .03. There was a  
significant three way interaction of Condition x Presentation Order x TMS subscale, 
F(1,86)= 4.49, p =  .04Ș2= .05. 
Table 2.  










Mindful 2.81 (1.12) 3.12 (1.20) 3.23 (0.74) 3.52 (0.86) 
Control 2.49 (0.75) 2.79 (1.01) 2.63 (0.79) 2.52 (1.12) 
Simple Effects Analysis 
Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustments showed that participants 
who completed the decentering subscale first, scored significantly higher on the 




curiosity subscale post-audio in the mindful condition (M= 3.52, SD= 0.86) than the 
control condition (M= 2.52, SD= 1.12), F(1, 86)= 8.21, p = .01, Ș2= .09. This was 
also true for those who completed the curiosity subscale first, although the effect was 
slightly weaker, with scores on the decentering subscale post-audio were 
significantly higher in the mindful condition (M= 3.23, SD= 0.74) than in the control 
condition (M= 2.63, SD= 0.79), F(1, 86)= 6.69,  p = .01, Ș2= .07. Table 2 and Figure 
1 show that the mindfulness condition did increase levels of state mindfulness 
compared to the control. 
Fig 1. The effect of mindfulness condition on decentering and curiosity as a 
function of presentation order. 
 
 
There were no significant differences across either the mindfulness or control 
conditions in mean scores of decentering and curiosity between the groups who 
completed the decentering subscale first and those who completed the curiosity 
subscales first (all p¶s > .09). This shows that there were no significant differences in 
mean levels of the two subscales between participants at pre-or post-audio, and 
across both mindfulness and control conditions. This suggests that the results from 

























Taken together, this supports the hypothesis that state mindfulness would be 
significantly increased after the brief mindfulness practice, but would not after no 
practice, and suggests that delivery of the mindfulness practice via the internet would 
be feasible. The finding that the two subscales did not differ between participants 
suggests that when combined, the online sample showed an increase in both curiosity 
and decentering. However, the separation of the two TMS subscales means that it is 
not possible to see the differences in scores between pre- and post-intervention in the 
online sample. With this in mind, Experiment 3 extends these findings by asking 
participants to complete the full TMS scale before, and immediately after, the 
condition but unlike Experiment 1 using the online methodology.  
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Sixty-one participants (37 male and 24 female, Mage = 33.56, ranging from 18 
to 70 years) were recruited via MTurk. Participants were residents of the U.S.A and 
received a small monetary incentive for participation. The study was a 2 (Condition: 
mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (Time: 1, 2) mixed factor design, with Time as a within-
participants factor. There were 28 participants in the control condition and 27 in the 
mindfulness condition. 
Materials and Procedure 
The same materials were used as in Experiments 1 and 2. The whole TMS 
was presented to participants before and immediately after the audio (as in 
Experiment 1) and the survey was delivered entirely online (as in Experiment 2).  




Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics for the TMS at time 1 and time 2 are presented in Table 
3. Data was analysed with a 2 (Condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (Time: time 
1, time 2) mixed ANOVA, with the Time as a within-participants factor.  
Table 3.   
T1 and T2 Mean (SD) scores for TMS by condition 
 
TMS TMS 
  T1 T2 
Mindful 3.17 (0.91) 3.49 (0.82) 
Control 2.81 (0.86) 2.71 (0.96) 
 
There was a significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 59)= 7.33, p = Ș2= 
.11, showing that those in the mindful condition scored significantly higher on state 
mindfulness (M= 3.33, SD= 0.82) than those in the control condition (M= 2.76, SD= 
0.96). The main effect of Time was non-significant, F(1, 59)= 1.78, p  Ș2= .03. 
The interaction of Condition x Time was significant, F(1, 59)= 5.56, p = .02Ș2= .09. 
Simple Effects Analysis 
The simple effects (using Bonferroni adjustments) of the interaction between 
condition and time show that, in the control condition, there were no significant 
differences in the state mindfulness scores at T1 compared to T2, F(1, 59)= 0.55, p = 
.46Ș2= .01. As expected, for participants in the mindfulness condition, the reported 
state mindfulness was significantly higher at T2 than at T1, F(1, 59) = 6.49, p = .01, 
Ș2= .10.    
Importantly, there were no significant differences in TMS scores at T1 
between the mindfulness and control conditions, F(1, 59)= 2.50, p  Ș2= .04. 
The scores at T2 did differ between the mindfulness and control conditions, F(1, 




59)= 11.51, p = .00Ș2= .16. This showed that at T2 those in the mindful condition 
scored significantly higher on state mindfulness as measured by TMS (M= 3.49, SD= 
0.82) than those in the control condition (M= 2.71, SD= 0.96). 
The results from Experiment 3 extend those of Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2, showing that as little as five minutes of computer-mediated mindfulness practice 
elicits an increase in state mindfulness.  
General Discussion 
The current research suggests that 5-minutes of mindfulness practice is 
enough to elicit increases in state mindfulness, when delivered online. To our 
knowledge this is the first study to empirically test the use of a 5-minute mindfulness 
exercise in terms of changes to state mindfulness levels pre- and post-practice, and to 
investigate this in the context of delivering the practice online, with no other 
information or specialist input. A 5-minute mindfulness task has been used in 
previous research in the laboratory (Heppner et al., 2008; Hopthrow et al., 2016; 
Weger et al., 2012), however this utilised a mindful raisin eating practice. Since the 
purpose of this research was to empirically assess the use of computer-mediated 
practice, it was not possible to use the mindful raisin eating practice, and so a body 
scan was adapted for use as a 5-minute practice.  
Previous research has shown that brief mindfulness practices have been used 
without measuring levels of mindfulness (Frewen et al., 2011; Friese et al., 2012; 
Mohan et al., 2011; Mrazek et al., 2015) or with the use of additional materials 
(Erisman & Roemer, 2010), thus assuming that practice leads to increased 
mindfulness. However, none have looked at changes to levels of mindfulness after 




the use of a brief practice and whether as little as 5-minutes would be enough to 
elicit these changes.  
 Experiment 1 did not show an impact of the brief mindfulness intervention 
in the laboratory setting, although the trend was in the right direction. The findings 
from Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that this is likely to be due to the experimental 
conditions, the nature of the mindfulness condition being delivered in a group 
laboratory setting.  
When the 5-minute mindfulness practice was delivered via the internet, 
Experiment 2 showed that there were differences in state mindfulness between a 
mindfulness and control condition. On refining the paradigm, Experiment 3 showed 
that computer-mediated mindfulness practice elicited an increase in TMS scores. 
This provides evidence that the use of a brief mindfulness practice with a non-
clinical sample, and without any specialist input is effective in increasing levels of 
state mindfulness. Although a number of mindfulness practices exist that are readily 
available to the general population through smartphone apps and websites, this is the 
first study to examine whether such practices are effectively increasing state 
mindfulness.  
The findings from the present research suggests that allowing participants to 
carry out interventions in their own surroundings, with greater anonymity,  may be 
the cause of increases in the effectiveness of interventions (Beattie et al., 2009; 
Christensen et al., 2006) and that this is true even when the practice is very brief, and 
the participants are not using the practice to alleviate clinical sympotms.  Taken 
together the studies presented in this research show that 5-minutes of mindfulness 




practcie effectively increase levels of state mindfulness, and that delivering practice 
online so that participants can practice in their own time/surroundings is effective.  
Further behavioural measures were not included in the present research since 
previous research has suggested brief mindfulness practice has beneficial effects in 
social domains such as stereotype threat, social rejection, and judging others 
behaviour (Heppner et al., 2008; Weger et al., 2012). However, this is the first 
empirical investigation of whether mindfulness practice itself is increasing state 
mindfulness, something that previous research has assumed. However, the present 
findings suggest that 5-minute mindfulness practices, delivered online could be 
applied to different research questions, and practical contexts, and also have a 
positive impact on the number of individuals who can access mindfulness practice, 
ZLWKRXWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUFRVWO\H[SHUWWUDLQLQJDQGUHOLDQFHRQLQGLYLGXDOV¶
motivation to commit to long courses. 
The studies presented are not without limitations. Participants in the online 
samples were not asked about their chosen surroundings and were assumed to be 
alone at the time of practicing the mindfulness exercise. In the context for which it is 
thought that a breif, computer-mediated mindfulness practice would be beneficial 
(such as organisations or classrooms), background noise and some slight disctrations 
in the environment are likely to be unaviodable, and may in fact increase the strength 
of these findings. However, future studies could ask participants the extent to which 
they were focused on the task or perhaps use mouse tracking to see whether 
participants are clicking elsewhere, perhaps viewing other webpages during the 
audio. In particualr this could shed light on what participants are doing in the control 
condition, where they are left in silence for the duration of the 5-minute audio file. 




Alternative control conditions may also provide greater insight into the process by 
which mindfulness is having an effect.  
The Mindfulness Attitudes Scale (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015) has also been 
used to control for participants openness to mindfulness practice, which indicates the 
level to which participants were willing to engage in the practice. However this relies 
on participants understanding what mindfulness is, which may be particualrly varied 
depending on the cotext in which mindfulness is applied (Singh et al., 2008). In 
addition, the present research relied on self-reported levels of state mindfulness, 
which may also have bHHQLQIOXHQFHGE\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶OHYHORIXQGHUVWDQGLQJRU
contextual knowledge of mindfulness and meditation. Although Experiment 2 
separated the TMS subscales to ensure participants levels of state mindfulness were 
not being impacted by memory of questionnaire items, future research should 
consider more innovative ways to measure mindfulness and also consider previous 
mindfulness experience.   
Furthermore, splitting the TMS into its subscales may, in itself, have been 
problematic. Decentering and curiosity, as facets of mindfulness, could be measuring 
different features of mindful attention and thus are both dependent variables. 
Therefore presenting one subscale before and one after the mindfulness manipulation 
may not have shown a true reflection of the increase in minfulness levels. A better 
approach may be to ranomly split the TMS scale so as to keep a mixture of 
decentering and curiosity questions in both pre- and post- measures. This would also 
buffer any learning/memory effects because participants would not see the same 
questions at both time points.  




Age is another factor to consider since Cavanagh et al. (2013) point out that 
the privacy and anonymity of online practice is particulalry appealing to younger 
individuals. This is pertinent to the sample in Study 1, since anonymity was reduced 
by the fact that although the practice was individual, they were still sat in a large 
open room amongst peers. Participants in Experiments 2 and 3 were generally older 
than those in Experiment 1, so future research could consider the use of the online 
mindfulness practice with a younger sample. However, age was not a key factor in 
the current research and despite the possible limitations of the younger sample, the 
findings support the notion that a 5-minute, computer-mediated mindfulness 
H[HUFLVHZLWKQRSUDFWLWLRQHULQSXWLQFUHDVHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VWDWHPLQGIXOQHVV 
In conclusion, the current research addresses an important gap in the current 
literature on mindfulness. That is, empirically measuring changes to state 
mindfulness and testing the effectiveness of a brief mindfulness practice. The studies 
presented show that as little as 5-minutes of mindfulness is enough to elicit increased 
state mindfulness. In addition, in the context of computer-mediated practice, the 5-
minute mindfulness practice can be delivered effectively with no specialist input, and 
is effective when delivered online where the participant is able to choose their own 
surroundings to carry out the practice. This has implications for being able to apply 
PLQGIXOQHVVLQWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶GDLO\OLYHV$-minute practice can be used alone to 
increase state mindfulness, without the additional time and resources that 
mindfulness courses require. The next step is to investigate whether this brief 
practice has positive behavioural outcomes, in the same way that mindfulness 
courses can have.  




Chapter 5: Mindfulness and the Correspondence Bias 
Chapter Summary 
In Chapter 4, three experiments showed that as little as 5-minutes of 
mindfulness practice, delivered online, can increase levels of state mindfulness. This 
chapter presents one experiment that aims to address three key limitations identified 
in the previous studies. Namely, using a mindful eating task to test whether the 
effects in Experiments 1-3 were unique to the body scan practice, comparing the 
mindfulness and control conditions to an attention to detail condition to investigate 
whether mindfulness is merely increasing attention, and including an attitude-
attribution task to investigate the effect of mindfulness on the correspondence bias as 
an outcome measure. The results of Experiment 44 showed that the mindful eating 
task did increase participants¶ levels of state mindfulness, and that mindfulness had a 
unique attenuating effect on the correspondence bias that was not found in the 
attention to detail or control conditions.  
Mindfulness and the Correspondence Bias 
The correspondence bias (CB) is the tendency to make correspondent 
GLVSRVLWLRQDOLQIHUHQFHVDERXWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRXUHYHQZKHQWKHEHhaviour is 
highly, if not completely, constrained by situational factors (Gawronski, 2004; 
Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In trying to increase our understanding of the behaviour of 
others, and increase the ability to predict future instances of behaviours, we are often 
forced to infer intangible aspects of individuals, such as beliefs, intentions and 
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desires, from visible aspects of their person (e.g. language or actions) (Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995). However, this is prone to perceptual mistakes. Especially since the 
least cognitively demanding way to infer behaviour is to rely on pre-existing 
schemas and automatic associations. This means that individuals have quickly 
accessible mental short cuts to help organise and make sense of an otherwise 
overwhelming amount of incoming sensory information (Van Bavel & Cunningham, 
2008), but do not give effortful thought and attention to the details of the wider 
context of the others behaviour.  
When observing the behaviour of others, it is often concluded that the person 
who performed the behaviour is predisposed to do so. In other words, the person is 
how they behave. Therefore, encountering a person who drives fast, passing through 
a red light, we may think that s/he is reckless and ignorant of other road users, rather 
than rushing to get to hospital in an emergency situation. Although this occurs in 
ambiguous situations, it is also prevalent in situations when logical analysis of the 
situation would suggest the behaviour is not dispositional (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) 
and is constrained by the situation (Jones & Harris, 1967). Gawronski (2004) argues 
that situational factors have low salience, particularly for invisible factors such as 
social roles or psychological elements, and thus perceivers may not be aware of the 
magnitude of the impact they have on behaviour. Logically then, when aware of 
situational factors, perceivers should correct attributional biases before making 
person judgements. The fact is that perceivers do not. The correspondence bias is a 
replicable and pervasive finding in social psychology, and has been found to 
generalise to the U.S. population (Bauman & Skitka, 2010).  




Using the attitude-attribution paradigm, Jones and Harris (1967) showed a 
consistent finding of dispositional causal inference, even when the situational factors 
were made salient to participants, and when they acknowledged them. The 
experiments required participants to read an essay either in support of, or opposed to, 
DWRSLFRQZKLFKSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHH[SHFWHGWRKDYHVWURQJRSLQLRQV&DVWUR¶V&XED
and Segregation in the US), and for which participants would expect another person 
to hold certain views (e.g. that an American citizen would be anti-Castro, or that 
someone from a Southern state would be more in favour of segregation than 
someone from a Northern state). Participants were told that the writer of the essay 
was either assigned by an authority figure, or was free to choose their position. The 
findings consistently showed that whilst participants were aware of the choice 
conditions and held expectations of the essay writer, there was still a tendency to 
attribute the attitude of the essay writer dispositionally, ignoring the influence of 
situational factors (Jones & Harris, 1967).  
Furthermore, Snyder and Jones (1974) investigated whether such effects were 
artefacts of the essay having been written by the researchers (e.g. high 
persuasiveness). Yet, even when participants wrote essays themselves, assigned by 
the researcher, and then subsequently evaluated essays written by another 
participant, (i.e. they followed the instructions themselves first, and then evaluated 
another person who had done the same task, increasing the salience of the situational 
information) the correspondence bias remained. It was expected that under 
conditions of free choice participants who chose a certain view would be more likely 
to hold that view, and thus attribution of their attitude to disposition is expected. 
However, a consistent finding in attribution research, is that even when participants 




are fully aware that the writer had no choice in their position, they still tend to 
attribute their attitude to dispositions, and ignore the situational constraints.  
A possible reason for this is the false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977). 
This theory postulates that perceivers view their own opinions on a subject as 
relatively common among their peers, and this perception of commonness can 
influence their attributions of others. This would suggest that perceivers use their 
own views on a topic as a measure of the views of others, which suggests a 
disposition in the other, compared to a situational influence in the self. That is, the 
tendency to attribute our own behaviour to situations, but attribute the behaviour of 
others to stable dispositions. Ross et al. (1977) argued that attitude-attribution biases 
PD\LQSDUWEHWKHFDXVHRISHUFHLYHUV¶PLVFRQFHSWLRQVDERXWWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFK
their own response aligns with the response of peers. Therefore consensus estimates 
can be used as covariates to assess whether perceivers own opinion influences their 
ratings of the target.  
Alternative factors that may influence the correspondence bias include 
perspective taking, and orientation of attention. Perspective taking is defined as 
DGRSWLQJDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VYLHZSRLQW(Davis, 1983; Parker, Axtell, Academy, Dec, & 
Parker, 2001). Instructions to take the perspective of another, or perspective taking 
training have been shown to reduce the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE), 
another form of attribution bias (Galper, 1976; Hooper, Erdogan, Keen, Lawton, & 
Mchugh, 2015b). This is thought to be the result of perspective taking increasing 
empathy for the other (Regan & Totten, 1975) and increasing self-other overlap, so 
that the views of the target are seen as clRVHUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIRQH¶VRZQWKRXJKWV
feelings or behaviours (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Thus, in line with the 




false consensus effect, perceivers would be expected to make more situational 
inferences with increased perspective taking.  Perspective taking is thought to 
increase the salience of situational factors, increasing the likelihood that participants 
will correct for situational factors, and thus reduce the correspondence bias (Storms, 
1973). Additionally, mindfulness is closely linked with empathy, in particular the 
ability to see another perspective (Block-Lerner et al., 2007), so increased 
mindfulness could have the potential to more easily take another perspective, and in 
turn reduce attribution error.  
Attention may alter the occurrence of the correspondence bias. In particular, 
three cognitive networks of attention; alerting, orienting, and conflict monitoring 
(Posner & Petersen, 1989) have been shown to vary with mindfulness experience 
and/or practice (Jha et al., 2007). For example, experienced meditators show 
enhanced conflict monitoring at baseline. That is, the ability to prioritise among 
competing tasks. Experienced meditators also showed enhanced alerting after a 
mindfulness retreat, that is, the ability to achieve and maintain alertness. On the other 
hand, naïve meditators showed an increase in orienting after an MBSR course, which 
is the process of directing attention to specific inputs (Jha et al., 2007). Importantly, 
this finding suggests that after mindfulness practice naïve meditators should be able 
to focus their attention on specific inputs, which in turn means that they may be 
better able to attend to the situational information after practice.  
Voluntary attention- guided by goals or explicit instructions (such as in this 
experiment) ± can be used to improve behavioural accuracy (Maclean et al., 2010) 
and can be directed to various moments in time (Correa, Lupianez, Madrid, & 
Tudela, 2006). This type of attention requires sustained focus, which is limited and 




leads to vigilance decrement (Maclean et al., 2010).  With this in mind, mindfulness 
and attention to detail both involve sustained focus on a particular feature (i.e. breath 
or task) but may lead to different behavioural outcomes.  
There is evidence to suggest that mindfulness practice might be beneficial to 
cognitive performance, freeing up space in working memory to allow for further 
cognitive processing (Mrazek et al., 2013) and reducing emotional reactivity (Arch 
& Craske, 2006).  In addition, mindfulness practice may alter individuals¶ attention 
(Semple, 2010; Tang et al., 2007) and increase the ability to focus ones attention on a 
single task (Valentine & Sweet, 1999). On the other hand, attentional control (the 
ability to focus attention, avoid distraction and switch attentional focus) has been 
shown to predict trait mindfulness (Walsh, Balint, Smolira, Fredericksen, & Madsen, 
2009). To our knowledge, the nature of the relationship between state mindfulness 
and attention is yet to be empirically tested. However, Valentine and Sweet (1999) 
suggest that the effects of mindfulness on changes to awareness and affect are 
distinct from other types of attentional focus.  
A possible explanation of this may be that mindfulness does not merely 
LQFUHDVHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VIRFXVRQWKHGHWDLOVRIDVLWXDWLRQEXWLQIDFWLQFUHDVHVWKHLU
awareness of the content of it. Since mindfulness is specifically an intentional focus 
on the present moment, it is possible that those in a mindful state are better able to 
consider all aspects of the person-situation context more deliberately than 
automatically, reducing the likelihood of committing the CB. In contrast, being 
instructed to pay attention to the task may increase efficiency in absorbing the details 
of the situation, but have little to no effect on the automaticity of responding to 
contextual information and thus still cause the individual to commit the CB. 




This would then suggest that whilst mindfulness and paying attention to 
detail in a task might both make individuals more attentive to the details of a 
subsequent task, any behavioural outcomes may be affected differently by the two 
processes. In Experiment 4, this may mean that in both conditions the participants 
will be more aware of the particulars of the task (such as the detail that the essay 
writer had no choice), but will respond differently in evaluating the essay writer. In 
order to test this hypothesis, we compared mindfulness to attention to detail.  
In the control condition, a larger dLIIHUHQFHLQWKHUDWLQJRIWKHZULWHU¶V
DWWLWXGHWRZDUGQXFOHDUSRZHUEHWZHHQµIRU¶DQGµDJDLQVW¶SRVLWLRQVZDVH[SHFWHG
with the difference in the mindfulness condition being significantly reduced. 
Importantly, it was further expected that the attention to detail condition would show 
similar results to the control condition, showing the unique influence of mindful 
attention. Therefore, a significant interaction between condition and essay position 
was expected.  
Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were an opportunity sample of 187 undergraduates at the 
University of Kent who were taking part in the experiment in return for course 
credit. Nineteen participants were removed from the original data set. One 
participant reported having not heard the 5-minute audio file, four were removed for 
having failed embedded attention checks throughout the questionnaire and 14 were 
removed for scoring more than 2SD from the mean number of arrows reported on the 




attention to detail task. This left 169 participants (141 female and 28 male, Mage = 
19.27, ranging from 18 to 42 years) in the analysis.  
The experiment involved a 2 (Essay Position: for vs. against nuclear power) x 
3 (Condition: mindfulness vs. attention to detail vs. control) between participants 
design, and participants were randomly assigned to condition via the survey 
software. These were either a mindfulness (N= 61), control (N=61), or attention to 
detail (N= 47) condition, and either for (N= 81) or against (N=88) essay position. 
Materials 
Mindfulness practice. Mindfulness was manipulated using a 5-minute 
mindful eating raisin task via a pre-recorded audio file (see Appendix C). 
Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 4 showed that 5-minutes of mindfulness practice 
successfully induced a state of mindfulness, using a mindful body scan exercise. Part 
of the aim of using the mindful eating task in this experiment is to test whether the 
effects are unique to the body scan, or whether other 5-minute mindfulness tasks can 
also be effective. The raisin task has been used successfully in previous research to 
induce a state of mindfulness (e.g. Heppner et al., 2008; Jordan et al., 2014; Ostafin 
& Kassman, 2012; Weger, Hooper, Meier, & Hopthrow, 2012). Participants are 
asked to eat two raisins over the 5-minute period, paying attention to particular 
sensations and experiences while doing so. Participants were first asked to pick up a 
raisin, feel its texture, and hold the raisin for a few moments to take in the smell, 
shapes and contours of the raisin. They were then asked to hold the raisin in their 
mouth to feel the texture on their tongue before biting into the raisin to experience 
the sensations of flavour and physiological response such as salivation. The 




instructions guide participants through eating the first raisin, and then allow a further 
few minutes for participants to do the practice again unguided.  
Control condition. In the control condition, participants were merely asked 
to eat two raisins over the period of five minutes, with no other instructions. The 
instruction to eat a raisin was given at the start, and then again after 4-minutes (see 
Appendix C). 
Attention to detail. The attention to detail task asked participants to count 
the number of arrows in a particular orientation, within a grid of 228 arrows (e.g. see 
Appendix D), which was repeated over five trials. To ensure consistency with the 
other conditions, participants were also given the audio instruction to eat a raisin 
before the first trial and then again before trial four. Each trial lasted approximately 
50-seconds, with 10 seconds to input an answer, ensuring the attention to detail task 
lasted 5-minutes, in line with the other audio files. All audio instructions were 
recorded using the same male voice to ensure consistency. Participants who scored 
more than 2SD from the mean number of arrows reported were excluded from the 
final analysis (N=14). 
Attitude-Attribution paradigm. The correspondence bias was assessed 
using a task adapted from the attitude-attribution paradigm developed by Jones and 
Harris (1967). Participants read a paragraph in favour or opposed to the use of 
nuclear power (see Appendix E). Before reading the paragraph, participants were 
given written instructions that explicitly stated that the writer of the paragraph was 
assigned to the position by coin flip (i.e. not freely chosen) as part of a class. 





Correspondence Bias. A single item assessed the correspondence bias. 
3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHG³7RZKDWH[WHQWGRHVWKHZULWHUIDYRXURURSpose the use of 
QXFOHDUSRZHU"´ This was measured on a 7-point scale ( µYHU\RSSRVHG¶WR 
µYHU\IDYRXUDEOH¶). In terms of participants rating the writHU¶VDWWLWXGHVFRUHVFORVHU
to the scale endpoints were seen as indicative of the classic correspondence bias 
finding (Jones & Harris, 1967). 
3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWKHLURZQYLHZVRQWKHXVHRIQXFOHDUSRZHU³7R
ZKDWGHJUHHGR\RXIDYRXURURSSRVHWKHXVHRIQXFOHDUSRZHU"´VLQFHLQGividuals 
tend to attribute their own personal views to social targets, known as the false 
consensus effect (Mcarthur, 1972; Moore & Kim, 2003). This was answered on a 7-
point scale (1 =  very opposed, 7 =  very favourable), see Appendix F. 
Perspective taking. The nine-item perspective taking scale (taken from the 
Empathy Scale; Davis, 1980) was used to measure the extent to which participants 




DZKLOH´ZHUHPHDVXUHGRQD-point scale (1 µGRHVQRWGHVFULEHPHZHOO¶ 7= 
µGHVFULEHVPHYHU\ZHOO¶). Higher scores therefore reflect a greater ability to take the 
SHUVSHFWLYHRIDQRWKHUSHUVRQĮ M= 5.02, SD= 0.91).  
State mindfulness. The TMS scale (Lau et al., 2006), was used as in Chapter 
4, Experiments 1-3. Questionnaire items were randomised and all items were 
measured on a 5-point scale (1= not at all, 5= very much), with higher scores 
LQGLFDWLQJKLJKHUOHYHOVRIVWDWHPLQGIXOQHVVĮ M= 2.53, SD= 0.77). 




Embedded Attention Checks. A single item was embedded within the 
perspective taking scale to test whether participants were paying attention to the 




failed to notice the instruction and selected a response other than strongly agree were 
excluded from the analysis (N= 4).  
Procedure 
Participants were gathered in a large computer room and each seated at a 
computer station with headphones, and two raisins. The room was open, and 
computer stations were not separated with dividing partitions. A brief introduction to 
the session was given by the researchers, outlining what the participants could expect 
in the experiment and some ethical considerations, such as the right to withdraw. 
Participants were told that they would be asked to listen to audio files that might 
contain some pauses of varying lengths, but that the survey software was 
programmed to move to the next page when the audio had finished, so participants 
would be required to keep their headphones on for the duration of the experiment. 
This also ensured that participants were unaware of the length of audio, and both 
participants and researchers were blind as to who was in which condition. 
Once logged into the survey software, participants first received a written 
information sheet and were asked to indicate their consent. The start of each 
recording asked participants to pick up or eat a raisin. Those assigned to the 
mindfulness condition received their 5-minute mindful eating instructions, whilst 
those assigned to the attention to detail task completed the five trials and those in the 
control condition just ate two raisins either side of a 4 minute silence. After the five 




minute audio, participants completed the dependent measures and were then 
debriefed and thanked.  
Results and Discussion 
State mindfulness manipulation check 
A one-way ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference in levels 
of state mindfulness between the conditions, F(2, 168)= 3.64, p =.03. See Table 4 for 
descriptive statistics. Post-hoc analysis using Bonferroni adjustments showed that 
participants in the mindfulness condition reported significantly higher levels of state 
mindfulness than those in the control condition, p =.03. There was no significant 
difference in levels of state mindfulness between those in the mindfulness condition 
compared to the attention to detail condition, p = .51, or those in the control 
condition compared to the attention to detail condition, p = .77. Although the 
difference between the attention to detail condition and both mindfulness and control 
conditions was non-significant, the pattern of means is in the expected direction, 
with those in the mindfulness condition exhibiting the highest levels of state 
mindfulness.  
Table 4.  
Mean (SD) of TMS scores by condition 
 TMS Mean (SD) 
Mindfulness 2.62 (0.80) 
Attention to detail 2.41 (0.72) 
Control 2.23 (0.91) 
 





A 3 (Condition: Mindfulness vs. Control vs. Attention) x 2 (Essay: For vs. 
Against nuclear power) ANCOVA was conducted on the degree to which 
SDUWLFLSDQWVFRQVLGHUHGWKHZULWHUWREHµIRU¶RUµDJDLQVW¶QXFOHDUSRZHUZLWK
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQYLHZDVDFRYDULDWH7DEOH5 shows the means. The main effect of 
mindfulness condition was not significant, F(2, 161)= 1.04, p = .34Ș2= .01. The 
covariate of participants own view was significant, F(1, 161)= 10.76, p = .00Ș2= 
.06, and the main effect of essay position was significant, F(1, 161)= 330.40, p < 
Ș2 = .67. The participants who read an essay in favour of nuclear power 
considered the writer to be more in favour of nuclear power (M= 5.88, SD= 1.36) 
than participants who read the essay opposing nuclear power (M= 1.75, SD= 1.32). 
In support of the hypothesis, there was a significant interaction between condition 
and essay position, F(2, 161)= 3.07, p = Ș2= .04. As shown in Table 5, the 
interaction revealed that mindfulness attenuated the CB, whereby the difference in 
ratings was smaller in the mindfulness condition (3.70) than in both the control 
(4.15) and attention conditions (4.78).  
In order to investigate whether this effect was attributed to a unique aspect of 
mindfulness, rather than merely increasing attention, a second analysis was carried 
out, removing participants in the control condition. A 2(Condition: Mindfulness vs. 
Attention) x 2 (Essay: For vs. Against nuclear power) ANCOVA was conducted, 
ZLWKSDUWLFLSDQW¶VRZQYLHZDVDFRYDULDWH7KHPDLQHIIHFWRIFRQGLWLRQZDVQRW
significant, F(1, 103)= 0.83, p = Ș2=.01. The covariate of participants own view 
was significant, F(1, 103)= 5.22, p = .02Ș2= .05, and the main effect of essay 
position was significant, F(1, 103)= 236.70, p < Ș2 = .70. The participants who 




read an essay in favour of nuclear power considered the writer to be more in favour 
of nuclear power (M= 6.00, SD= 1.09) than participants who read the essay opposing 
nuclear power (M= 1.83, SD= 1.42). Most importantly, there was a significant 
interaction between condition and essay position, F(1, 103)= 6.19, p = .01Ș2= .06. 
This showed that the difference in the mindfulness condition was significantly 




nuclear power.  
 
Mindfulness Control Attention 
For 5.64 (1.04) 5.71 (1.66) 6.45 (1.00) 
Against 1.94 (1.53) 1.56 (1.00) 1.67 (1.27) 
Difference 3.70 4.15 4.78 
 
Perspective taking 
A 2(Essay: for vs. against) x 3 (Condition: mindfulness vs. control vs. 
attention to detail) ANOVA was conducted on perspective taking. The main effect of 
condition was not significant, F(2, 163)= 0.24, p  Ș2< .01. The main effect of 
essay position was not significant, F(1, 163)= 0.36, p  Ș2< .01. The interaction 
of mindfulness x essay position was not significant, F(2, 163)= 1.17, p  Ș2= 
.01.  
Previous research suggests that perspective taking can increase the salience 
of situational factors, increasing the likelihood that participants will correct for 
situational factors, and thus reduce the correspondence bias (Storms, 1973). 
Therefore, perspective taking was added as a covariate in analysing the extent that 
participants committed the correspondence bias.  




A 2(Essay: for vs. against) x 3 (Condition: mindfulness vs. control vs. 
attention to detail) ANCOVA was conducted with perspective taking as a covariate. 
The main effect of condition was not significant, F(2, 162)= 1.45, p  Ș2= .02. 
The covariate was not significant, F(1, 162)= 1.21, p  Ș2= .01. There was a 
significant main effect of essay position, F(1, 162)= 408.49, p Ș2= .72. The 
interaction of Condition x Essay position did not reach significance, F(2, 162)= 1.96, 
p  Ș2= .02, but the means showed a trend that suggests a possible reduction in 
correspondence bias in the mindfulness compared to the control and attention to 
detail conditions. In line with the attitude-attribution paradigm, the difference score 
was lower in the mindfulness condition compared to the control and attention to 
detail conditions, suggesting that perspective taking may require further 
investigation. 
Table 6.  
Means (SD) IRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXGJHPHQWVRIWKHHVVD\ZULWHU¶VRSLQLRQRQWKHXVHRI
nuclear power with perspective taking as a covariate 
 
Mindfulness Control Attention 
For 5.66 (1.02) 5.69 (1.61) 6.46 (1.45) 
Against 1.92 (1.53) 1.57 (1.31) 1.68 (1.54) 
Difference 3.74 4.12 4.78 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 4 addressed some of the key limitations arising from 
Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 4. First, the use of a different mindfulness induction 
showed that 5-minutes of mindful eating was effective in increasing state 
mindfulness compared to the control condition, but not the attention to detail 
condition. Second, whilst the difference in state mindfulness between mindful and 
attention conditions was not significant, the results did show a difference in 




correspondence bias between these two conditions, showing that effects were not the 
result of increased attention to detail. Finally, the inclusion of a behavioural outcome 
measure highlights the application of a brief mindfulness practice for social 
judgements. The results showed that mindfulness practice reduced the 
correspondence bias in relation to a control condition and an attention to detail task, 
when accounting for the false consensus effect. The results suggest that mindfulness 
alters the correspondence bias in a way that is qualitatively different from simply 
sustained attention, which may suggest that mindfulness does not merely increase 
awareness of the situational factors in the essays.  
Snyder and Jones (1974) found that when students were asked to write their 
own essays on a topic for an attitude-attribution task and then swap them with 
another participant, they still made correspondent dispositional inferences. That is 
the correspondence bias persisted. Snyder and Jones argue that students employed a 
tactic of writing what they believed, regardless of their assigned position, and then 
assuming that the other essay writer had done the same, and therefore the essay 
reflected their true attitude. Although the essay topic might not have aligned with 
personal attitude, students attribute the essay to situational factors- the writer had no 
choice- but do not afford the other writer the same attribution. In attribution, there is 
a tendency to attribute our own successes to disposition (effort, ability) and our own 
failures to situations (bad luck, fate) (Bernstein, Stephan, & Davis, 1979), especially 
depending on the locus of control of the outcome (Weiner, 1985).  
In addition, attributions are often based on moral culpability, or whether the 
person should have behaved in a certain way. This leads to holding the person 
responsible for a bad outcome, but attributing a positive outcome to luck or chance 




(Griffin, 1994). Therefore, the correspondence bias should be more evident when the 
essay matches the students¶ own opinion. In Experiment 4 this effect was present in 
the control and attention conditions, but was attenuated in the mindfulness condition. 
This means that after the mindfulness induction, participants were less extreme in 
WKHLUMXGJHPHQWVRIWKHHVVD\ZULWHUDQGZHUHOHVVOLNHO\WRDVVXPHWKHZULWHUV¶
disposition aligned with their essay, despite their own views.  
:KHQDFFRXQWLQJIRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUVSHFWLYHWDNLQJWKHLQWHUDFWLRQRI
Condition x Essay position did not research significance. The difference in means 
were in the expected direction though, showing a reduction in the correspondence 
bias.  Although perspective taking is considered to influence the prevalence of 
attribution error (Hooper et al., 2015b), the results from Experiment 4 showed that 
including perspective taking as a covariate did not have a significant effect on the 
CB. In addition, there was no significant effect of Condition or Essay position on 
participants¶ perspective taking ability. The simple effects analysis showed that for 
PLQGIXOQHVVWKHHIIHFWDSSURDFKHGVLJQLILFDQFHZKHUHE\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUVSHFWLYH
taking abiOLW\ZDVKLJKHUZKHQWKH\UHDGWKHHVVD\µDJDLQVW¶QXFOHDUSRZHUWKDQµIRU¶
nuclear power.  
A possible explanation for non-significant effects on perspective taking is 
that the participants were unable to consider the essay writers perspective with such 
limited information about the writer. The essay content is that it is assumed to give 
DZD\WKHZULWHU¶VRSLQLRQ(Snyder & Jones, 1974), however there are contextual 
details that are not given in the instructions used for the present experiment. For 
example, the instructions are fairly ambiguous and tell participants that the writer 
was assigned to their essay position via coin flip in a class. It does not suggest 




whether they were given time to research the topic, what the writers own views were 
or whether their essay was marked or evaluated. This may have led to the construal 
problem (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), where the participant is unable to see the other 
perspective because they cannot imagine what the situation would have been like for 
the essay writer. This theory postulates that the observer (participant) cannot 
understand that they may hold additional information that the actor (essay writer) did 
not have. For example, once people know the solution to a difficult problem they are 
instantly unable to appreciate how difficult the problem would be for someone who 
did not know the solution (Fischhoff et al., 1975).  
Alternatively, nuclear power may not have evoked a particularly strong 
response from participants about the essay writer, or the participants may not have 
had particularly strong opinions or knowledge of the subject before reading the 
HVVD\V3HUVSHFWLYHWDNLQJVWHPVIURPLQFUHDVHGHPSDWK\IRUDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VSRLQW
of view (Regan & Totten, 1975) and increases self-other overlap (Davis et al., 1996). 
The essay content in the present experiment was described as being allocated to the 
essay writer (no choice), and so if mindfulness made this fact more prominent to 
participants it may have been more difficult to consider it their point of view or 
relate to their opinions since there were no consequences for the writer, nor were the 
opinions necessarily in line with their actual views. Furthermore, the essay content 
could then have had a stronger impact on their knowledge of nuclear power use, than 
on their opinions of the essay writer. Gawronski (2003) found that assigned counter 
attitudinal essays were expected to be less persuasive, but that a highly persuasive 
essay was taken as an indicator of disposition. This suggests that the perceived 
SHUVXDVLYHQHVVRIWKHHVVD\FRXOGDOVRLQIOXHQFHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DWWULEXWLRQMXGJHPHQWV
Perspective taking, in relation to mindfulness and attributions, requires further 




investigation, and therefore Experiment 5 uses a scenario ostensibly written by a 
person who is struggling to get a job. This may be a situation in which participants 
would more easily be able to imagine themselves in, and thus may be more able to 
consider their perspective. 
Whilst this shows a positive impact of mindfulness for reducing the 
correspondence bias, the process by which this happens remains unclear. One 
possible explanation for these results is an increase in cognitive capacity. Cognitive 
capacity has been found to underlie the occurrence of the CB (Gilbert, 1989; Trope 
& Gaunt, 2000; Weary et al., 2006). In addition, mindfulness has been shown to 
enhance cognitive processes, including working memory and executive functioning 
(Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, & Goolkasian, 2010), as well as attention (Jha et 
al., 2007).  
These particular aspects of cognitive function are important in two ways. 
First, if mindfulness enhances working memory, then the negative effect of cognitive 
load on the correspondence bias could have been reduced after mindfulness practice. 
In this respect, mindfulness may have allowed deeper processing of the information 
provided to access schemas for the situational factors, rather than relying on the 
automatically accessible schemas relating to dispositional judgement. This would 
allow participants to simultaneously attend to multiple pieces of information in 
working memory (Paas, Renkel, & Sweller, 2003), potentially avoiding the need to 
discount the effortful process of attending to situational information. Second, 
enhanced attention may have encouraged participants to use all of the available, 
relevant information when informing their judgement of the target, which may have 
meant that the situational instruction was more salient (Trope & Gaunt, 2000). This 




would be easier under conditions of enhanced working memory, since the relevant 
pieces of information can be stored in an active and quickly retrievable state (Engle, 
2002), and may suggest an explanation for why the correspondence bias was not 
attenuated in the attention to detail task. 
In sum, the results from Experiment 4 support the use of a 5-minute 
mindfulness task, and suggest that mindfulness attenuates the correspondence bias, 
an effect that is not achieved in control and attention to detail conditions. The 
inclusion of perspective taking did not result in significant changes in the dependent 
variables, but is worth further examination. The limitations of the present 
experiment, specifically the use of the essay in the attitude-attribution paradigm will 
be addressed in Experiments 5 and 6. A different form of attribution bias will be 
evaluated, using a scenario that it is expected that participants will be able to relate to 
more easily, and thus may elicit perspective taking. An intergroup element will be 
added to test the effect of mindfulness on attribution error in relation to ingroup vs. 
outgroup members.  




Chapter 6: Mindfulness, Attributions and Perspective taking 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents two experiments in which the online mindfulness 
practice was applied to a different attribution task, the fundamental attribution error. 
In addition, the experiments presented in this chapter tested the impact of perspective 
taking on the relationship between mindfulness and the fundamental attribution 
error. Experiment 5 showed that mindfulness attenuated the tendency to commit the 
FAE. Experiment 6 revealed a complex relationship between mindfulness, 
perspective taking and group membership. The results showed that in the control 
condition, participants who considered the other perspective were equally likely to 
FRPPLWWKHIXQGDPHQWDODWWULEXWLRQHUURUUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHWDUJHW¶VJURXS
membership. On the other hand, for those considering their own perspective, the 
target¶V group membership influenced the likelihood of making the fundamental 
attribution error. The opposite pattern of results was observed for participants in the 
mindful condition where those who read the scenario from their own perspective 
were equally likely to commit the fundamental attribution error, regardless of group 
membership. However, considering the other perspective led to participants making 
the fundamental attribution error for the outgroup target but not for the ingroup 
target. These findings are discussed in relation to theory in the general discussion. 
Mindfulness, Attributions and Perspective taking 
Being able to dis-identify from thoughts and emotions may suggest that 
mindfulness could be useful in reducing reliance on pre-learned information and 
automatic responding through dis-identification with pre-existing schema, thus 




reducing the propensity for attribution errors. For example, mindfulness has been 
shown to reduce implicit age and race bias as measured by IAT (Lueke & Gibson, 
2015), weaken the relationship between automatic alcohol motivation and drinking 
behaviour (Ostafin, Bauer, & Myxter, 2012; Ostafin & Marlatt, 2008), reduce 
uncontrolled eating (Jordan et al., 2014), and improve insight problem solving 
(Ostafin & Kassman, 2012). An important theoretical framework in the field of 
social judgement is attribution theory.  The studies presented in this chapter test 
whether mindfulness can attenuate attribution bias in social judgement.  
Attribution is the process of making inferences based on categorisation, 
stereotypes, and automatic processing (e.g. Bruner, 1957). The behaviour of 
individuals becomes associated with a causal locus, which helps to attribute the 
causes and consequences of behaviours based on quickly accessible schemas. 
Judging and categorising occurs via the process that requires least effort (heuristics 
and stereotypes; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and thus may be linked to 
mindlessness (Langer et al., 1978). With this in mind, Experiment 5 aims to test 
whether inducing mindfulness through a brief body scan exercise will reduce 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶SURSHQVLW\WRDWWULEXWHEODPHWRDQLQGLYLGXDOIRUDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFh 
there may be a number of other possible causes. That is, to reduce the fundamental 
attribution error.  
Attribution Errors 
+HLGHU¶V)XQGDPHQWDO$WWULEXWLRQ(UURU)$(VXJJHVWVWKDW
individuals have a tendency to underestimate or ignore the impact of situational 
(environmental) factors and overestimate the role of dispositions in controlling 
behaviour. This also extends to groups (Allison & Messick, 1985), where individuals 




have the tendency to infer the attitudes of an entire social group based on individual 
JURXSPHPEHUV¶EHKDYLRXU)RUH[DPSOHAllison and Messick (1985) found that 
individuals tend to assume that the attitudes of group members primarily influence 
WKHJURXS¶VGHFLVLRQ-making, ignoring the impact of decision-making rules and 
group norms. A particularly important distinction that Allison and Messick (1985) 
made was that this effect was amplified for outgroups compared to ingroups, and in 
particular, for negative events. This means that not only can causal evaluations 
towards groups in general be misattributed, but when evaluating an outgroup 
PHPEHU¶VEHKDYLRXUDWWLWXGHVPD\EHHYHQPRUHVNHZHGWRZDUGVGLVSRVLWLRQDO
attributions and individual blame, especially when the behaviour is negative. 
Furthermore, that outgroups are perceived to be more homogenous and therefore, 
group members behaviour is attributed more similarly than for ingroup members 
(Quattrone & Jones, 1980). 
The group attribution error is relevant to our understanding of prejudice, and 
how individuals evaluate members of ingroups and outgroups, as well as global 
evaluations of groups (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Buidin, 2001; Pettigrew, 1979). 
The process of separating and categorising human groups is enough to trigger the 
psychological processes that lead to intergroup prejudice (Allport, 1979). Therefore, 
the attributions made to members of outgroups compared to ingroups is likely to be 
motivated by different factors. For example, race affects categorisation within 
milliseconds (Ito & Urland, 2003). As race is highly salient, race categorisation is 
difficult to suppress (Park & Rothbart, 1982). Attempts to suppress racial bias often 
lead to mental exhaustion (Richeson & Shelton, 2003) and an increased use of 
stereotypes (Macrae, Bodenhausen, et al., 1994) creating a loop in behaviour 
whereby trying to reduce reliance on heuristics about race, actually increases the use 




of heuristics.  Race is also a visually salient category, for example, Black vs. White 
skin colour, which means race is often used to denote category membership before 
other cues.  
Group membership 
Race is a particularly pervasive intergroup category that informs attributions. 
For example, Duncan (1976) questioned whether individuals would attach more or 
less weight to dispositions than situational factors when attributing the behaviour of 
Black and White others. The results showed that White participants labelled an 
DPELJXRXVµVKRYH¶more violent when performed by a Black person than when 
performed by a White person. Situation attributions were preferred when the 
perpetrator was White, and personal/dispositional attributions were used when the 
perpetrator was Black, suggesting that violence was more accessible when thinking 
about a Black than a White perpetrator. In part, attributing an ambiguous act by an 
ingroup member to situational factors serves to protect the ingroup identity, thus 
SURWHFWLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHQVHRIVHOI2QWKHRWKHUKDQGDVVRFLDWLRQVEHtween 
racial groups and certain behaviours, for example Black men and a propensity for 
violence, implicit association of Black faces with negative words (more so than 
White faces and with positive words) (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Van 
Bavel & Cunningham, 2008) or more intense anger (compared to the same face 
categorised as White) (Hutchings & Haddock, 2008) are automatic and well-
established (Quillian & Pager, 2001).  
Similar effects have also been shown to pervade organisational and personnel 
decision-making. Selection decisions are notoriously uncertain, and are made with 
very limited information, thus relying heavily on stereotypes and pre-existing 




categories. Negative stereotypes about racial groups may bias the selection process. 
For example, King, Madera, Hebl, Knight, & Mendoza (2006) found that 
occupational stereotyping, a preconceived attitude about a particular occupation or 
people employed in that occupation /LSWRQ2¶&RQQRU7HUU\	%ellamy, 1991, 
p.129) mediated the relationship between race and evaluations of job applicants.  
Black applicants were evaluated the least positively, and did not benefit from a better 
TXDOLW\UHVXPHDVPXFKDV:KLWHDSSOLFDQWVGLG)RUORZTXDOLW\UHVXPH¶s, Black 
applicants were judged the most suitable for low status jobs. This further emphasises 
how the automatic associations between a group and certain behaviours or contexts 
can have detrimental consequences for members of that group.  
Furthermore, attributions about racial groups have been shown to affect 
perceptions of responsibility for natural disasters (Ben-Porath & Shaker, 2010) and 
influence self-reported racial bias in political contexts (Gomez, Carolina, Wilson, & 
Methodist, 2006). Modern racism theory encompasses why automatic associations 
can lead to minority racial groups facing bias in organisational settings (e.g. Brief, 
Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000). It postulates that racism against minority 
groups still exists but is unrecognisable because it is more subtle than traditional 
forms of racism and therefore influences decisions such as personnel selection by 
devaluing the high credentials of racial minorities. This poses difficulties in trying to 
reduce bias in personnel decision-making since the process is both automatic and 
unrecognisable as discrimination. It is therefore not possible to examine the nature of 
bias based on overt prejudices. In addition, the social undesirability of prejudice 
means that individuals are not likely to openly admit their prejudiced attitudes. 




Using attribution theory as a framework, assessing the tendency to make 
dispositional attributions for outgroups overcomes the problem of social desirability 
VLQFHWKHUHLVDOHVVRYHUWHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHWDUJHW¶VVSHFLILFWUDLWVDQGUDWKHU, a more 
global evaluation of their disposition being more influential on their behaviour than 
the situation. However, it is still possible to see the effect of bias in the tendency to 
make more dispositional attributions for the outgroup than the ingroup, especially if 
WKHWDUJHW¶VEHKDYLRXULVXQGHVLUDEOH)XUWKHUPRUHLWDOORZVIRUDGLUHFWHYDOXDWLRQRI
WKHFDXVHVRIWKHWDUJHW¶VEHKDYLRXU:KLOVWVWHUHRW\SHVmay exist about a group, it is 
more difficult to assess whether they form the basis of the evaluation of a target, 
whereas attribution allows us to test the extent to which the target is seen as 
personally responsible for behaviour or actions.  
 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) conducted a field experiment in which 
applications were sent to real job advertisements, and applications differed only in 
the racial stereotypicality of the name. White names (e.g. Emily, Sarah, Brad, Neil) 
received 50% more call backs for interview than Black names (e.g. Latoya, Ebony, 
Leroy, Tyrone). The methodology used, in changing only the name on the 
applications is also useful in uncovering bias as it suggests that the associations 
made with the name was the primary reason for differences in call back rates. 
Experiment 5 uses a similar methodology to investigate whether mindfulness may 
reduce the automaticity of responding to stereotypically Black or White sounding 
names in attributing the cause of a situation. Specifically a fictitious statement is 
XVHGWKDWRVWHQVLEO\GHWDLOVDWDUJHW¶VVWUXJJOHWRREWDLQHPSOR\PHQWGHVSLWHJRRG
qualifications and previous experience.  




Mindfulness, Perspective Taking and Locus of Control 
Mindfulness is expected to be particularly useful in reducing attribution bias 
in this context since mindfulness has been shown to reduce habitual responding 
(Jordan et al., 2014; Kiken & Shook, 2011)%DVHGRQ/DQJHU¶V(1989) notion that 
mindful judgement involves less reliance on previously learnt information, and more 
creation of new categories, mindfulness is expected to reduce the reliance on 
heuristic thought and therefore reduce the likelihood of making an attribution error. 
This is of interest because mindfulness is likely to make category membership more 
salient, but reduce negative social judgement. Two further variables that are 
considered in Experiments 5 and 6 are perspective taking and locus of control, both 
of which are known to reduce attribution errors, but are not empirically tested in 
relation to mindfulness.  
Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) found that increased perspective taking 
increased the expression of positive attitudes of a target and reduced the use of 
stereotypes when evaluating them. This was thought to be the result of increasing 
overlap between the self and the target group (Galinsky et al., 2005). Attribution 
theory postulates that an individual is more likely to attribute personal success to 
disposition, and failure to situation (Beckmann, 1970; Ross, 1977), therefore by 
increasing self-other overlap, perspective taking should increase the situational 
attributions of the outgroup target who is unsuccessful in getting a job. In addition, 
since mindfulness is thought to be positively associated with perspective taking, it 
would be expected that increases in individXDOV¶PLQGIXOQHVVZRXOGDOVRLQFUHDVH
their perspective taking ability.  




Individuals with an external locus of control tend to attribute the behaviour of 
others to external factors, more so than those with an internal locus of control 
(Shaver, 1975). It is likely that an individual will attribute their own success to 
personal disposition and own failure to environmental factors (Beckmann, 1970; 
Ross, 1977). With this in mind, lRFXVRIFRQWUROFDQPHDVXUHWKHGLUHFWLRQRIRQH¶V
attributional tendency. However, group membership can also affect this. Outgroup 
members are more likely to be evaluated by dispositional attributions for a negative 
act, and situational factors are seen as responsible for a positive act (Griffin, 1994). 
This means that how a target is evaluated may depend on the degree of the 
percHLYHU¶VRZQORFXVRIFRQWURO$V\HWUHVHDUFKKDVQRWFRQVLGHUHGWKHHIIHFWRI
mindfulness on locus of control, but theoretically, it is expected that if mindfulness 
enhances perspective taking and concern for others, and increases self-other overlap, 
there may too be an effect on locus of control.   
Hypotheses 
It is expected that in the control condition participants will be more likely to 
PDNHWKHIXQGDPHQWDODWWULEXWLRQHUURUDQGZLOODWWULEXWHWKHRXWJURXSWDUJHW¶V
position to dispositions, and the inJURXSWDUJHW¶VSRVLWLRQWRVLWXDWLRQ,WLVH[SHFWHG
that this effect will be attenuated in the mindfulness condition. That is, evaluations 
should be less extreme, and participants are expected to be less susceptible to 
attribution error. 
It is expected that participants in the mindfulness condition will be more 
DZDUHRIWKHWDUJHW¶VJURXSPHPEHUVKLSDQGWKHUHIRUHEHPRUHDZDUHRISRWHQWLDO
situational biases and use this as a factor in explaining their situation, rather than 
relying on stereotypic associations with their group membership. Furthermore, 




mindfulness is expected to enhance perspective taking when evaluating the outgroup 




Participants and Design 
One hundred and eighty-three participants UHFUXLWHGIURP$PD]RQ¶V
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), who were residents of the U.S.A, took part in the 
experiment in return for a small monetary payment. Forty-three participants were 
removed from the original data set who reported race as other than White/Caucasian 
(N= 39) or failed embedded attention checks (N= 4). This left 140 White participants 
(90 women and 50 men, Mage = 39.69, ranging from 22 to 75 years) in the analysis. 
In a 2 (mindfulness: mindful vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) 
experimental design, the survey software randomly allocated participants to 
condition. These were either a mindfulness (N= 71) or control (N=69) condition, and 
evaluation of either an ingroup (N= 65) or outgroup (N=75) member. 
Materials 
Mindfulness practice. The same mindfulness audio files, consisting of a 5-
minute body scan, and 5-minute control was used as in Chapter 4, Experiments 1-3.  
Ingroup vs. Outgroup Scenario. Participants were asked to read a statement 
made by a 29-year-old man named Jamie (ingroup) or Jamal (outgroup), designed to 
convey a high achieving graduate (see Appendix H). The statement informed 
SDUWLFLSDQWVWKDW-DPLH-DPDOZDVDµ'HQWDO3UDFWLFH0DQDJHPHQW¶JUDGXDWHZLWKD




high Grade Point Average (GPA), having studied at the University of California5. A 
similar procedure for creating candidate profiles has been used in previous research 
(see e.g. Gaddis, 2015).  
The statement outlined the work experience that Jamie/Jamal had gained 
since graduating, and the skills he felt he had developed. The statement explained 
that having applied for in excess of 50 new positions Jamie/Jamal had been 
consistently unsuccessful. The statements were identical, apart from the name given 
at the start. Stereotypical sounding names have successfully been used to manipulate 
race in applicant evaluation studies previously (e.g. Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; 
King et al., 2006; Wood, Hales, Purdon, Sejersen, & Hayllar, 2009). Previous 
research has shown that Jamal is seen as a stereotypically African-American 
sounding name (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; King et al., 2006) so this was 
chosen to represent the outgroup member. King et al. (2006) used James as the 
stereotypically White-American sounding name, however in the interests of keeping 
the two names as similar sounding and looking as possible, this experiment adopted 
the use of Jamie as a variant of James to represent the ingroup member.   
Dependent measures 
State Mindfulness. The TMS scale (Lau et al., 2006), was used as in Chapter 
4, Experiments 1-3. Questionnaire items were randomised and all items were 
measured on a 7-point scale (1= not at all, 7= very much), with higher scores 
LQGLFDWLQJKLJKHUOHYHOVRIVWDWHPLQGIXOQHVVĮ M= 4.70, SD= 1.07).  
                                                 
5
 It was not specified which University of California college was attended, however 
according to the US News and World Report (US News, n.d.), all of the University of California 
colleges rank between 20th and 42nd in the U.S.A, of 199 rankings. 




Fundamental Attribution Error. A single item assessed the extent to which 
participants felt that Jamie/Jamal had control over his situation with regards to 
finding a new job. This was measured on 7-point bi-polar scale (1= the situation was 
µHQWLUHO\>-DPLH-DPDO@¶VRZQIDXOW¶WR µHQWLUHO\RXWRI>-DPLH-DPDO@¶V FRQWURO¶). 
In addition, participants were asked to indicate the three most important reasons they 
thought explained why Jamie/Jamal was unable to get a job. These were left open-
ended and participants were free to write any reason they felt was a primary 
contributing factor to the targets lack of success in the job market, see Appendix H.  
Perspective Taking. The same perspective taking scale was used as in 
Experiment 4 (taken from the Empathy Scale; Davis, 1980). Items were measured on 
a 5-point scale ( µGRHVQRWGHVFULEHPHZHOO¶WR µGHVFULEHVPHYHU\ZHOO¶). 
Higher scores therefore reflect a greater ability to take the perspective of another 
SHUVRQĮ M= 3.71, SD= 0.64), see Appendix G.  
Locus of Control.  The five-item scale was adapted from Bright, Kane, 
0DUVKDQG%LVKRSDQGFRQVLVWHGRITXHVWLRQVVXFKDV³$JUHDWGHal of what 
KDSSHQVWR>-DPLH-DPDO@LVSUREDEO\MXVWDPDWWHURIFKDQFH´DQG³/LIHLVFRQWUROOHG
E\RXWVLGHDFWLRQVDQGHYHQWV´,WHPVZHUHPHDVXUHGRQDILYH-point scale (1= 
³VWURQJO\GLVDJUHH´WR ³VWURQJO\DJUHH´) with good reliability, Į M= 2.96, 
SD= 0.75), see Appendix H. Higher scores reflected a more external locus of control.  
Attention check questions. In order to ensure that participants were paying 
attention to the instructions and questions, an attention check question was 
embedded within one of the scales (see Appendix F). The question was worded so 
that it did not obviously differ from the other questions in the scale, but specifically 
asked participants to select only the answer corresponding to the 7th point on the 




scale. Participants who selected any other answer were assumed to not be paying 
close attention and were removed from analysis.  
Procedure 
The experiment was delivered online and participants indicated informed 
consent within the software. They were then able to complete the items in their own 
time and in any location with internet access. Participants first listened to either the 
mindfulness or control audio and were then automatically directed to the TMS (Lau 
et al., 2006). After this, participants read the statement about Jamie or Jamal. They 
were then asked the open ended question about the reasons they thought Jamie/Jamal 
could not get a job, followed by the FAE question. Participants completed the 
perspective taking scale, locus of control scale, and some demographic questions 
such as age, gender and race, before being thanked and debriefed.  
Results & Discussion  
State Mindfulness manipulation check  
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) 
ANOVA was conducted on the TMS measure of state mindfulness. There was a 
main effect of condition, F(1, 136)= 12.77, p < .001, Ș2 =.09. This showed that 
participants in the mindfulness condition scored higher on the TMS (M= 4.68, SD= 
1.07) than those in the control condition (M= 3.90, SD= 1.48). There was no main 
effect of group, F(1, 136)= 2.75, p = .10, Ș2 =.02. There was no significant 
interaction of condition x group, F(1, 136)= 0.32, p = .57, Ș2 <.01. This confirms that 
the mindfulness manipulation had worked effectively. Those in the mindfulness 




condition were more mindful than participants in the control condition. This was not 
affected by the group manipulation.  
Fundamental Attribution Error 
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) 
ANOVA was conducted on the FAE. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 7. 
There was no main effect of condition, F(1, 136)= 0.30, p = .58, Ș2 <.01 or group, 
F(1, 136)= 0.74,  p= .39, Ș2 =.01. There was a significant condition x group 
interaction effect, F(1, 136)= 4.43, p =.04, Ș2 =.03.  
Table 7.  
Means (SD) IRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DWWULEXWLRQVWRWKHWDUJHW 
 Ingroup Outgroup 
Mindful 4.63 (1.61) 4.26 (1.60) 
Control 3.91 (1.13) 4.65 (1.40) 
 
Simple effects analysis, using Bonferroni adjustments showed that in the 
control condition participants made a more dispositional attribution for the ingroup 
member (M= 3.91, SD= 1.13) than the outgroup member (M= 4.65, SD= 1.40), F(1, 
136)= 4.36,  p= .04, Ș2 =.03. In the mindfulness condition, the difference was non-
significant. Participants attribution of the ingroup member (M= 4.63, SD= 1.61) was 
not significantly different to the outgroup member (M= 4.26, SD= 1.60), F(1, 136)= 
0.78, p = .38, Ș2 =.01. This showed that, as expected, participants made the 
fundamental attribution error in the control condition, but that this effect was 
attenuated in the mindfulness condition.  
For the ingroup, participants in the control condition (M= 3.91, SD= 1.13) 
made a slightly more dispositional attribution than those in the mindfulness 
condition (M= 4.56, SD= 1.61), although this did not reach statistical significance, 




F(1, 136)= 3.29, p = .07, Ș2 =.02. For the outgroup, participants did not differ in the 
attributions made of the target in the control condition (M=4.64, SD= 1.40) 
compared to the mindfulness condition (M= 4.26, SD= 1.60), F(1, 136)= 1.30, p = 
.26, Ș2 =.01. 
Locus of Control 
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) 
ANOVA was run on the locus of control scale. There was no main effect of 
condition, F(1, 136)= 0.07, p = .79, Ș2 <.01. There was no main effect of group, F(1, 
136)= 0.85, p = .36, Ș2 =.01. The interaction of condition x  group was not 
significant, F(1, 136)= 1.03, p = .31, Ș2 =.01.  
Attributions are affected by locus of control (Shaver, 1975), so a 2 
(condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) ANCOVA 
was run on the FAE, with locus of control as a covariate. Descriptive statistics are 
shown in Tabel 8. There was no main effect of condition, F(1, 135)= 0.23, p = .63, 
Ș2 <.01. The covariate, locus of control was significant, F(1, 135)= 30.58, p < .001, 
Ș2 = .19. There was no main effect of group, F(1, 135)= 0.26, p = .61, Ș2 <.01. Most 
importantly, there was a significant condition x group interaction, F(1, 135)= 7.81, p 
=.01, Ș2 =.06 that was followed up by pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
adjustments, presented below. 
Table 8.  
Means (SD) IRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DWWULEXWLRQVWRWKHWDUJHWZLWKORFXVRIFRQWURODVD
covariate 
 Ingroup Outgroup 
Mindful 4.66 (1.61) 4.15 (1.60) 
Control 3.92 (1.13) 4.66 (1.40) 
 




When accounting for participants locus of control, those in the control 
condition were significantly more likely to make a dispositional attribution of the 
ingroup target (M=3.92, SD= 1.13) than the outgroup target (M= 4.66, SD= 1.40), 
F(1, 135)=5.45, p =.02 , Ș2 =.04. However, in the mindful condition there was no 
significant difference in the attrbution when evaluating the ingroup target (M=4.66, 
SD= 1.61) comapred to the outgroup target (M= 4.15, SD= 1.60), F(1, 135)=2.62, p 
= .11, Ș2 =.02. 
For the ingroup, participants in the control condition (M= 3.92, SD= 1.13) 
made a more dispositional attribution than those in the mindfulness condition (M= 
4.66, SD= 1.61), F(1, 136)= 5.03, p = .03, Ș2 =.04. For the outgroup, participants did 
not differ in the attributions made of the target in the control condition (M=4.66, 
SD= 1.40) compared to the mindfulness condition (M= 4.15, SD= 1.60), F(1, 136)= 
2.89, p = .09, Ș2 =.02. 
Perspective Taking 
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) 
ANOVA was conducted on perspective taking. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 9. There was a main effect of condition, F(1, 136)= 4.12, p = .04, Ș2 = .03. 
This showed that participants in the mindfulness condition scored lower for 
perspective taking (M= 3.61, SD= 0.60) than participants in the control condition 
(M=3.82, SD= 0.66). There was no main effect of group, F(1, 136)= 1.89, p = .17, Ș2 
= .01. There was a significant condition x group interaction, F(1, 136)= 6.26, p = .01, 
Ș2 = .04. 
  




Table 9.  
Means (SD) for perspective taking 
 Ingroup Outgroup 
Mindful 3.55 (0.63) 3.67 (0.58) 
Control 4.02 (0.50) 3.62 (0.74) 
 
Simple effects analysis, using Bonferroni adjustments, of the interaction 
showed that in the control condition participants perspective taking ability was 
higher for the ingroup target (M=4.02, SD= 0.50) than the outgroup target (M= 3.62, 
SD= 0.74), F(1, 136)=7.44, p = .01, Ș2 = .05. This is to be expected based on social 
identity theory, which suggests that the ingroup is seen as more similar to ourselves 
than the outgroup. In the mindfulness condition there was no significant difference in 
participants perspective taking ability for the ingroup target (M= 3.55, SD= 0.63) 
compared to the outgroup target (M=3.67, SD= 0.58), F(1, 136)=0.64, p = .43, Ș2 = 
.01.  
In the ingroup condition, participants perspective taking ability was 
significantly lower in the mindfulness (M= 3.55, SD= 0.63) comapred to the control 
condition (M= 4.02, SD= 0.50), F(1, 136)=9.59, p = .01, Ș2 = .07. In the outgroup 
condition there was no significant difference in perspective taking ability between 
the mindfulness (M= 3.67, SD= 0.58) and control conditions (M= 3.62, SD= 0.74), 
F(1, 136)=0.12, p = .73, Ș2 < .01. This suggests that the mindfulness practice reduces 
the ability to consider an alternative perspective when thinking about an ingroup 
member.  
FAE with perspective taking covariate 
Research has shown that perspective taking reduces the fundamental 
attribution error (Hooper et al., 2015b) and so this was included as a covariate in a 2 




(condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) ANCOVA. 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 10. The covariate, perspective taking, was 
not significant, F(1, 135)= 2.30, p = .13, Ș2 = .02. There was no main effect of 
condition, F(1, 135)= 0.65, p = .42, Ș2 =.01,  and no main effect of group, F(1, 135)= 
1.08, p = .30, Ș2 = .01. There was a significant condition x group interaction, F(1, 
135)= 5.69, p = .02, Ș2 = .04.  
Table 10.  
Means (SD) IRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DWWULEXWLRQVWRWKHWDUJHWZLWKSHUVSHFWLYHWDNLQJDVD
covariate 
 Ingroup Outgroup 
Mindful 4.61 (1.61) 4.27 (1.60) 
Control 3.81 (1.13) 4.67 (1.40) 
 
Simple effects analysis using Bonferroni adjustments revealed that in the 
control condition a more dispositional attribution was made of the ingroup target 
(M= 3.81, SD= 1.13) compared to the outgroup target (M= 4.67, SD= 1.40), F(1, 
135)= 5.70, p = .02, Ș2 = .04. Thus participants had made the FAE. In the 
mindfulness condition there was no significant difference in the atrtibutions made to 
the ingroup target (M= 4.61, SD= 1.61) comapred to the outgroup target (M= 4.27, 
SD= 1.60), F(1, 135)= 0.98, p = .32, Ș2 = .01. Therefore, when accounting for 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶OHYHORISHUVSHFWLYHWDNLQJWKHDWWHQXDWLQJHIIHFWRIPLQGIXOQHVVRQWKH
FAE remained. 
In the ingroup condition, participants in the control condition made a 
significantly more dispositional attribution (M= 3.81, SD= 1.13) than participants in 
the mindfulness condition (M= 4.61, SD= 1.61), F(1, 135)= 4.63, p = .03, Ș2 = .03. In 
the outgroup condition there was no significant difference in the attributions made in 




the control condition (M= 4.67, SD= 1.40) compared to the mindfulness condition 
(M= 4.27, SD= 1.60), F(1, 135)= 1.42, p = .24, Ș2 = .01.  
Open eneded questions measuring the FAE 
In order to analyse the open ended question asking participants to state the 
three most important reasons that Jamie/Jamal6 could not get a job, answers were 
first coded by mention of race. Answers which included race as a reason were coded 
as 1 and those with no mention of race coded as 0. A second researcher also coded 
the answers, and since many of the responses were either one word or very short 
sentences there was 100% agreement in the coding between the researcher and 
primary investigator. A logliner analysis was conducted to test for differences 
between conditions in the number of reasons that included race. The three-way log 
linear analysis produced a model that retained the second order effects. The 
OLNHOLKRRGUDWLRIRUWKLVPRGHOZDVȤ2(2)= 0.33, p = .85. This indicated that the two 
second order interactions (condition x race mentioned and group x race mentioned) 
ZHUHVLJQLILFDQWȤ2(1)= 7.23, p =DQGȤ2(1)=21.76, p <.001 respectively.  
  
                                                 
6
 It was noted that some participants had assumed the gender of the target to be female, 
whilst it was intended that the targets be assumed male. In the outgroup condition N= 4 participants 
UHIHUUHGWR-DPDODVµVKH¶LQWKHLUDQVZHUVLQWKHLQJURXSFRQGLWLRQ1  UHIHUUHGWR-DPLHDVµVKH¶ 




Table 11.  
Number of participants in each condition mentioning race as a reason for WDUJHW¶V
situation 
Condition Group Race mentioned Total mentioned (%) 
  Yes No  
Mindful 
Ingroup 0 32 0 
Outgroup 26 13 67% 
Control 
Ingroup 0 33 0 
Outgroup 3 33 8% 
 
To break down this effect, separate chi-square tests on groups were 
performed independently for mindfulness and control conditions. In the mindfulness 
condition there was a significant association between group and whether race was 
PHQWLRQHGȤ2(1)= 13.06, p <.001; this was not true for the control condition 
Ȥ2(1)=2.88, p =.09. In the outgroup condition there was a significant relationship 
between condition and whether race was PHQWLRQHGȤ2(1)=6.97, p =.01. Race was 
mentioned by only one participant (of 65) in the ingroup condition. Tests of effect 
sizes were carried out by calculating the odds ratio for the ingroup vs. outgroup, 
showing that when participants had read the outgroup members statement the odds 
that race was mentioned as a reason for being unsuccessful in the job market were 
5.56 times higher in the mindful condition than in the control condition.  
Discussion 
Experiment 5 showed that mindfulness attenuated the tendency to make the 
FAE, this effect remained when the participants own locus of control and ability to 
take another perspective were included as covariates. In addition, a significant 




interaction was observed for the effect of condition and group on participDQWV¶
perspective taking, showing that in the mindful condition participants were equally 
able to take another perspective, regardless of group. A log linear analysis of coded 
open-ended questions showed that participants in the mindful condition were more 
WKDQILYHWLPHVPRUHOLNHO\WRPHQWLRQUDFHDVDWWULEXWLQJWRWKHWDUJHW¶VVLWXDWLRQWKDQ
those in the control condition.  
This provides support for the hypothesis that mindfulness influences the 
attribution of behaviour of others and reduces the tendency to automatically ascribe 
dispositional attributions to an outgroup member and situational attributions to an 
ingroup member. This suggests that mindfulness may be useful in reducing 
automatic responding, as is the case for implicit bias (Lueke & Gibson, 2015), 
drinking behaviour (Ostafin et al., 2012; Ostafin & Marlatt, 2008), uncontrolled 
eating (Jordan et al., 2014) insight problem solving (Ostafin & Kassman, 2012), but 
may also have applications to attribution theory. In addition, the hypothesis that 
mindfulness would make participants more aware of racial bias as a situational 
attribution was supported, and thus may have implications for increasing awareness 
of bias.  
The results indicated that mindfulness and intergroup dynamics may also 
influence participants ability to take the perspective of another person, in that 
mindful participants, compared to control participants, were equally able to consider 
the perspective of an outgroup member, but perspective taking ability was reduced 
when considering an ingroup member.  This contradicts previous findings that 
suggest mindfulness is positively associated with perspective taking ability (Beitel, 
Ferrer, & Cecero, 2005; Johns, Allen, & Gordon, 2015), and that perspective taking 




ability should be higher for ingroup members. Experiment 6 therefore explored the 
HIIHFWRIPDQLSXODWLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUVSHFWLYHWDNLQJE\H[SOLFLWO\DVNLQJWKHPWR
consider either their own or another perspective when reading the scenario, to see 
whether this produced the same attenuating effect on the FAE.  
Experiment 6 
Previous research has shown that perspective taking training reduces 
individuals propensity to make the FAE (Hooper et al., 2015b) and also decreases 
the use of stereotypes in evaluating others (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). In 
addition, mindfulness has been shown to positively correlate with perspective taking 
(Beitel et al., 2005; Johns et al., 2015). This would suggest that an increase in 
mindfulness would increase perspective taking, and therefore reduce the FAE. 
However, the results from Experiment 5 showed that, in the mindfulness condition, 
perspective taking was reduced when evaluating an ingroup target, compared to an 
outgroup target. This is the opposite effect to that seen in the control condition, and 
showed that mindfulness interacts with group membership to influence perspective 
taking ability.  Therefore, Experiment 6 extends this and directly manipulates 
perspective taking so that half of the participants will be asked to read the target 
scenario considering how they would feel in that position (own perspective) and the 
RWKHUKDOIDVNHGWRUHDGWKHVFHQDULRFRQVLGHULQJWKHWDUJHW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRWKHU
perspective).  
Attributions about racial groups can influence racial bias (Gomez et al., 
2006). Modern racism theory suggests that most racial bias goes unnoticed because it 
is not recognisable as explicit bias (Brief et al., 2000). Therefore, in addition to 
attributions, Experiment 6 includes a measure of hostile and benevolent racism 




(Ramasubramanian & Oliver, 2007). This provides a more explicit measure of bias 
as well as the FAE measuring automatic associations which may provide a proxy for 
bias. The results of Experiment 5 revealed that participants in the mindfulness 
condition were more likely to highlight that the outgroup member (Jamal) was 
experiencing difficulty finding work due to his race. With this in mind the present 
experiment includes a measure of racist attitudes to see whether there is an 
interaction of mindfulness, perspective and group. It is expected that scores on the 
racism scales will be reduced for the outgroup target in the mindfulness condition 
when considering the other perspective.   
Hypotheses 
It is expected that participants in the mindfulness condition who are explicitly 
DVNHGWRFRQVLGHUWKHµRWKHU¶SHUVSHFWLYHZLOOEHOHDVWOLNHO\WRGHPRQVWUDWHWKH)$(
and make dispositional attributions. It is expected that there will be an interaction 
effect between perspective taking and mindfulness in the ingroup condition.  
Participants in the control condition are expected to exhibit the effects shown 
in previous research, that is, perspective taking will reduce the FAE. Participants 
FRQVLGHULQJWKHµRWKHU¶SHUVSHFWLYe will be expected to attribute less dispositionally 
than those in the own-perspective condition.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Three hundred and forty-WKUHHSDUWLFLSDQWVUHFUXLWHGIURP$PD]RQ¶V
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), who were residents of the U.S.A, took part in the study 
in return for a small monetary payment. Ninety-two participants were removed from 




the original data. Eighty for having reported race as other than White/Caucasian and 
13 who had failed embedded attention checks, which is below the average of 5% 
(according to Hauser and Schwarz, 2016). This left 251 White participants (163 
female and 86 male, Mage = 38.75, ranging from 19 to 77 years) in the remaining 
analysis.  
The experiment employed a 2 (mindfulness: mindful vs. control) x 2 
(perspective: own vs. other) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) between-participants 
design. The survey software randomly allocated participants to either a mindfulness 
(N=142) or control (N=109) condition, to read the statement considering their own 
perspective (N= 124) or the perspective of the other (the target; N=127), and to 
evaluate either an ingroup (N= 129) or outgroup (N=122) member. 
Materials 
Mindfulness manipulation. The 5-minute mindful body scan exercise used 
in Experiment 5 was used again in Experiment 6, along with the same control audio 
file.  
Perspective taking. Before being given the Jamie/Jamal statements to read, 
participants were instructed to read the statement considering either their own 
perspective, or that of the individual who made the statement (based on similar 
previous manipulations,  e.g Davis et al., 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). 
Participants were asked to think about how they/the target would feel in that 
situation, how they thought others might view themselves/the target and how they 
WKRXJKWLWPLJKWDIIHFWWKHLURZQWKHWDUJHW¶VIXWXUHMREDSSOLFDWLRQVVHH$SSHQGL[, 
Ingroup vs. Outgroup scenario. The same statements as in Experiment 5 
were used. The names Jamie and Jamal remained. Some of the open question 




responses in Experiment 5 suggested that a minority of the participants perceived the 
name Jamie to be a female target7, so to control the perceived gender of the target, 
WKHVWDWHPHQW³KHVD\V«´ZDVDGGHGWRWKHstart of the scenario.  
Dependent measures 
The same measures of perspective taking, FAE, state mindfulness and locus 
of control were used as in Experiment 5. All items were measured on a 7-point scale. 
Descriptive statistics for each measure are presented in Table 12.  
Hostile and benevolent racism. A measure of hostile and benevolent racism 
was adapted from Ramasubramanian and Oliver (2007). A list of eight traits was 
presented to participants, who were asked to state how much they felt each when in 
the presence of African-$PHULFDQVĮ 7KLs included hostile traits such as 
anger and dislike, and benevolent traits such as pity and guilt, see Appendix I.  
Attention check questions. As in Experiment 5 an attention check question 
was embedded into one of the scales and asked participants to select only the answer 
corresponding to the 7th point on the scale (see Appendix F). Participants who 
selected any other answer were assumed to not be paying close attention and were 
removed from analysis.  
  
                                                 
7
 It was noted that, in Experiment 5 open ended question, some participants had assumed the 
gender of the target to be female, whilst it was intended that the targets be assumed male. It was not 
explicitly asked what gender participants thought the target was. In the outgroup condition N= 4 
SDUWLFLSDQWVUHIHUUHGWR-DPDODVµVKH¶LQWKHLUDQVZHUV in the ingroup condition N= 25 referred to 
-DPLHDVµVKH¶ 




Table 12.  
Means, standard deviations and alpha scores for perspective taking, FAE, state 
mindfulness and locus of control dependent measures. 
 Mean (SD) Į 
Perspective taking 5.01 (0.86) .81 
FAE (single item) 4.67 (1.30) - 
State mindfulness 4.58 (0.92) .89 
Locus of control 3.77 (1.13) .81 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 5, with the exception that after 
listening to the mindfulness audio, and before reading the statements, participants 
were given instructions to either consider the statements from their own perspective, 
or from the perspective of Jamie/Jamal. The TMS measure of state mindfulness was 
also moved to the end of the questionnaire. State mindfulness was measured at the 
end of the questionnaire as a manipulation check, but was not measured immediately 
after the practice since Experiment 3 shows that the 5-minute online mindfulness 
task increased state mindfulness.  
Results and discussion 
Manipulation checks 
Mindfulness. A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup 
vs. outgroup) x 2 (perspective: own vs. other) ANOVA was run on the TMS. There 
were no significant main effects of condition, F(1, 243)= 0.69, p = .41, Ș2 <.01, 
perspective, F(1, 243)= 1.91, p = .17, Ș2 =.01, or group, F(1, 243)= 0.33, p= .57, Ș2 
<.01. The two-way interactions of condition x perspective, condition x group and 
group x perspective were non-significant, F¶s < 1. There was a significant three-way 




interaction of condition x perspective x group, F(1, 243)= 7.65, p = .01, Ș2 =.03, see 
Figure 2.  The analysis of simple effects using Bonferroni adjustments is detailed 
below.  
Figure 2. The effect of condition and group on mindfulness levels as a 
function of perspective 
 
 
Effect of perspective within group and condition. In the control, ingroup 
condition there was no significant difference in TMS scores between the own (M= 
4.63, SD= 0.90) and other (M= 4.55, SD= 0.84) perspective conditions, F(1, 243)= 
0.11, p = .74, Ș2 <.01. In the control, outgroup condition participants in the other 
perspective condition (M= 4.73, SD= 1.07) scored significantly higher on the TMS 
than participants in the own perspective condition (M= 4.16, SD= 1.02), F(1, 243)= 
5.00, p = .03, Ș2 = .02. In the mindfulness, ingroup condition, there was a marginally 
significant difference in TMS scores between the own (M= 4.41, SD= 0.74) and 
other perspective (M= 4.81, SD= 0.96) conditions, F(1, 243)= 3.53, p = .06, Ș2 =.01. 
This showed that participants reported higher mindfulness scores in the other 
























outgroup condition there was no significant difference in TMS scores between the 
own (M= 4.74, SD= 0.86) and other (M= 4.50, SD= 0.94) perspective conditions, 
F(1, 243)= 1.19, p = .28, Ș2 =.01. 
Effect of group within condition and perspective. In the control, own 
perspective condition there was no significant difference in TMS scores between the 
ingroup (M= 4.63, SD= 0.90) and outgroup (M= 4.16, SD= 1.02) conditions, F(1, 
243)= 3.16, p = .08, Ș2 =.01. In the control, other perspective condition there was no 
significant difference in TMS scores between the ingroup (M= 4.55, SD= 0.84) and 
outgroup (M= 4.73, SD= 1.07) conditions, F(1, 243)= 0.61, p = .44, Ș2 <.01. In the 
mindfulness, own perspective condition there was no significant difference in TMS 
scores between the ingroup (M= 4.41, SD= 0.74) and outgroup (M= 4.74, SD= 0.86) 
conditions, F(1, 243)= 2.48, p = .12, Ș2 =.01. In the mindfulness, other perspective 
condition there was no significant difference in TMS scores between the ingroup 
(M= 4.81, SD= 0.96) and outgroup (M= 4.50, SD= 0.94) conditions, F(1, 243)= 1.94, 
p = .17, Ș2 =.01. 
Effect of condition within perspective and group. In the own perspective, 
ingroup condition there was no significant difference in TMS scores between the 
mindfulness (M= 4.41, SD= 0.74) and control (M= 4.63, SD= 0.90) conditions, F(1, 
243)= 0.84, p = .36, Ș2 <.01. In the own perspective, outgroup condition participants 
in the mindfulness condition (M= 4.74, SD= 0.86) scored significantly higher on the 
TMS, and thus were more mindful, than participants in the control condition (M= 
4.16, SD= 1.02), F(1, 243)= 6.06, p = .02, Ș2 =.02. In the other perspective, ingroup 
condition there was no significant difference in TMS scores between the mindfulness 
(M= 4.81, SD= 0.96) and control (M= 4.55, SD= 0.84) conditions, F(1, 243)= 1.48, p 




= .23, Ș2 =.01. In the other perspective, outgroup condition there was no significant 
difference in TMS scores between the mindfulness (M= 4.50, SD= 0.94) and control 
(M= 4.73, SD= 1.07) conditions, F(1, 243)= 0.92, p = .34, Ș2 <.01. 
Perspective taking. A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (perspective: own vs. other) ANOVA was run on 
perspective taking. There were no significant main effects of condition, F(1, 243)= 
2.70, p = .10, Ș2 =.01, perspective, F(1, 243)= 1.59, p= .21, Ș2 =.01, or group, F(1, 
243)= 0.57, p = .45, Ș2 <.01. The two-way interactions of condition x perspective, 
condition x group and group x perspective were non-significant, Fs<1. The three-
way interaction of condition x perspective x group was not significant, F(1, 243)= 
0.12, p = .73, Ș2 <.01. 
Fundamental attribution error 
Experiment 5 found that participants in the mindful condition were less 
extreme in their evaluations of the target and why he had been unsuccessful in 
getting a job, and the FAE was attenuated. In contrast, in the control condition 
participants made more dispositional attributions of the ingroup target than the 
outgroup target. The same question was asked of participants in Experiment 6 to test 
whether manipulating perspective taking influenced this effect.  
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 
2 (perspective: own vs. other) ANOVA was run on the FAE item. There was no 
significant main effect of condition, F(1, 243)= 0.82, p = .37, Ș2 <.01, or of 
perspective, F(1, 243)= 1.10, p = .29, Ș2 = .01. There was a significant main effect of 
group, F(1, 243)= 4.37, p = .04, Ș2 =.02, showing that the ingroup target (M= 4.52, 
SD= 1.26) was evaluated with a more dispositional attribution than the outgroup 




target (M= 4.86, SD= 1.32).  The two-way interactions between mindfulness x 
perspective, mindfulness x group and perspective x group were all non-significant, 
)¶V < 1. The three-way interaction of mindfulness x group x perspective was 
significant, F(1, 243)= 4.23, p = .04, Ș2 = .02, see Figure 3. Analysis of simple 
effects using Bonferroni adjustments is detailed below.  
Effect of group within condition and perspective. In the control, own 
perspective condition there was a marginally significant difference in the FAE 
between the ingroup (M= 4.29, SD= 1.30) and outgroup (M= 4.96, SD= 1.20) 
conditions, F(1, 243)= 3.23, p = .07, Ș2 =.01. This showed that more dispositional 
attributions were made in the ingroup condition than the outgroup condition. In the 
control, other perspective condition there was no significant difference in the FAE 
between the ingroup (M= 4.88, SD= 1.14) and outgroup (M= 4.93, SD= 1.39) 
conditions, F(1, 243)= 0.02, p = .88, Ș2 <.01. In the mindfulness, own perspective 
condition there was no significant difference in the FAE between the ingroup (M= 
4.60, SD= 1.19) and outgroup (M= 4.56, SD= 1.40) conditions, F(1, 243)= 0.02, p = 
.90, Ș2 <.01. In the mindfulness, other perspective condition there was a significant 
difference in the FAE between the ingroup (M= 4.30, SD= 1.35) and outgroup (M= 
5.00, SD= 1.25) conditions, F(1, 243)= 4.86, p = .03, Ș2 =.02. This showed that 
participants made the FAE and made more dispositioal attributions in the ingroup 
condition than in the outgroup condition. 
Effect of perspective within condition and group. In the control, ingroup 
condition there was no significant difference in the FAE between the own (M= 4.29, 
SD= 1.30) and other (M= 4.88, SD= 1.14) perspective conditions, F(1, 243)= 2.89, p 
= .09, Ș2 =.01. In the control, outgroup condition there was no significant difference 




in the FAE between the other perspective condition (M= 4.93, SD= 1.39) and the 
own perspective condition (M= 4.96, SD= 1.20), F(1, 243)= 0.01, p = .93, Ș2 <.01. In 
the mindfulness, ingroup condition, there was no significant difference in the FAE 
between the own (M= 4.60, SD= 1.19) and other perspective (M= 4.30, SD= 1.35) 
conditions, F(1, 243)= 1.00, p = .34, Ș2 <.01. In the mindfulness, outgroup condition 
there was no significant difference in the FAE between the own (M= 4.56, SD= 1.40) 
and other (M= 5.00, SD= 1.25) perspective conditions, F(1, 243)= 1.98, p = .16, Ș2 
=.01. 
Effect of condition within perspective and group. In the own perspective, 
ingroup condition there was no significant difference in the FAE between the 
mindfulness (M= 4.60, SD= 1.19) and control (M= 4.29, SD= 1.30) conditions, F(1, 
243)= 0.82, p = .37, Ș2 <.01. In the own perspective, outgroup condition there was no 
significant difference in the FAE between the mindfulness (M= 4.56, SD= 1.40) and 
control (M= 4.96, SD= 1.20) conditions, F(1, 243)= 1.45, p = .23, Ș2 =.01. In the 
other perspective, ingroup condition there was a marginally significant difference in 
the FAE between the mindfulness (M= 4.30, SD= 1.35) and control (M= 4.88, SD= 
1.14) conditions, F(1, 243)= 3.57, p = .06, Ș2 =.01. This showed that more 
dispositional attributions were made in the ingroup control condition than in the 
ingroup mindfulness condition. In the other perspective, outgroup condition there 
was no significant difference in the FAE between the mindfulness (M= 5.00, SD= 
1.25) and control (M= 4.93, SD= 1.39) conditions, F(1, 243)= 0.04, p = .83, Ș2 <.01. 
  





Locus of Control  
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 
2 (perspective: own vs. other) ANOVA was run on locus of control. There were no 
significant main effects of condition, F(1, 243)= 0.62, p = .43, Ș2 <.01, perspective, 
F(1, 243)= 1.87, p = .17, Ș2 =.01, or group, F(1, 243)= 0.05, p = .82, Ș2 <.01. The 
two-way interactions of condition x perspective, condition x group and group x 
perspective were non-significant, Fs<1. The three-way interaction of condition x 
perspective x group was not significant, F(1, 243)= 0.004, p= .95, Ș2 <.01. However, 
it was expected that locus of control might affect attributions, so locus of control was 
used as a covariate, as in Experiment 5.  
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 
2 (perspective: own vs. other) ANCOVA was run on the FAE, with locus of control 
as a covariate. The covariate was significant, F(1, 242)= 34.29, p < .001, Ș2 = .12. 
There was no main effect of mindfulness condition, F(1, 242)= 0.45, p = .50, Ș2 
<.01), or perspective taking condition, F(1, 242)= 0.37, p = .55, Ș2 < .01. There was 
















that more dispositional attributions were made in the ingroup condition (M= 4.52, 
SD= 1.26) than the outgroup condition (M= 4.86, SD= 1.32). There were no 
significant two-way interactions of mindfulness x group, perspective taking x group 
or mindfulness x perspective taking ()¶V < 1), however the 3-way interaction of 
mindfulness x perspective taking x group was significant, F(1, 242)= 4.63, p = .03, 
Ș2= .02. Analysis of simple effects using Bonferroni adjustments is detailed below. 
Effect of group within condition and perspective. In the control, own perspective 
condition there was a marginally significant difference in the FAE between the 
ingroup (M= 4.35, SD= 1.30) and outgroup (M= 4.99, SD= 1.20) conditions, F(1, 
242)= 3.35, p = .07, Ș2 =.01. This showed that more dispositional attributions were 
made in the ingroup condition than the outgroup condition. In the control, other 
perspective condition there was no significant difference in the FAE between the 
ingroup (M= 4.80, SD= 1.14) and outgroup (M= 4.84, SD= 1.39) conditions, F(1, 
242)= 0.02, p = .90, Ș2 <.01. In the mindfulness, own perspective condition there 
was no significant difference in the FAE between the ingroup (M= 4.64, SD= 1.19) 
and outgroup (M= 4.60, SD= 1.40) conditions, F(1, 242)= 0.02, p = .88, Ș2 <.01. In 
the mindfulness, other perspective condition there was a significant difference in the 
FAE between the ingroup (M= 4.31, SD= 1.35) and outgroup (M= 5.00, SD= 1.25) 
conditions, F(1, 242)= 5.38, p = .02, Ș2 =.02. This showed that participants made 
more dispositioal attributions in the ingroup condition than in the outgroup 
condition. 
Effect of perspective within condition and group. In the control, ingroup 
condition there was no significant difference in the FAE between the own (M= 4.35, 
SD= 1.30) and other (M= 4.80, SD= 1.14) perspective conditions, F(1, 242)= 1.90, p 
= .17, Ș2 =.01. In the control, outgroup condition there was no significant difference 




in the FAE between the other perspective condition (M= 4.84, SD= 1.39) and the 
own perspective condition (M= 4.99, SD= 1.20), F(1, 242)= 0.20, p = .66, Ș2 <.01. In 
the mindfulness, ingroup condition, there was no significant difference in the FAE 
between the own (M= 4.64, SD= 1.19) and other perspective (M= 4.31, SD= 1.35) 
conditions, F(1, 242)= 1.34, p = .25, Ș2 =.01. In the mindfulness, outgroup condition 
there was no significant difference in the FAE between the own (M= 4.60, SD= 1.40) 
and other (M= 5.00, SD= 1.25) perspective conditions, F(1, 242)= 1.94, p = .17, Ș2 
=.01. 
Effect of condition within perspective and group. In the own perspective, 
ingroup condition there was no significant difference in the FAE between the 
mindfulness (M= 4.64, SD= 1.19) and control (M= 4.35, SD= 1.30) conditions, F(1, 
242)= 0.83, p = .36, Ș2 <.01. In the own perspective, outgroup condition there was no 
significant difference in the FAE between the mindfulness (M= 4.60, SD= 1.40) and 
control (M= 4.99, SD= 1.20) conditions, F(1, 242)= 1.57, p = .21, Ș2 =.01. In the 
other perspective, ingroup condition there was no significant difference in the FAE 
between the mindfulness (M= 4.31, SD= 1.35) and control (M= 4.80, SD= 1.14) 
conditions, F(1, 242)= 2.82,  p = .09, Ș2 =.01. In the other perspective, outgroup 
condition there was no significant difference in the FAE between the mindfulness 
(M= 5.00, SD= 1.25) and control (M= 4.84, SD= 1.39) conditions, F(1, 242)= 0.28, p 
= .60, Ș2 <.01.   
Hostile and benevolent racism. 
Two separate 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. 
RXWJURXS[SHUVSHFWLYHRZQYVRWKHU$129$¶V were run with benevolent and 
hostile racism as dependent variables. For benevolent racism there were no 




significant main effects of mindfulness, F(1, 243)= 0.06, p = .81, Ș2< .01, 
perspective, F(1, 243)= 0.83, p = .36, Ș2< .01, or group, F(1, 243)= 0.05, p = .95, Ș2< 
.01. There were no significant two-way interactions of condition x perspective, F(1, 
243)= 0.004, p = .83, Ș2< .01, condition x group, F(1, 243)= 1.99, p = .16, Ș2= .01, or 
perspective x group, F(1, 243)= 0.43, p = .51, Ș2< .01. The three-way interaction did 
not reach significance, F(1, 243)= 0.08, p = .78, Ș2< .01. 
For hostile racism, there were no significant main effects of mindfulness, 
F(1, 243)= 1.74, p = .19, Ș2= .01, perspective, F(1, 243)= 2.43, p = .12, Ș2= .01,  or 
group, F(1, 243)= 1.64, p = .20, Ș2= .01. The mindfulness x perspective, and 
perspective x group two-way interactions did not reach significance (F¶s < 1). There 
was a significant two-way interaction of mindfulness x group condition, F(1, 243)= 
4.28, p = .04Ș2= .02. The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 243)= 
0.08, p  Ș2< .01. 
Table 13.  
Means (SD) for hostile racism scores for the condition x group interaction 
 Ingroup Outgroup 
Mindful 1.81 (1.09) 1.37 (0.68) 
Control 1.71 (1.07) 1.81 (1.22) 
 
Simple effects analysis of the significant two-way interaction, using 
Bonferroni adjustments, revelaed that in the control condition there was no 
significant difference in hostile racism scores between the ingroup (M= 1.71, SD= 
1.07) and outgroup conditions (M= 1.81, SD= 1.22), F(1, 243)= 0.27, p  Ș2< 
.01. In the mindfulness condition there was a significant difference in hostile racism 
scores between the ingroup (M= 1.81, SD= 1.09) and outgroup (M= 1.37, SD= 0.68) 




conditions, F(1, 243)= 6.46, p  Ș2= .03. This showed that hostile racism scores 
were lower for mindful participants who were evaluating the outgroup target.  
Comparing the group conditions showed that there was no significant 
difference in hostile racism scores in the ingroup condition between the control (M= 
1.71, SD= 1.07) and mindfulness (M= 1.81, SD= 1.09) conditions, F(1, 243)= 0.29, p 
 Ș2< .01. In the outgroup condition, hostile racism scores were significantly 
lower in the mindfulness condition (M= 1.37, SD= 0.68) compared to the control 
condition (M= 1.81, SD= 1.22), F(1, 243)= 5.55, p  Ș2= .02. Taken together 
this shows that mindfulness significantly reduced scores of hostile racism in the 
outgroup condition.  
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 6 showed that in the control condition, 
participants who were asked to consider the other perspective made similar 
attributions of the ingroup and outgroup target. In the own perspective condition, 
participants in the control condition made more dispositional attributions of the 
ingroup target than an outgroup target. The opposite pattern of results was observed 
for participants in the mindfulness condition. Participants in the own perspective 
condition made similar attributions of the ingroup and outgroup target. In the other 
perspective condition, participants in the mindfulness condition made more 
dispositional attributions of the ingroup target compared to the outgroup target, 
suggesting that the FAE was still present.  
The results in the control condition support those of Hooper et al. (2015b), 
that showed perspective taking reduced the fundamental attribution error. However, 
in the mindfulness condition the effect is reversed, and participants in the other 




perspective condition made the FAE, whereas those in the own perspective condition 
did not. This may be due to the use of race as the group category, since perceptions 
about race are particularly difficult to alter (Ito & Urland, 2003; Park & Rothbart, 
1982), and affect strongly held judgements such as transgression credit offered to 
leaders (cf. Abrams, Travaglino, Randsley de Moura, & May, 2014). Furthermore, 
Hooper et al. (2015b) used a different measure of the FAE and manipulated 
perspective taking through a training task, and thus differed from the present 
research.  
Taken together the results showed that the effect mindfulness has on the FAE 
towards different group members is qualified by perspective taking, although further 
research is needed to fully understand this effect. It would be of interest to 
investigate the relationship between mindfulness and perspective taking more 
directly to better understand these results. Previous research suggests a positive 
correlation (Beitel et al., 2005; Johns et al., 2015), however, this has not yet been 
empirically tested.  
Another possible area to follow up is the impact of mindfulness on direct 
measures of hostile racism. Although the results showed that participants generally 
scored below the mid-point for hostile racism, there was a mindfulness x group 
interaction which showed that mindfulness reduced perceptions of hostility towards 
the outgroup target. This has implications for reducing explicit racist attitudes 
towards outgroup members, and could also be compared to implicit measures, where 
mindfulness has been shown to reduce racial bias (Lueke & Gibson, 2015).  





Two experiments investigated the effect of mindfulness on the FAE when 
evaluating ingroup and outgroup targets. Experiment 5 showed that mindfulness 
attenuated the FAE and attributions were less extreme to outgroup members, 
compared to ingroup members. For perspective taking, mindfulness reduced the 
ability to take another perspective in the ingroup condition. Experiment 6 developed 
this further by manipulating perspective taking. The results of Experiment 6 showed 
that in the control condition, participants taking their own perspective made the FAE 
and made more dispositional attributions of the ingroup member compared to the 
outgroup member, but in the other perspective condition this was attenuated. In 
contrast, the opposite effect was found in the mindfulness condition. More research 
is needed to further unpack this interaction and to fully understand the relationship 
between mindfulness and perspective taking.  
On possible explanation for the different effect in the mindfulness condition 
is that mindfulness may increase introspection (Fox et al., 2012) thus making 
perspective taking more difficult in the outgroup condition. If the mindfulness 
FRQGLWLRQLVLQFUHDVLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWURVSHFWLRQWKHQFRQVLGHULQJDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V
perspective may be too cognitively demanding. Although other research has 
suggested that a benefit of mindfulness practice is enhanced working memory 
capacity and more efficient management of cognitive load (Mrazek et al., 2015; van 
Vugt & Jha, 2011) it is possible that introspection and perspective taking clash and 
cause cognitive dissonance preventing the benefits of mindfulness for attenuating 
attribution bias.  




In particular, in the outgroup condition, participants are asked to consider not 
only another perspective, but one of a less similar other (than the ingroup). This may 
be too cognitively depleting and causes a fall back to reliance on heuristics. Based on 
stereotypes and heuristic schemas some associations are more easily accessible, for 
example, the association between Black men and violence (Duncan, 1976) or anger 
and Black faces (Hutchings & Haddock, 2008). Thus stereotypes associating Black 
individuals with lower status or unemployment may mean that it is easier to imagine 
the outgroup member being unsuccessful in the labour market than the ingroup 
member. This association may be relied upon in the case of cognitive dissonance 
since an easily accessible resolution to the dissonance would be preferred than 
effortful thinking of alternative explanations or associations.  
A possible limitation of these experiments is the ambiguity of the scenario. 
Participants were purposefully given limited information about the target and their 
EDFNJURXQGVRWKDWGLIIHUHQFHVLQUHVSRQVHVFRXOGEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHWDUJHW¶VJURXS
membership (ingroup vs. outgroup). However, ambiguity can also affect judgements 
of others. Dovidio (1995) found that when White students were asked to select the 
most suitable candidate for a role as resident advisors, a prestigious and honourable 
role at US colleges, unambiguous (highly positive or uniformly negative) 
information led to equal selection of Black and White candidates. However, when 
the information was ambiguous (both positive and negative) White applicants were 
endorsed more than Black applicants. The same may therefore be true in the 
employment context used in the present research. In addition, the intergroup context 
was similar to the present experiment in that participants were all White and 
evaluating ingroup (White) vs. outgroup (Black) others.  




Another potential problem in Experiment 6 could be the perspective taking 
PDQLSXODWLRQ3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRFRQVLGHUWKHWDUJHW¶VVFHQDULRFRQVLGHULQJ
how they would feel in that position (own perspective) or to consider how the target 
would be feeling (other perspective). However, the own perspective condition may 
also have enhanced perspective taking to some extent since participants were 
thinking about the scenario in third person. The task may also have been too 
cognitively depleting in the outgroup condition. Previous research (Hooper et al., 
2015b) XVHGEULHISHUVSHFWLYHWDNLQJWUDLQLQJWRHQKDQFHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DELOLW\WR
consider the other perspective. Whilst this may not be feasible for all situations, it 
may be more effective in enhancing perspective taking, which it may not be possible 
to achieve through simple instructions to think about another SHUVRQ¶s 
situation/feelings.  
Taken together, the results from Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that 
mindfulness is useful in reducing the fundamental attribution error for outgroup 
members, but is altered by explicitly trying to take the perspective of another person. 
In addition, Experiments 4-6 combined show that mindfulness has positive effects in 
attribution, and is beneficial to reducing attributional biases. In sum, these 
experiments add to an emerging body of literature on the positive effects of 
mindfulness on social judgements. It also lends to support to the notion that 
mindfulness has salutary effects in reducing automatic associations when evaluating 
others. A next logical step is to consider the effect of mindfulness on non-automatic 
cognitive processes within a social context. With this in mind, Experiment 7 aims to 
apply the brief mindfulness practice in the domain of group decision-making, since 
the decision process is based on non-automatic cognition.  




Chapter 7: Mindfulness and group decision-making 
Chapter Summary 
So far the experiments presented in this thesis have focused on automatic 
biases in person-judgement. The focus of Chapter 7 is on the non-automatic process 
of decision-making. This chapter presents a face-to-face group experiment in which 
participants were randomly assigned to a mindfulness vs. control condition, before 
working in groups to complete a problem decision task. Specifically, the experiment 
investigated the interaction of mindfulness and anxiety on group cohesion, group 
efficacy, and decision accuracy. The results revealed that groups did not make 
superior decisions compared to individuals, and that cohesion and efficacy were not 
significantly altered by mindfulness and anxiety, but trends suggest both were 
reduced after mindfulness practice compared to control groups. These results are 
inconsistent with recent literature that suggests mindfulness improves group 
performance in decision-making tasks and increases group cohesion. Possible 
explanations for these results are considered in the discussion.  
Mindfulness and group decision-making 
Groups tend to outperform individuals on decision-making tasks (Blinder & 
Morgan, 2000; Hill, 1982; Pavitt, 1994; Van & Delbecq, 1974; Vollrath, Sheppard, 
Hinsz, & Davis, 1989), especially when the features of the group and the nature of 
the task are optimally balanced (Hill, 1982). In practice, it is not always possible to 
identify suitable task features and group attributes ahead of time, and in many cases 
decision-making groups are made up of an ad hoc group of individuals. These groups 
differ from ³true´RUQDWXUDOO\RFFXUULQJ groups (Horn, 2008), in that decision-




making groups often exhibit different attributes and experience the decision process 
differently to ³true´ groups (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985; Kramer et al., 1993).  
One key difference between groups and individuals is that the presence of 
others can be intimidating for individuals and thus decreases performance. In 
contrast, the presence of others in a group situation sometimes increases arousal, 
motivation to perform well, and self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Zajonc, 
1965) leading to enhanced performance. In addition, groups are able to attenuate the 
negative aspects of arousal and mitigate cognitive fallacies 2¶/HDU\.  
However, an important feature that groups rely on for enhanced performance is the 
cohesiveness and mutual respect of group members. In other words, in order to 
achieve optimal performance, the group must also get along well.  
In a cohesive group, motivation gains are attained through being in the 
presence of others which enhances the desire to perform well for the good of the 
group, and can further increase group cohesion (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). Even 
temporary minimal groups can quickly form a group identity, which in turn can 
foster a sense of cohesion among ingroup members (Brewer, 1979) and help the 
group to perform efficiently. As is the case for attributional judgements, intergroup 
dynamics also affect this relationship, in that intergroup competition should further 
LQFUHDVHWKHLQJURXS¶VFRKHVLRQDQGLGHQWLW\VWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHLUµJURXSQHVV¶DQG
therefore the group members desire to perform well for the good of the group. In 
sum, groups who share a positive experience tend to be made up of members who 
are willing to contribute more to the group to ensure its success, leading to further 
positive experience and group efficacy.  




This experiment specifically investigates whether mindfulness and anxiety 
(through intergroup evaluations) affect group decision performance. It is expected 
that mindfulness will increase group cohesion, and enhance performance on the 
decision-making task. Furthermore, increased anxiety within the group is expected to 
hinder decision-making performance (Aiken, Kim, Hwang, & Lu, 1995; Bordia, 
Irmer, & Abusah, 2006), but increased intergroup anxiety is expected to heighten the 
ingroup identity (Oakes & Turner, 1980), and improve group performance and 
cohesion. 0LQGIXOQHVVKDVEHHQVKRZQWRGHFUHDVHLQGLYLGXDOV¶DQ[LHW\DQGLPSURYH
group-decision making, but as yet it is not known whether the two constructs 
interact, and whether mindfulness is only effective in improving decision-making 
when there is anxiety in the group. The hypothesis for Experiment 7 is that groups 
who are mindful and are put under anxiety inducing conditions should perform better 
than non-mindful groups and those who are not expecting to be evaluated.  
Features of the Group  
Group members that are trying to accomplish something typically interact, 
influence one another, and perceive themselves to be a group with shared goals and 
objectives (Baron & Kerr, 2003). Such a sense of shared purpose fosters group 
efficacy, thus it is unsurprising that groups tend to perform better than individuals. 
An advantage that groups have over individuals is the ability to pool their group 
PHPEHUV¶UHVRXUFHVZKLFKOHDGVWRVXSHULRUGHFLsion-making 2¶/HDU\. This 
allows for errors to be noticed and corrected, ideas and solutions to be shared and 
steps to be built upon through discussion.  For example, in eureka tasks (intellective 
puzzles where there is a unique answer that once found becomes immediately clear; 
Lorge, Fox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958), Shaw (1932) found that three of 21 




individuals were able to solve the problem (approximately 14%) compared to three 
of five groups (60% of the four person groups). In fact, groups have been found to 
perform better than, or at least as well as, the best individual members of the group 
(Laughlin et al., 2002, 1991), suggesting that many heads are better than one. 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that groups face problems that can 
hinder their ability to make optimal decisions.  For example, decision-making groups 
are more likely to discuss information that they all share or have in common than 
unique or new information (Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; 
Stasser et al., 1989; Stasser & Titus, 1985) and when unshared information does 
arise its impact is given less attention. This suggests that groups can only really 
benefit from the input of more individuals, if the information and expertise of those 
individuals is utilised. Bottger and Yetten (1988) found that groups carrying out the 
µ0RRQ/DQGLQJ¶VXUYLYDOWDVNZHUHPRUHHIIHFWLYHZKHQPHPEHUUHVRXUFHVZHUH
utilised effectively, especially when at least two members held high quality 
information. Unsurprisingly, groups with low member resource quality performed 
poorly.  
This also highlights how social judgements influence the group and how 
group member attributes can hinder the decision-making process, for example, status 
and ability. The research above, suggests that group members with better quality 
information, or the skills to make a correct decision (or solve a problem) help the 
group to achieve a high quality decision or solution. However, this relies on two 
things: the group member sharing their information, and the group accepting and 
using that information. As discovered by Stasser and Titus (1985), group members 
are more likely to discuss information that they all have in common, so if a group 




member stands alone with correct or useful information, the information may be 
overlooked, not shared, or not considered useful by the rest of the group. The group 
member with the best information is not always heard, especially if that member is 
of low status, or does not have confidence in their answer, and is unable to convince 
the other group members (Berger & Zelditch, 1998). This may suggest that 
LQWHUJURXSG\QDPLFVFDQDIIHFWPLQLPDOJURXSV¶DELOLW\WRZRUNHIIHFWLYHO\)RU
example, arbitrary groups made up of members from other known groups may be 
affected by group members superordinate group memberships. However, this may be 
overcome by increased cohesion among group members. 
Group Cohesion and Efficacy 
Increased group cohesion significantly predicts improved job satisfaction 
(Steinhardt, Dolbier, Gottlieb, & McCalister, 2003) and performance (Mullen & 
Copper, 1994). In addition, working as part of a group increases cohesion (Guzzo & 
Dickson, 1996). Therefore, the relationship between group work and cohesion may 
be two-way. As highlighted above, even temporary and minimal groups form 
cohesive groups (Brewer, 1979). Furthermore, Chin, Salisbury, Pearson, & Stollak, 
(1999) found that groups who were put together for the sole purpose of solving a 
single problem, and were therefore only together for a short time, still formed a 
cohesive relationship.  
Similarly, successful group performance increases group efficacy, and vice 
versa (Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005). This means that merely being 
placed in a group to perform a task could foster cohesion and perceived group 
efficacy. Furthermore, making a shared group identity salient was shown to increase 
negotiators concern for what others had obtained, and led to more equal outcomes 




for both parties. By contrast a salient individuating, or personal, identity increased 
self-focus and reduced concern for others performance, leading to less equal 
outcomes (Kramer et al., 1993). Therefore a salient group identity, rather than salient 
personal identity, should be beneficial to group performance and improve 
perceptions of the social experience for group members, although the effect may be 
different in bigger groups, or with a different decision task.  
Anxiety in Groups 
Decision-making groups do not need to be ³true´ groups with established 
norms and identity. In fact, Baron and Kerr (2003) suggest that established groups 
are more likely than nominal groups to suffer evaluation apprehension, which leads 
to reduced performance. Members of established groups, with a shared identity, may 
fear embarrassment or rejection from how other members evaluate their input, and 
therefore not contribute as much to the discussion. This was found in organisations 
where knowledge exchange can take place through either interpersonal interactions 
on in a shared database or intranet style system. Employees were found to be less 
likely to share information when apprehensive, and were more apprehensive about 
their input being evaluated when sharing this publicly in the database-style system 
(Bordia et al., 2006). This was thought to be the result of sharing the information 
with a number of people, and the information not being anonymous. This was 
supported by research that showed 85% of participants who communicated through 
an anonymous system felt little or no evaluation anxiety (Aiken et al., 1995).  
Other research suggests that evaluation apprehension is less likely to be a 
problem for a temporary nominal group, and thus a nominal group may suffer less 
adverse effects to productivity than an established group. Camacho & Paulus (1995) 




found that groups with low interaction anxiety performed as well as nominal groups, 
but those with high anxiety experienced process loss and underperformed. Therefore, 
a means to reduce evaluation anxiety should work to counter the negative effects and 
improve the group decision quality. One such intervention is mindfulness.  
Mindfulness 
Mindfulness has been found effective in reducing trait and state anxiety 
through both face-to-face (Dam, Hobkirk, Sheppard, Aviles-Andrews, & 
Earleywine, 2013; Tanay et al., 2012) and online courses (Boettcher et al., 2014; 
Krusche et al., 2013; Proudfoot et al., 2004). Although not directly related to 
evaluation anxiety, this suggests that mindfulness may be a promising intervention to 
reduce the negative effects of the heightened state of anxiety produced by intergroup 
evaluation. Moreover, mindfulness reduces emotional arousal, which has been 
shown to increase individual performance in academic settings (Shao & Skarlicki, 
2009), and thus mindfulness may attenuate the emotional arousal induced by 
intergroup evaluation.  
In addition, mindfulness has been found to increase empathy (Edwards, 
Adams, Waldo, Hadfield, & Biegel, 2014), is thought to increase empathic concern 
for others (Block-Lerner et al., 2007), and have a positive effect on group cohesion 
(Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015). Taken together, these findings advocate that 
mindfulness should have a positive effect on group performance. In particular, by 
improving the intragroup dynamics so that group members are able to work 
FRKHVLYHO\DQGHIIHFWLYHO\JLYLQJFRQVLGHUDWLRQWRHDFKRWKHU¶VSRVLWLRQIn turn, this 
should enhance perceptions of group efficacy. As noted above, cohesive groups tend 
to share a more positive social experience and are able to work more efficiently. 




Therefore mindfulness may also be beneficial to group members¶ social experience 
when working in a group. 
Alongside the positive effects that mindfulness is thought to elicit among 
group members, there is emerging evidence that mindfulness is also beneficial to 
decision-making per se. For example, Hafenbrack et al. (2014) found that both trait 
and state mindfulness (after a 15 minute induction) were associated with reduced 
sunk-cost bias. The sunk-cost bias is the tendency to continue an endeavour after a 
commitment (e.g. time, effort or money) has been made, even though the outcomes 
may be negative. The research showed that mindfulness reduced this propensity 
through a reduced temporal focus on the past and future, which in turn decreased 
negative affect and led to less sunk-cost bias.  
Another investigation of individual decision-making showed that 
mindfulness improves insight problems, but not non-insight problems. Insight 
problems are those where finding a solution is hindered by past experience, and 
restructuring the problem helps to overcome this and see the solution more easily 
HJKDYLQJDQµDKD¶PRPHQW,QFRQWUDVWQRQ-insight problems are those where 
logic can be used to solve the problem through a series of incremental steps, and are 
helped by past experience or knowledge of the problem. Ostafin and Kassman 
(2012) found that more mindful participants were better able to solve the insight 
problems, but that mindfulness had no effect on performance in non-insight 
problems. This was thought to be the result of mindfulness enabling participants to 
overcome habitual responding in the insight problems, and consider the problem 
from alternative perspectives, and with more creativity. Additionally, experienced 
meditators showed significantly less cognitive rigidity than naïve meditators, which 




helped experienced meditators to find novel solutions to problems more easily 
(Greenberg et al., 2012). These studies, taken together, point to a positive effect of 
mindfulness in decision-making across different types of task. In particular, tasks 
that benefit from non-automatic responding and increased creative or flexible 
thinking.  
There is a hypothesised link between mindfulness and decision-making in 
other areas. For example, mindfulness enables decision-makers to sort relevant from 
non-relevant information more easily (Karelaia & Reb, 2014). This adds weight to 
the theory that mindfulness would aid decision-making for particular tasks, such as 
those that require some element of judgement as well as knowledge and skill. One 
such task that would therefore be useful to test in this context is a survival task (e.g. 
winter survival, desert survival, Johnson & Johnson, 2003). This type of task has a 
correct answer (items ranked by the expert), but relies on some level of judgement as 
to the use and importance of the items. Therefore it falls somewhere in the middle of 
the continuum from intellective tasks, or those with a demonstrably correct outcome, 
and judgmental tasks that do not have a correct answer (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). 
Consequently, a degree of flexible thinking is required, and group members with 
knowledge of survival situations or atypical uses for the 15 available items should be 
better equipped to make an accurate decision.  
At present, very little empirical research has investigated the influence of 
mindfulness on group performance and decision-making. However, Cleirigh and 
Greaney (2015) found that mindfulness increased group cohesion, and improved 
decision-making performance on a survival task. They delivered a brief (10 minute) 
mindfulness induction, followed by an introduction to the benefits of mindfulness on 




emotional experience and an awareness themed poem to half of their participants. 
The other half (control group) listened to two educational excerpts from a radio 
show. Thirty-WZRSDUWLFLSDQWVWKHQZRUNHGLQJURXSVRIIRXUWRFRPSOHWHWKHµ:LQWHU
6XUYLYDO¶WDVN(Johnson & Johnson, 2003) where participants completed the task 
individually and then as a group. Using openness to the concept of mindfulness 
(Mindfulness Attitudes Scale, MAS) as a covariate, the researchers found that group 
scores in the mindfulness condition were significantly higher, and thus more 
accurate, than group scores in the control condition.  
Although this research shows promise for the use of mindfulness to improve 
group performance, and is a good preliminary investigation, the design means that 
we still do not know whether the groups performed better than individuals. The 
results show that mindful groups perform better than non-mindful groups, but not 
whether this also represents an increase from individual performance. Furthermore, 
the study is based on a very limited number of participants and is statistically 
underpowered. In addition, although the researchers included a measure of group 
cohesion, they did not take into account other group level factors, such as intergroup 
evaluations.  
The aim of the present experiment is to test the use of the 5-minute 
mindfulness task in a face-to-face group setting to investigate whether mindfulness 
improves the outcome on a non-automatic task, specifically a group decision-making 
task. Furthermore, the experiment will test the effect of mindfulness on group 
performance compared to individual performance on decision-making, as well as 
whether mindfulness impacts evaluation anxiety, group cohesion and group efficacy. 
Groups of four will be used as in the original study (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015), and 




because fostering identity and belonging to improve cooperative decision-making 
has been found easier in small groups (M. B. Brewer & Kramer, 1986). A smaller 
group is also expected to benefit from reduced production blocking. In bigger 
groups, since only one person can speak and be heard at a time, group members have 
to take turns. This can decrease efficiency as waiting can lead to ideas being skipped, 
missed or forgotten (Johnson & Johnson, 2003). It is expected that this will create 
optimal group conditions. Furthermore, the same type of survival task will be used as 
in the original study since this type of task requires skills that mindfulness is 
expected to enhance.  
Hypotheses 
Experiments 4-6 revealed that a single-session 5-minute mindfulness practice 
improved evaluations of others through reducing the automatic process of 
attribution. The hypothesis for Experiment 7 is that mindfulness will also have an 
effect on the non-automatic process of decision-making. Based on the previous 
findings, it is expected that mindfulness will have a positive effect on group 
performance, increasing decision accuracy, group cohesion, and group efficacy.  
Furthermore, it is expected that increased anxiety will lead groups to perform 
worse on the decision-making task, but that their group identity will be stronger. 
Mindfulness is expected to attenuate this group performance decrement, and 
therefore, it is expected that participants in the mindfulness condition, and 
experiencing anxiety will perform better than participants in control conditions with 
low anxiety. Furthermore, mindfulness and increased anxiety are expected to 
HQKDQFHWKHJURXSSHUIRUPDQFHUHODWLYHWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOJURXSPHPEHUV¶
performance.  






Participants and Design 
An opportunity sample of two hundred and forty undergraduate students 
voluntarily participated in the experiment, in return for course credit. Forty-eight 
participants were excluded due to a technical problem with the audio file for 12 
groups, leaving 192 participants in the analysis (150 women, 28 men and 14 not 
specified, Mage =18.81 years, ranging from 16-63). A 2 (mindfulness vs. control) x 2 
(high vs. low anxiety) between participants design was employed. Participants were 
randomly allocated to groups of four using playing cards, which also assigned them 
to condition. These were mindfulness (N= 108), control (N= 84), high anxiety (N= 
100) and low anxiety (N= 92).  
Materials 
Mindfulness Manipulation. The same mindfulness audio file, consisting of 
a 5-minute body scan, was used as in Experiments 1-3.  
Anxiety Manipulation. Anxiety was manipulated by telling participants in 
the high anxiety condition that after the experiment they would be asked to ³VWDQG
up in front of the class to present your scores to the rest of the groups and evaluate 
\RXUSHUIRUPDQFHDQG\RXUJURXS¶VSHUIRUPDQFHWRVHHZKLFKJURXSDFKLHYHGWKH
PRVWDFFXUDWHDQVZHU´. In the low anxiety condition, participants were told that 
³7KHVFRUHVRQWKHGHFLVLRQ-making task will not be compared to other individuals 
RURWKHUJURXSVDQGWKHRXWFRPHVZLOOQRWEHHYDOXDWHG´.  





6XUYLYDO6LWXDWLRQ¶WDVNZKLFKLVDJURXS decision-making task for examining 
individual and team effectiveness (see Appendix J)6LPLODUWDVNVVXFKDVWKHµ:LQWHU
6XUYLYDO¶WDVN-RKQVRQ	-RKQVRQSKDYHEHHQused in previous group 
decision-making research (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015; Haslam et al., 1998; 
Sundstrom et al., 1997). The task required participants (working in groups of four) to 
imagine that their plane had crash landed in the Sonara desert in the South-West 
United States in mid-August, and gives some information about their last known 
location and the conditions in their current location. They are given a list of 15 items 
(e.g. magnetic compass, cosmetic mirror and jack knife) which were salvaged from 
the plane wreckage, and told to rank these items in order of importance to the 
JURXSV¶VXUYLYDO3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHJLYHQ-minutes to complete this ranking 
individually, without discussing with other group members. They were then given 
10-minutes to work collectively and rank the items as a group. Groups were then 
given the list with the order of importance as decided by a real survival expert and 
asked to calculate the difference between their individual ranking and the expert 
ranking, and the group ranking compared to the expert ranking.  
Dependent Measures 
Decision. Error scores were used to reflect decision quality. Both individuals 
ranking, and group ranking scores were subtracted from the expert ranking to 
provide an error score ranging from 0 (perfect match to expert) to 95 (inverse 
ranking). This provided two scores, an individual and group performance score. 
6FRUHVFORVHUWRWKHH[SHUW¶VORZHUVFRUHVZKLFKUHSUHVHQWHGDVPDOOHUHUURUZHUH
indicative of a better performance on the task.  




Anxiety. After receiving the instructions and the anxiety manipulation, 
participants were asked three manipulation check questions to assess how anxious 
they felt (see Appendix J). These were measured on a 7-point, bi-polar scale (calm - 
tense, anxious - relaxed (reverse scored) and confident - XQVXUHĮ M= 3.60, 
SD= 1.11). 
Group identification. Two items were adapted from a larger group 
identification scale (Randsley de Moura, Abrams, Retter, Gunnarsdottir, & Ando, 
2009) and asked participants how strongly they identified with the group they were 
DVVLJQHGWRIRUWKHH[SHULPHQWHJ³,IHHOVWURQJWLHVZLWKWKLVJURXS´,WHPVZHUH
measured on a 7-point scale (1= not at all, 7= very much), with higher scores 
indicating stronger identification, r= .67 (M= 4.58, SD= 0.99), see Appendix K.  
Group Cohesion. A 10 item scale was created to measure group 
FRKHVLYHQHVV6L[LWHPVHJ³,VHHP\VHOIDVSDUWRIWKLVJURXS´ZHUHWDNHQIURP
the perceived cohesion in small groups scale (Chin et al., 1999) and a further four 
ZHUHDGGHGDVNLQJSDUWLFLSDQWVKRZPXFKWKH\OLNHGWKHJURXSHJ³,IHOWWKDW,ZDV
VLPLODUWRRWKHUPHPEHUVRIWKHJURXS´³,HQMR\HGEHLQJSDUWRIWKLVJURXS´,WHPV
were measured on a 7-point scale (1= not at all, 7= very much), with higher scores 
LQGLFDWLQJVWURQJHUFRKHVLRQĮ 1 (M= 4.88, SD= 0.88), see Appendix K. 
Group Efficacy. Two items assessed how well participants perceived that 
their group had worked effectively in the decision-PDNLQJWDVN³All members of the 
group contributed to the discussion and worked well together´³7KHJURXSFDPHXS
ZLWKWKHEHVWGHFLVLRQVSRVVLEOH´,WHPVZHUHPHDVXUHGRQD-point scale (1= not at 
all, 7= very much), r= .39 (M= 5.34, SD= 1.07), see Appendix K. 




Mindfulness Attitudes Scale. The mindfulness attitudes scale (Cleirigh & 
Greaney, 2015) was included to assess participants openness to the concept of 
mindfulness. One question asked participants to rate their attitude towards 
mindfulness on a 7-point scale ( ZRXOGQ¶WEHRSHQWRthe concept, 7= would be 
open to the concept) (M= 5.26, SD = 1.16), see Appendix K.  
Mindfulness knowledge. Two questions asked participants how familiar 
they were with mindfulness practice (M= 3.06, SD= 1.76), and how focused they 
were on the decision-making task (M= 5.51, SD= 1.07). Both items were measured 
on a 7-point scale (1= not at all, 7= very much). These were analysed separately as 
single items (see Appendix K).  
Procedure 
Participants initially reported to a large computer room in groups of 40-50, 
where they were given an information sheet and were verbally introduced to the 
experiment and given details of ethical considerations by the researchers. Random 
allocation to group was achieved by playing card, whereby the value of the card 
represented a group number (e.g. Queen = group number 12). Participants then 
divided into their groups of four in small group laboratories set up with group 
members sat around a table where they could listen to the audio. The 5-minute audio 
files were played via tablets placed in the middle of the tables, and lab doors were 
kept closed to ensure the groups could not hear the audio for other conditions. After 
the audio file had finished, a researcher entered the lab and gave each participant an 
instruction sheet for the decision-making task (see Appendix J). This contained the 
anxiety manipulation and manipulation check questions, along with the scenario 
about the task. Participants were given approximately 5-minutes to read this 




information, after which a researcher presented the participants with the individual 
ranking form. Lab doors were kept open during the 5-minutes for individual ranking 
to ensure participants were not discussing the task. Following this, the researcher 
gave each group one copy of the group ranking form and allowed the groups 10-
minutes to discuss and decide on a rank order. Participants were told to alert the 
researcher when they had reached a decision if this was done in under 10-minutes. 
The groups were then given time to work out difference scores for their individual 
and group rankings. Approximately 10-minutes before the end of the session 
participants were given the questionnaire pack and asked to complete them 
individually, without discussing the questions or their answers. After this 
participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Results and Discussion 
Decision-making 
Group score   
Since participants were assigned to their groups at the beginning of the 
experiment, the scores were aggregated by group for analysis. After excluding those 
who experienced the technical fault with the audio file, 48 groups (N= 192) remained 
for the analysis.  A 2(condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2(anxiety: high vs. low) 
ANOVA was conducted on group score8. There was no main effect of condition, 
F(1, 44)= 0.01, p = .97Ș2 <.01 or of anxiety, F(1, 44)= 0.30, p = .59Ș2 =.01. The 
                                                 
8
 0$6ZDVDGGHGDVDFRYDULDWHDVLQ&OHLULJKDQG*UHDQH\¶V(2015) study, but this did not 
change the overall pattern of results and so MAS was not included in further analysis. The covariate 
was not significant, F(1, 43)= 0.21, p= Ș2 =.01, There was no main effect of condition, F(1, 43)= 
0.01, p Ș2 <.01, or of anxiety, F(1, 43)= 0.34, p Ș2 =.01. The interaction of mindfulness 
condition x anxiety was not significant, F(1, 43)= 1.20, p Ș2 =.03 




interaction of condition x anxiety was not significant, F(1, 44)= 1.20, p = .28Ș2 
=.03. 
Individual vs. Group score  
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (anxiety: high vs. low) mixed 
ANOVA was run with score as a within participants factor.  There was no main 
effect of condition, F(1, 44)= 0.03, p  Ș2 <.01. There was no main effect of 
anxiety, F(1, 44)= 0.05, p  Ș2 <.01. The interaction of condition x anxiety was 
not significant, F(1, 44)= 0.69, p  Ș2 =.02. There was no effect of score, F(1, 
44)= 0.15, p  Ș2 <.01. The two-way interaction of score x condition was not 
significant, F(1, 44)= 0.09, p  Ș2 <.01, and the two-way interaction of score x 
anxiety condition was not significant, F(1, 44)= 1.97, p  Ș2 =.04. The three-way 
interaction of score x condition x anxiety was not significant, F(1, 44)= 1.04, p = .31, 
Ș2 =.02. 
Table 14. 
Means (SD) for individual and group scores on decision-making task, by condition 
 High Anxiety Low Anxiety 
 Individual Group Individual Group 
Mindfulness 75.69 (8.57) 72.77 (8.27) 73.73 (5.12) 76.86 (9.57) 
Control 75.21 (2.55) 75.58 (7.86) 72.89 (5.40) 74.22 (9.57) 
 
Mindfulness manipulation check  
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (anxiety: high vs. low) ANOVA 
was conducted on the single MAS item. There was no significant main effect of 
condition, F(1, 190)= 3.37,  p  Ș2 =.01, or of anxiety, F(1, 190)= 0.55, p = .46, 
Ș2 <.01. There was no significant condition x anxiety interaction effect, F(1, 45)= 
0.01, p = Ș2 <.01. Since there were no effects of mindfulness or anxiety 




condition on the MAS, and it was measured at the end of the study, it was not 
included as a covariate in the analysis.  
A further two 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (anxiety: high vs. 
ORZ$129$¶VZHUHUXQZLWKIDPLOLDULW\ZLWKPLQGIXOQHVVSUDFWLFHDQGIRFXVRQ
the task as dependent variables. For focus, there was no main effect of condition, 
F(1,190)= 2.68, p  Ș2 =.01, or of anxiety, F(1,190)= 0.14, p  Ș2 <.01. The 
interaction of condition x anxiety was not significant, F(1,190)= 0.18, p  Ș2 
<.01. 
For familiarity, there was a main effect of condition, F(1,190)= 15.96, p < 
Ș2= .08. This showed that those in the mindfulness condition (M= 3.46, SD= 
1.69) reported significantly greater familiarity with mindfulness practice than those 
in the control condition (M= 2.51, SD= 1.74). There was a main effect of anxiety, 
F(1,190)= 15.26, p Ș2 =.08, showing that those in the high anxiety condition 
(M= 3.47, SD= 1.82) reported significantly greater familiarity with mindfulness 
practice that those in the low anxiety condition (M= 2.52, SD= 1.51). There was no 
interaction of condition x anxiety, F(1,190)= 1.57, p  Ș2 =.01. 
Anxiety 
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (anxiety: high vs. low) ANOVA 
was conducted on anxiety scores. There was no main effect of condition, F(1, 190)= 
0.70, p  Ș2 <.01 or of anxiety, F(1, 190)= 1.21, p  Ș2 =.01. There was no 
significant condition x anxiety interaction effect, F(1, 190)= 0.84,  p = Ș2 <.01. 
Group identification 
A 2(condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2(anxiety: high vs. low) ANOVA 
was conducted on group identification scores. The main effect of condition 




approached significance, F(1, 190)= 3.71, p  Ș2 =.05. The means showed that 
those in the mindfulness condition reported lower group identity (M=4.46, SD= 1.06) 
than participants in the control condition (M= 4.73, SD= 0.86). The main effect of 
anxiety was significant, F(1, 190)= 10.99, p < Ș2 =.06. The means showed that, 
as hypothesised, those in the high anxiety condition felt a stronger sense of 
identification with their group (M= 4.82, SD= 1.04) than those in the low anxiety 
condition (M=4.36, SD= 0.86). There was no significant condition x anxiety 
interaction effect, F(1, 190)= 0.20, p  Ș2 <.01. 
Group cohesion 
A 2(condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2(anxiety: high vs. low) ANOVA 
was conducted on group cohesion scores. There was a significant main effect of 
condition, F(1, 190)= 6.00, p = .02Ș2 =.03. The means showed that those in the 
mindful condition showed less group cohesion (M= 4.74, SD= 0.91) than those in the 
control condition (M= 5.05, SD= 0.81). There was no main effect of anxiety, F(1, 
190)= 0.52, p = .47Ș2 =.01. There was no significant condition x anxiety interaction 
effect, F(1, 190)= 0.11, p = .74Ș2 <.01. 
Group efficacy 
A 2 (condition: mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (anxiety: high vs. low) ANOVA 
was conducted on group efficacy scores. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 15. 
There was a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 190)= 8.23, p  Ș2 =.04. 
This showed that participants in the mindful condition evaluated the group as less 
effective (M= 5.14, SD= 1.09) than those in the control condition (M=5.58, SD= 
0.99). There was no significant effect of anxiety, F(1, 190)= 0.29, p  Ș2 <.01. 




The condition x anxiety interaction approached significance, F(1, 190)= 3.54, p =.06, 
Ș2 =.02. 
Table 15. 
Means (SD) for individual and group scores on decision-making task, by condition 
 High anxiety Low anxiety 
Mindfulness 4.95 (1.28) 5.32 (0.84) 
Control 5.68 (1.03) 5.47 (0.94) 
 
Analysis of the simple effects using Bonferroni adjustments showed that in 
the low anxiety condition, there was no significant difference in perceptions of group 
efficacy between the mindfulness (M=5.32, SD= 0.84) and control (M=5.47, SD= 
0.94) conditions, F(1, 190)= 0.46, p  Ș2 <.01. In the high anxiety condition, 
there was a significant difference in perceptions of group efficacy between the 
mindfulness and control conditions, F(1, 190)= 12.06, p  Ș2 =.06. Participants 
in the mindfulness condition perceived significantly less group efficacy (M= 4.95, 
SD= 1.28) than participants in the control condition (M= 5.68, SD= 1.03).  
In the control condition there was no significant difference in perceptions of 
group efficacy between the high (M= 5.68, SD= 1.03) and low (M= 5.47, SD= 0.94) 
anxiety conditions, F(1, 190)= 8.23, p Ș2 =.04. There was also no significant 
difference in perceptions of group efficacy in the mindfulness condition, F(1, 190)= 
3.83, p Ș2 =.02, comparing high (M= 4.95, SD= 1.28) and low (M= 5.32, SD= 
0.84) anxiety conditions.  
Discussion 
Experiment 7 aimed to investigate the use of the 5-minute mindfulness 
manipulation in the context of group decision-making. Extending previous research, 




the results of Experiment 7 did not support WKRVHLQ&OHLULJKDQG*UHDQH\¶V(2015) 
investigation. The results of the present experiment show that there were no 
significant differences between JURXSV¶ decision-making scores depending on 
mindfulness and anxiety conditions. Furthermore, the present experiment showed 
that groups did not perform significantly better than their individual members.  
The finding that groups are more cohesive after a mindfulness induction was 
also not replicated. In fact, for both group cohesion and group efficacy, mindful 
groups perceived their group to be less cohesive and efficacious than non-mindful 
groups. Moreover, for participants in the high anxiety condition, group efficacy was 
perceived to be significantly lower after the mindfulness manipulation than the after 
the control. The present experiment showed that participants in the high anxiety 
condition did perceive greater group identification than those in the low anxiety 
condition, but that this was not affected by the mindfulness manipulation. In fact, the 
marginally significant main effect suggested that, akin to cohesion and efficacy, 
mindfulness reduced participanWV¶ group identity compared to the control condition. 
Taken together these results suggest that, for group decision-making among 
student participants, mindfulness was not beneficial. Importantly for the social 
experience of group members, mindfulness had a negative effect, and significantly 
reduced the perceptions of group identity, cohesion and efficacy, irrespective of the 
decision. Although this experiment has some limitations, these results highlight a 
potential problem for the application of mindfulness in group settings, such as 
organisations.  
A key explanation for the difference between the present findings and those 
LQ&ODHLULJKDQG*UHDQH\¶VVWXG\LVWKHLQFUHDVHGVWDWLVWLFDOSRZHULQWKH




present experiment, through the use of a much larger sample size that was 
aggregated by group for the purposes of analysis. With only 32 participants, it is not 
possible to be sure that the previous results are reliable. Although the present 
experiment is not without limitations, the findings may more closely represent a true 
effect.  For example, the inclusion of the anxiety manipulation will alter the effects 
slightly, but the present experiment found little to no effect of mindfulness on 
performance, and certainly not evidence of a positive effect.  
Another possible explanation for the difference in results is the mindfulness 
practice. Cleirigh and Greaney (2015) used a 10-minute practice, followed by 
additional mindfulness induction materials. Therefore the practice was at least 
double the length of time used in the present experiment. In addition, the practices 
included a mindfulness task similar to that used in the present experiment, but also 
supplemented this with another practice and other information. As mentioned 
previously (see Chapter 4), additional information in mindfulness practice may lead 
to increases in positive outcomes without the increases in mindfulness per se (Eberth 
& Sedlmeier, 2012). With this in mind, the present experiment did not include 
anything alongside the 5-minute practice. Although this has been shown to 
effectively increase state mindfulness, it was not measured in the present experiment, 
and so it is not possible to say whether the mindfulness manipulation worked. 
Furthermore, Cleirigh and Greaney (2015) found that mindful participants exhibited 
increased decentering and curiosity at time 2, which was after completing the 
survival task, although differences in mindfulness levels were not measured in the 
present experiment. 




Moreover, the mindfulness practice was delivered to the groups, so 
participants were required to complete the practice in their groups of four, in the 
laboratory setting. There are a number of potential problems with this. First, as 
shown in Experiment 1, students in a lab setting did not show the same increase in 
levels of state mindfulness that were achieved with an online sample with a wider 
age range. This was hypothesised to be a result of apprehension in following the 
instructions in front of peers, which could also have been a problem in the current 
experiment. Particularly since the participants were seated around a table, and were 
therefore facing each other. As detailed previously, perspective taking orientation 
affects evaluations of the self and others (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Storms, 1973). 
The nature of the task could have impacted the results of the present 
experiment, not only because the decision was made as a group, but also because it 
was a task that relied less on automatic processes, and more on effortful thought. 
Some emerging research has shown that mindfulness increases individual decision-
making quality (Hafenbrack et al., 2014; Ostafin & Kassman, 2012), but in previous 
work, the decision has been underlined by automatic processes (e.g. avoiding a sunk-
cost and improving insight problem solving). As detailed above, the survival task 
used in this research lies between an intellective and judgement task (Laughlin & 
Ellis, 1986). This means that some level of effortful thought is required to achieve 
the most accurate outcome. This may therefore suggest that mindfulness is not 
effective in altering performance on non-automatic tasks, or at least 5-minutes of 
practice is not long enough to affect change.  
There may also be some limits to the effects of mindfulness in different 
decision contexts. For example, group decision-making requires different skills; 




group-work skills that are needed to work effectively in a group, and task-work skills 
that are needed to be able to complete the task/solve the problem. Whilst it was 
expected that mindfulness would enhance both types of skill, it is likely that the 
effect on task-work skills is more limited. For example, mindfulness may have 
enhanced cognitive capacity and flexibility (Baird, Smallwood, Fishman, Mrazek, & 
Schooler, 2013; Chambers et al., 2008; Greenberg et al., 2012; Jha et al., 2007; 
Ostafin & Kassman, 2012) which may have led to more creative ideas for uses of the 
15 items, but not necessarily correct or useful ideas in relation to the survival task. 
Mindfulness would not have made the correct solution any more apparent and so is 
limited in increasing task-work skills.  
Additionally, it may be that the task-work skills are affected more in 
individual mindfulness practice (e.g. Hafenbrack et al., 2014; Ostafin & Kassman, 
2012), but not in group situations. Alternatively, although the hypothesised increase 
in group cohesion was not found, this may have been a result of methodological 
problems, rather than mindfulness not having an effect. Nominal groups can form 
strong cohesive groups (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Chin et al., 1999), however these are 
usually made up of group members with no previous familiarity. The use of students 
in the present experiment meant that some groups may have comprised of people 
who had previously worked together, or in fact, knew each other very well. This may 
KDYHOLPLWHGWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIPLQGIXOQHVVRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶JURXS-work skills 
since intragroup dynamics may already exist, or previous knowledge of 
superordinate group membership may have influenced input. For example, that 
group members of low status or lacking confidence in their ability not contributing to 
the group decision (Berger & Zelditch, 1998).  




In addition, the student sample were more likely to be aware of the artificial 
settings and the fact that there was limited time in which they were expected to take 
part in the experiment. This may have reduced the impact of the anxiety 
manipulation as participants were told they would be gathered in a larger room and 
ZRXOGHYDOXDWHHDFKRWKHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFH7KLVLQVWUXFWLRQPD\QRWKDYHVHHPHG
realistic given the time frame of the study which was to fit into 50-minutes. 
Furthermore, this time restriction meant that both individuals and groups were 
limited in how much time they had to make a decision. This was around half the time 
JLYHQLQ&OHLULJKDQG*UHDQH\¶VVWXG\DQGWKHUHIRUHPD\DOVRH[SODLQWKH
difference in the findings. Furthermore, the time restrictions may have increased 
cognitive load and weakened the effect of the mindfulness practice.  
Additionally, this may have affected the decision-making methods employed 
by the groups. Johnson and Johnson (2003) detail ten methods of reaching a 
decision. Two that are particularly pertinent to the decision-making task used in this 
experiment. They are: vote, or majority rule, and consensus. Consensus is the most 
effective, but requires the most time to work effectively, and thus the time constraint 
imposed here may have hindered the JURXS¶VDELOLW\WRFDUU\RXWIXOOUDWLRQDO
discussion of all possible options. Groups may therefore have opted for majority rule 
as a quicker method, however, since majority rule can create a divide within the 
group, using this method could have impeded the creation of group identity and 
cohesion.  
Aside from mindfulness, the anxiety manipulation may have been 
problematic in the current methodology since individual participants were within 
groups whose performance was to be evaluated, rather than personal evaluations, 




which may have diffused some of the responsibility for performing well, particularly 
among the groups who were less cohesive. In addition, the anxiety manipulation 
stated groups would be compared to other groups, so this may have increased 
intergroup competition, rather than, or more so, than evaluation apprehension. This 
would be an interesting avenue for future research since mindfulness may have 
impact on competitiveness and intergroup performance. For example mindfulness is 
beginning to be researched in sports contexts (Blecharz et al., 2014), and therefore 
understanding the effect of mindfulness on intergroup competition could have wider 
applications than group decision-making.  
Together, the findings of the present experiment showed that there were no 
significant interactions of anxiety and mindfulness for decision-making, group 
cohesion or group efficacy. Although this contradicts the hypotheses, and does not 
support previous research, it adds to the literature on mindfulness effects in group 
contexts. The effect of mindfulness on non-automatic decision tasks and the effect in 
group settings merits further investigation. It is possible that the present research has 
begun to uncover a boundary condition for the positive effects of mindfulness. 
Although it is known that mindfulness is not a cure-all and is not effective in all 
situations (e.g. Goyal et al., 2014), more research is needed to investigate contexts in 
which mindfulness is not beneficial, or may even have negative effects. A wealth of 
literature theorises that mindfulness should improve decision-making but as yet little 
empirical research has been produced to support such hypotheses. The present 
research suggests two possible avenues to pursue; the difference between individual 
and group decision-making, and different decision tasks and their automaticity.   




The remaining Chapter in this thesis draws together the findings of the seven 
experiments presented in the previous four chapters. A general discussion of the 
findings and their contribution to the literature on mindfulness and social judgements 
is presented, followed by an overview of limitations and the potential future 
directions derived from them.  




Chapter 8: General Discussion 
This final chapter draws together the findings reported in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis and concludes what this adds to the emerging literature on 
mindfulness and social judgements. The research presented in this thesis has 
examined the use of a 5-minute, online mindfulness practice and found it effective 
for increasing state mindfulness. This practice was then applied to the automatic 
process of person judgement using attribution theory, and the non-automatic process 
of decision-making in a group context. Results suggest that a brief mindfulness 
induction is effective in altering attributions, but may be limited in the group 
decision-making context. Central findings are discussed in greater detail below, in 
view of the potential applications of the research. Limitations of the thesis are 
addressed, and avenues for future work are suggested.  
Theoretical Approach 
Despite origins in Buddhist spirituality (Brown & Ryan, 2003), mindfulness 
research has proliferated psychology literature for over 40 years (Black, 2011). The 
focus of research, until recently, had been on the effect of mindfulness courses for 
clinical symptoms such as stress, anxiety, depression and chronic illness (for a 
review see Goyal et al., 2014). Attention then moved to courses that were delivered 
online for clinical populations (Beattie et al., 2009; Christensen et al., 2006; M. C. 
Davis & Zautra, 2013; Kemper & Yun, 2015; Krusche et al., 2012, 2013; Proudfoot 
et al., 2004; Spijkerman, Pots, & Bohlmeijer, 2016) and whether self-help courses, 
without the need for specialised, clinical-practitioner input, were effective (for 
review see Cavanagh, Strauss, Forder & Jones, 2014).  




Only in the last ten years have researchers shifted focus away from prolonged 
courses and considered the use of single-session mindfulness and the use of online 
practice. As highlighted in the theoretical discussion in this thesis, to date, these 
approaches have either been considered separately, or without measuring their effect 
RQLQGLYLGXDOV¶OHYHOVRIPLQGIXOQHVV)XUWKHUPRUHDVGHWDLOHGDERYHWKHPDMRULW\
of mindfulness research has concentrated on alleviating clinical symptoms. 
Relatively few papers have applied mindfulness in the context of social psychology 
(Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Greenberg et al., 2012; Hong et al., 2014; S. Johnson et 
al., 2013; Kiken & Shook, 2011; Papies et al., 2012; Shao & Skarlicki, 2009), and of 
those even fewer have considered the impact of mindfulness on interpersonal or 
intergroup judgements (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015; Hopthrow et al., 2016; Weger et 
al., 2012).  
Combining single-session, online mindfulness provided one of the key aims 
RIWKHHPSLULFDOZRUNLQWKLVWKHVLV$OWKRXJKEULHIPLQXWHVPLQGIXOQHVV
practices have been used in previous research (Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Heppner et 
al., 2008; Hong et al., 2014; Hooper et al., 2011; Reynolds et al., 2015; Weger et al., 
2012) none had tested whether the practice had increase mindfulness from pre- to 
post-test, or in some cases had not measured mindfulness at all. This thesis therefore 
started by addressing this important gap in the literature, by testing whether a 5-
minutes mindful body scan, practiced via online software, effectively induced a state 
of mindfulness.  
Another key hypothesis underpinning the research in this thesis is that 
present-moment, non-judgemental awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) should prevent 
rumination on the past and anxiety about the future (Baer, 2003; Brown & Ryan, 




2004; Diaz, 2011), and prevent habitual responding (Jordan et al., 2014; Kiken & 
Shook, 2011) based on heuristics. Heuristics are thought to be the basis of automatic 
responding in person judgement, such as attributions (Bruner, 1957; Heider, 1958; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Shaver, 1975), and particularly attribution biases (e.g. 
FAE, Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977; or CB, Gawronski, 2004; Gilbert & Malone, 1995). 
Furthermore, mindfulness has been shown to increase cognitive flexibility 
(Greenberg et al., 2012) which should enhance performance on problem-decision 
tasks. In combination with an increase in empathy and perspective-taking through 
more mindful attentional awareness this was expected to improve other person 
judgements and group cohesion in a decision-making task. This thesis draws 
together these ideas to investigate the use of mindfulness in the context of social 
judgement.  
The application of a brief mindfulness practice to social psychology has 
underpinned the overall theoretical and empirical questions examined in this thesis. 
The aims of this thesis have been to test the effectiveness of a 5-minute online 
mindfulness practice in increasing state mindfulness, and then apply this to social 
judgements, specifically focusing on attribution bias and decision-making. 
Specifically, this thesis investigated whether a brief online mindfulness induction 
would prove beneficial in reducing attribution biases, and improve the accuracy of 
decision-making in small groups.  
Summary of findings 
These hypotheses were tested across seven experiments, starting by 
investigating the effectiveness of the 5-minute online mindfulness practice. In 
Experiment 1, adolescent participants completed the mindfulness practice in a large 




open-plan computer room. State mindfulness was measured using the TMS (Lau et 
al., 2006) just before, and immediately after the mindfulness practice.  The 5-minute 
mindful body scan practice was compared to a 5-minute control condition in which 
participants received instructions in the first and last 30 seconds of the audio, but 
were asked to listen to silence for the rest of the 5-minute audio clip. This approach 
was used throughout the thesis in all of the experiments.  
The findings of Experiment 1 revealed no significant effects, but a trend in 
the expected direction, where means for participants in the mindful condition were 
higher at T2. The results were primarily thought to be a result of methodological 
problems, such as participants in different conditions being sat next to one another 
and not focusing on the task, as well as the age of the participants. Research has 
shown that younger people taking part in practices such as mindfulness prefer 
privacy and anonymity during practice (Cavanagh et al., 2013). In Experiment 1 this 
was not possible, and participants may have been very aware of their peers, 
especially since half of the group were asked to close their eyes to complete the 
mindfulness practice, whilst the other half were left to let their mind-wander (and 
thus may have become bored and distracted others).  
Experiments 2 and 3 built upon this, with the aim of addressing the 
limitations highlighted in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 tested the delivery of the 
mindfulness practice online where participants were able to complete the practice in 
their choice of surroundings and in their own time. In order to ensure that the 
questions in the TMS were not eliciting heightened mindfulness the two subscales of 
the TMS were separated and one presented pre-practice and the other presented post-
practice (counterbalanced). The results of Experiment 2 showed that state 




mindfulness was higher among participants in the mindfulness condition, compared 
to the control condition, and thus confirmed that the TMS was not eliciting the 
increase in mindfulness.  
Experiment 3 further refined the paradigm, and showed that delivered online, 
mindfulness was significantly increased from pre- to post-practice in adult 
participants. This provides evidence that the use of a brief mindfulness practice with 
a non-clinical sample, and without any specialist input is effective in increasing 
levels of state mindfulness. This is important because a number of mindfulness 
practices already exist, and can be accessed for free through websites and 
smartphone apps, but until now it was unknown whether such online, self-guided 
practices were actually able to induce a state of mindfulness. These experiments 
suggest that they could be beneficial, in as little as 5-minutes.  
Experiments 1-3 taken together support the hypothesis that a 5-minute 
mindfulness practice delivered online increases state mindfulness. In fact, the non-
significant results in a laboratory setting support the notion that allowing participants 
the anonymity and privacy of carrying out mindfulness practices in their own 
surroundings facilitates the increase in mindfulness levels (Beattie et al., 2009; 
Christensen et al., 2006).   
Experiment 4 built upon Experiments 1-3 and addressed some 
methodological issues that may have affected the results in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 4 aimed to test a different type of 5-minute practice and to investigate 
whether the 5-minute practice elicited any change in perception using the attitude-
attribution paradigm, which can be used to measure the propensity for the 
correspondence bias. The correspondence bias is an attributional error characterised 




by ignoring the situation in favour of dispositional explanations for behaviour 
(Gawronski, 2004). Furthermore, the correspondence bias can be influenced by 
participants own views on topics used in the attitude-attribution paradigm, or the 
false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977). Therefore this was used as a covariate in 
the analysis of Experiment 4. 
Mindfulness has yet to be applied in the context of social judgement and 
attribution, but previous theorising suggested a connection between mindful thinking 
and reduced reliance on categorisation (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000b; Langer, 
1989), and less habitual responding (Kiken & Shook, 2011). This was expected to 
reduce the automatic association of dispositional inference in explaining behaviour. 
Although this could be achieved through enhanced attention to detail, which would 
be expected to refocus attention on the situational instructions (Correa et al., 2006; 
Maclean et al., 2010), mindfulness was hypothesised to have an added benefit of 
increasing cognitive capacity to allow for more effortful thought (Chambers et al., 
2008; Jha et al., 2007; Mrazek et al., 2013).  
Based on this, the hypothesis for Experiment 4 was that mindfulness would 
reduce the propensity for the correspondence bias, and would have an effect above 
and beyond that of merely paying greater attention. The findings showed that a 5-
minute mindful eating practice completed in laboratory conditions led to a greater 
decrease in making the correspondence bias than a control or attention to detail task, 
when controlling for participants own view on the topic. This showed that 
mindfulness altered the correspondence bias response in a way that was qualitatively 
different from simply sustained attention. Therefore, mindfulness may have achieved 
more than merely increased awareness of the situational factors in the instructions. 




Moreover, it showed that after the mindfulness practice, participants were not only 
less extreme in their judgements of the essay writer, but were also less likely to make 
a dispositional attribution based on their own views.  
In addition to participants¶ RZQYLHZVRQWKHWRSLFSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUVSHFWLYH
taking was used as a covariate, which has been found to reduce attribution errors in 
previous research (Hooper et al., 2015b). The correspondence bias was not 
VLJQLILFDQWO\DWWHQXDWHGE\PLQGIXOQHVVZKHQDFFRXQWLQJIRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
perspective taking, but this may have been due to limited information about the 
target of the attitude inference. The means were in the expected direction, showing 
that the tendency for the correspondence bias was reduced in the mindfulness 
condition, and therefore suggested that perspective taking required further 
investigation.  
With this in mind, Experiments 5 and 6 explored the role of perspective 
taking in the relationship between mindfulness and attribution bias, using the 
fundamental attribution error. This is the tendency to overestimate the role of 
dispositions in explaining behaviours, and underestimate the role of situation 
(Heider, 1958). This differs to the correspondence bias in that the situational 
influences are weighted in the process of making the evaluation, but the outcome 
favours dispositions as being more influential. Attributional errors have been shown 
to apply more broadly to groups (Allison & Messick, 1985) and can be influenced by 
a perceivers own locus of control (Shaver, 1975). This assumes that perceivers with 
an external locus of control (who believe fate and chance is primarily responsible for 
controlling behaviour) are more likely to make situational or external attributions, 
compared to those with an internal locus of control (who believe that they are 




primarily responsible for their own behaviours). The aim of these experiments was to 
investigate the effect of mindfulness on the fundamental attribution error, taking into 
account locus of control and perspective taking.  
The hypotheses of Experiment 5 were that mindfulness would attenuate the 
effects of the fundamental attribution error relative to a control condition, and in 
particular, participants would become more aware of situational factors that may 
affect the outgroup target. It was expected that mindfulness would reduce the 
automaticity of responding to the outgroup target. Participants were given a scenario 
about either an ingroup member or an outgroup member who detailed their struggle 
to gain employment. Participants were asked the extent to which they believed the 
WDUJHW¶VVLWXDWLRQZDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUGLVSRVLWLRQRUHQYLURQPHQWDOIDFWRUVWKDWZHUH
outside of their control.  
The results of Experiment 5 supported the hypotheses. Mindfulness 
attenuated the tendency to make the fundamental attribution error, even when taking 
LQWRDFFRXQWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ORFXVRIFRQWURODQGSHUVSHFWLYHWDNLQJ)XUWKHUPRUH
mindfulness also attenuated ingroup favouritism effects in perspective taking. This 
showed that in the control condition participants were better able to take the 
perspective of an ingroup member, as expected based on social identity. However, 
after the mindfulness manipulation, participants were equally able to take the 
perspective of an outgroup member as an ingroup member. Further supporting the 
hypotheses, Experiment 5 showed that when participants listed the main reasons they 
believed the target was unable to find employment, there was significantly more 
consideration of situational factors in the mindfulness condition, and for an outgroup 
target. This highlights the potential applications of a brief mindfulness practice in 




reducing automatic responding in intergroup situations, which could prove beneficial 
to reducing implicit biases in person-judgements in a variety of contexts (as found 
for race, e.g. Lueke & Gibson, 2015). This could be particularly beneficial in job 
applications and personnel decision-making.  
These results also suggest that intergroup dynamics and mindfulness may 
influence perspective taking, but may not support previous research that suggested 
mindfulness is positively associated with perspective taking (Beitel et al., 2005; 
Johns et al., 2015). Experiment 6 directly built upon Experiment 5. It used similar 
methodology, but with the addition of manipulating perspective taking (asking 
SDUWLFLSDQWVWRFRQVLGHUWKHLURZQRUWKHWDUJHW¶VSHUVSHctive when reading the 
scenario) in order to try and better understand the role of perspective taking in 
relation to mindfulness and attribution. Based on previous research, the hypotheses 
in Experiment 6 were that mindfulness would increase perspective taking and reduce 
the fundamental attribution error for participants who are asked to consider the 
WDUJHW¶VRWKHUSHUVSHFWLYH 
The results supported previous research that perspective taking reduces the 
fundamental attribution error (Hooper et al., 2015b). A significant 3-way interaction 
of mindfulness x perspective taking x group condition showed that perspective 
taking attenuated the fundamental attribution error in the control condition. In the 
own perspective condition, participants in the control condition attributed the 
LQJURXSWDUJHW¶VSRVLWLRQPRUHGLVSRVLWLRQDOO\WKDQWKHRXWJURXSWDUJHW+RZHYHULQ
the mindfulness condition, the opposite effect was found, in contradiction to the 
hypothesis. The fundamental attribution error was made more when participants 





group when considering their own perspective.  
This is the first empirical investigation of mindfulness with perspective 
taking, and suggests that the two constructs may be working in opposition, and thus 
contradicts the theory that they should be positively related (Beitel et al., 2005; Johns 
et al., 2015). The results point to a potentially conflicting relationship whereby 
mindfulness may have increased introspective ability (Fox et al., 2012) and in turn 
PDGHWDNLQJWKHµRWKHU¶SHUVSHFWLYHPRUHGLIILFXOW,IWKLVZHUHWKHFDVHWKHRSSRVLQJ
cognitive abilities of becoming more introspective and taking another perspective 
may have created cognitive dissonance and diluted the positive effects that 
mindfulness has on cognitive capacity (Mrazek et al., 2015; van Vugt & Jha, 2011; 
Weger et al., 2012). This could be particularly pertinent for non-automatic processes, 
which require more effortful cognition from the outset.  
Experiment 7 therefore applied mindfulness to the non-automatic process of 
group decision-making. In group situations, dividing attention between the group 
and the task can hinder performance by increasing stress and arousal (Baron et al., 
1978). Aside from group contexts, mindfulness attenuates emotional arousal and 
increases emotional regulation (Shao & Skarlicki, 2009). Consequently it was 
expected that practicing mindfulness before entering into a group decision task 
should mitigate the arousal of the group context, and thus improve the group 
decision quality. Furthermore, a group decision task was used that required some 
level of judgement and flexible thinking (Survival task, Johnson & Johnson, 2003), 
which mindfulness has been found to increase (Greenberg et al., 2012). Additionally, 
previous research has shown that mindfulness increased individual decision-making 




accuracy (Hafenbrack et al., 2014; Ostafin & Kassman, 2012), and one study has 
found that mindfulness improved group decision-making, and increased group 
cohesion (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015). 
Experiment 7 aimed to investigate the relationship between mindfulness and 
evaluation anxiety on group decision-making in a survival decision task, to build 
upon the only known study of mindfulness in group decisions (Cleirigh & Greaney, 
2015). The hypothesis was that mindfulness would attenuate the negative 
consequences of evaluation anxiety and help groups to make superior decisions and 
foster group cohesion. Participants in Experiment 7 completed the 5-minute 
mindfulness practice in groups of four and were given instructions that increased 
evaluation anxiety (vs. control). To increase evaluation anxiety, participants were 
given bogus information that they would present their group decision and be 
compared and evaluated against other groups. The groups of four then completed the 
decision tasks.  
Contrary to the previous research, and the hypothesis for Experiment 7, the 
results showed that mindfulness and anxiety did not significantly affect group 
decision performance. The mindfulness and anxiety conditions did not have any 
effect on group cohesion either, therefore showing no support for the findings of 
previous group decision research (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015). A key explanation for 
the difference in these results and those found in the previous study of group 
decision is the statistical power. In the present research, a much larger sample was 
used, and thus the results should be considered more reliable. In addition, the 
relationship with anxiety may be different in groups than for individuals. Although 
mindfulness reduces anxiety for individuals (Bohlmeijer et al., 2010; Carmody et al., 




2009; Khoury et al., 2013), there is less evidence that considers the effect of 
mindfulness on anxiety in group settings (Edwards et al., 2014). It is also possible 
that although Experiments 4-6 show that mindfulness had positive effects for the 
automatic process of attribution, that mindfulness may not be beneficial to the non-
automatic process of decision-making.  
Summary 
Overall the results of the experiments presented in this thesis show that 5-
minutes of mindfulness practice elicits state mindfulness, and is particularly effective 
when participants are able to carry out the practice in their own surroundings 
(Experiments 1-3). Therefore, supporting the hypothesis that a brief, online 
mindfulness practice is effective for increasing state mindfulness.  
This brief practice was then applied to social judgements where the findings 
revealed that mindfulness reduced attributional biases. Namely, mindfulness was 
more effective than a control and attention task in reducing the propensity for the 
correspondence bias (Experiment 4), and attenuated the fundamental attribution error 
for outgroups (Experiment 5), which supported the hypotheses. However, the results 
of Experiment 6 showed that mindfulness and perspective taking may work in 
opposition and cannot be used in conjunction to reduce the fundamental attribution 
error, which contradicted the hypothesis and previous research. Together the results 
from Experiments 4-6 showed that mindfulness is beneficial for the automatic 
process of attribution, even in intergroup contexts (Experiments 5 and 6), but cannot 
be further enhanced with perspective taking. The brief mindfulness practice was also 
applied to the non-automatic process of decision-making, but did not elicit the 
expected positive effects on group decision performance and group cohesion.  




Overall the findings of this thesis provide good support that a 5-minute 
mindfulness practice can be used to elicit a state of mindfulness and be applied to 
automatic person judgements to reduce the tendency for attribution errors. 
Furthermore, the results support the use of mindfulness as a stand-alone practice. For 
the non-automatic process of decision-making mindfulness was not found to have 
salutary effects, and thus points to a possible area in which brief mindfulness may 
not be strong enough to elicit an effect, or may not work in a beneficial way that was 
found for automatic processes.  
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
The research presented in this thesis contributes to a growing body of 
literature on mindfulness. In particular it addresses an important gap in the literature 
by testing the single-session, online mindfulness practice. It also adds to an emerging 
area of mindfulness research that considers the effect of mindfulness in social 
psychology, namely social judgements. Specifically, the research contributes to 
literature considering automatic evaluative processes (attributions) and non-
automatic decision processes.  
Single-session online mindfulness 
Mindfulness research has typically focused on face-to-face and online 
mindfulness courses for clinical populations that are trying to achieve positive health 
and well-being outcomes (Bohlmeijer et al., 2010; Carmody et al., 2009; Kabat-Zinn, 
2003; Khoury et al., 2013; Krusche et al., 2012, 2013; Morledge et al., 2013; Piet et 
al., 2012; Singh et al., 2003; Tacón et al., 2004). Much less research has considered 
short, single-session, un-guided, practice (e.g. Erisman & Roemer, 2010b; Heppner 
et al., 2008; Hong et al., 2014; Kiken & Shook, 2011; Weger et al., 2012).  




A meta-analysis investigating the usefulness of self-help mindfulness 
practices found that, across 15 studies, self-help courses ranging from 2-12 weeks 
that included a mindfulness component, and were mostly (11/15 studies) aimed at 
clinical populations, were successful at increasing mindfulness and reducing anxiety 
and depressive symptoms (Cavanagh et al., 2014). Furthermore, a meta-analysis of 
mindfulness outcomes in non-clinical populations showed small to medium effect 
sizes on psychological variables relating to emotional well-being, psychological 
health and personality (Eberth & Sedlmeier, 2012). Importantly, this meta-analysis 
highlighted a large difference in effect sizes between MBSR courses, where practice 
is supplemented with additional information, and pure meditation. This suggested 
that the additional information provided in MBSR courses may be responsible for 
some of the positive outcomes, rather than the practice itself.  
Therefore, the findings from Experiments 1-3, that as little as 5-minutes of 
online mindfulness, with no further practice or information, increased state 
mindfulness, show the promise of this intervention. The increase in mindfulness was 
achieved without the additional information, and thus suggests that the mindfulness 
practice itself is reliable and effective for inducing a state of mindfulness. Moreover, 
the results supported the notion that practice may be enhanced by privacy and 
anonymity (Cavanagh et al., 2013). These experiments also provide the first 
empirical evaluation of brief, single-session, online mindfulness practice.  
This has practical implications for the ease of access to, and use of, freely 
accessible mindfulness practices. For example, Chittaro and Vianello (2014) found 
that participants preferred a mindfulness practice that they completed on a 
smartphone compared to imagination and physical tasks, but did not show whether 




this increased state mindfulness. The present research supports that such practices 
can elicit a state of mindfulness, and thus behavioural and emotional outcomes can 
be attributed to the mindfulness practice.  
Automatic processes 
Although automatic cognitive processes help individuals to effortlessly 
process an otherwise unmanageable amount of incoming sensory information (Van 
Bavel & Cunningham, 2008), they often also lead to implicit cognitive biases that in 
turn can evoke prejudices (Allport, 1979; Funder, 1987). However, the opposite 
process to this is individuation, which requires far more effortful thought. Therefore, 
interventions that are able to reduce categorisation or enhance effortful thought are 
valuable in social psychology research on person-judgement.  
Langer (1989) postulated that mindful thought is characterised by creation of 
new categories and enhanced awareness of multiple perspectives, but that this 
process is akin to individuation. Furthermore, mindfulness as a form of present-
moment, non-judgemental awareness has been shown to reduce attentional focus on 
the past and future (Hafenbrack et al., 2014), which was thought to be useful in 
reducing the habitual use of previously learnt associations or heuristics.  
Attributional biases are underpinned by automatic associations (Bruner, 
1957; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Shaver, 1975), and pervade areas such as race, 
which can be particularly detrimental for perceptions and experiences of prejudice 
(Berger et al., 1972; Duncan, 1976; King et al., 2006; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Plaut, 
2010; Wagner & Berger, 1993). The results of the experiments in this thesis showed 
that as little as 5-minutes of mindfulness can attenuate attributional biases, and 
furthermore can do so in intergroup contexts, where attributions about outgroup 




members are less extreme. This may suggest that mindfulness can beneficially alter 
the use of heuristics and previously learnt category associations and schemas.  
Although to date there is no confirmatory evidence, mindfulness is not likely 
to be changing these schemas or heuristics. Previous research on cognitive bias 
interventions suggests that rather than changing a stereotype about a group, it is more 
likely that the perceiver is sub-typing the individual as being different or less typical 
of their superordinate group. This leads the perceiver to increase liking for the 
individual target, but still apply the stereotype to the wider group (see Hewstone, 
Hopkins & Routh, 1992). This may also be the case for mindfulness. Instead of 
changing the cognition, mindfulness may affect the process that leads to the 
judgement, such as altering the emotions felt when faced with typical members of 
different groups (Haddock & Zanna, 1993). Mindfulness may be freeing cognitive 
resources to access deeper information or draw from a wider range of schema and 
categories. It may allow for a more thorough processing of inconsistent information, 
which would be consistent with previous research that shows mindfulness increases 
cognitive flexibility and working memory capacity (Chambers et al., 2008; 
Greenberg et al., 2012; Jha et al., 2007; Mrazek et al., 2013).  
This could have important implications for improving intergroup relations 
and reducing intergroup discrimination. The potential use of a 5-minute mindfulness 
practice to elicit such effects means that it is more likely to be able to fit into daily 
routines, and thus be used in a variety of contexts. In particular, this could have 
positive implications in employment contexts and personnel decisions, where limited 
information is used to form impressions and make judgements of others. Although 
Experiments 5 and 6 use a scenario about employment, it would be useful to test this 





would have to choose between targets as in a real organisational setting.  
Another important contribution of the research in this thesis is that it sheds 
light on the relationship between mindfulness and perspective taking, which has yet 
to be empirically investigated. Perspective taking reduces attribution biases (Galper, 
1976; Hooper et al., 2015b), which is thought to be achieved through increasing 
empathy for the target and self-other overlap (M. H. Davis et al., 1996; Regan & 
Totten, 1975). Furthermore, mindfulness was hypothesised to increase empathy and 
perspective taking (Block-Lerner et al., 2007), but this was not supported in the 
current research. In fact, the results of Experiment 6 suggest that mindfulness may 
even work in opposition to perspective taking. This is important for attribution 
research as it suggests that the two constructs will not supplement each other, as 
expected, in reducing attribution bias.  
More importantly this uncovers a potentially negative outcome of 
mindfulness practice. Although some research suggests that sustained meditation can 
have harmful side effects for some people (Craven, 1989; Shapiro, 1992), little 
research has addressed potentially negative outcomes of mindfulness practice (Goyal 
et al., 2014), or areas in which mindfulness has no effect. Therefore the current 
research also adds new insight to the efficacy of mindfulness research, and may 
provide an area in which future research could consider interventions that clash, or 
where different cognitive abilities are not compatible.  
Non-automatic processes 
Most decision-making and problem-solving tasks require deliberative, non-
automatic cognition (Johnson & Johnson, 2003). The survival task used in the 




research in this thesis requires some level of judgement and creativity, but has a 
demonstrably correct answer, and is thus situated between purely intellective and 
judgemental tasks (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). It is therefore a task that requires non-
automatic processes and deliberation- a correct answer is unlikely to suddenly 
become clear to the solver, but rather effort is required to reach a best solution. 
Previous research showed that mindfulness increased cognitive flexibility for 
problem decisions (Greenberg et al., 2012) and thus it was expected that mindfulness 
would prove beneficial to this type of decision task. Furthermore, mindfulness 
reduces emotional arousal (Shao & Skarlicki, 2009), which is usually heightened 
during group decision-making (Baron et al., 1978), and therefore mindfulness should 
attenuate the negative effects of emotional arousal in group decision-making. 
The impact of mindfulness in group decisions had only been tested in one 
empirical paper (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015) prior to the research undertaken in this 
thesis. The results showed that mindfulness improved group decision-making on a 
survival task, and increased group cohesion. However, the study was underpowered, 
and so the present research aimed to extend this with a larger sample, and the 
inclusion of the evaluation anxiety manipulation to more closely investigate 
emotional arousal effects. Contrary to the hypothesised relationships, the present 
research did not show that mindfulness and an anxiety manipulation improved group 
decision-making, although means showed a trend in the expected direction. 
Furthermore, a marginal main effect of mindfulness condition on group cohesion 
showed that mindful groups were less cohesive, and a significant main effect of 
mindfulness condition on group efficacy showed mindful groups were lower in 
efficacy than control groups. This directly opposed the research by Cleirigh and 




Other research has found that mindfulness has a positive effect on decision-
making tasks which use a more automatic process to reach a decision or solution 
(Hafenbrack et al., 2014; Ostafin & Kassman, 2012). The present research adds to 
this literature by testing the effects in a group setting, with a more deliberative 
decision task. The results showed that mindfulness, or at least a brief single-session 
practice, may not be powerful enough to elicit an effect on non-automatic processes, 
despite successfully altering performance on automatic decision tasks. Taken 
together the findings suggest that brief, single-session mindfulness may not be useful 
in group decision settings, but in particular may detrimentally affect group cohesion 
and efficacy, which in turn may reduce performance by decreaVLQJWKHJURXS¶V
ability to work cooperatively.  
This has practical implications for the use of mindfulness practice in groups 
and teams, for example, within organisations. Although mindfulness is thought to be 
especially useful for organisational decision-making (Karelaia & Reb, 2014), as yet 
little empirical research has tested the hypotheses. The present research suggests that 
mindfulness in organisational contexts should be used with caution and may not be 
beneficial to working in groups and teams.  
Limitations and Future directions 
The research presented in this thesis is not without limitations. Each 
empirical investigation presented was subject to some specific limitations that were 
discussed within each individual experiment. Wherever possible these limitations 
were addressed and built upon in subsequent experiments. Therefore, the discussion 
below considered some of the broader limitations of overall body of research in this 
thesis. This is followed by a discussion of the potential next steps research on 




mindfulness and social judgements could take, based on the results presented in the 
current research.  
Limitations 
Mindfulness 
A key problem that is faced in most research on mindfulness is the reliance 
on self-report measures of mindfulness among individuals. This is problematic since 
different individuals have varying degrees of understanding of mindfulness and may 
have experienced different types of practice. They then bring with them a variety of 
experiences and expectations that may influence their answers to self-report 
measures of mindfulness. In Experiment 2, TMS (Lau et al., 2006) was split into its 
two subscales, and one was presented before, and the other after practice. This 
showed that mindfulness was still higher among the mindful group compared to the 
control group, which suggests that the questions were not inducing mindfulness 
themselves. However, this may also have been problematic since the two subscales 
could be considered separate constructs in themselves, and thus the pre- and post- 
measures are capturing different things.  On the other hand, it is still possible that 
upon hearing the mindfulness audio, participants in the mindfulness condition may 
have then been more aware of the construct, and thus answered the second subscale 
with mindfulness effects in mind. A more objective, behavioural measure of 
mindfulness would be useful to ensure this is not the case in future studies.  
Although other methods have used neurophysiological changes to indicate 
differences in mindfulness (e.g. Brewer et al., 2011; Moyer et al, 2011), these 
generally rely on comparing experienced meditators brain activity with matched 
naïve samples. Additionally, the evidence is based on longer term practices such as 




after an 8-week course or lifetime meditation practice. Such techniques are not 
practical for brief single-session mindfulness, and in fact, may not pick up any 
changes in such a short period, or changes may not occur in 5-minutes. Thus, these 
measures are not feasible in this type of research. This has led researchers to 
consider alternatives to both self-reports and neurophysiological testing.  
Levinson et al (2014) developed and tested a breath counting task where 
participants are asked to count their breath for 18 minutes, in blocks of 9, where they 
press one button for breaths one to eight, and another on the ninth breath. This is 
compared to a respiratory monitor that also counts the number of breaths 
electronically. The researchers argue that the longer a person is able to sustain their 
attention on correctly counting their breaths, the more mindful they are. Furthermore, 
greater accuracy on the breath counting task positively correlated with self-reported 
levels of mindfulness, supporting their hypothesis. However, this is also problematic 
as the exercise of counting breaths is similar to many mindfulness practices that 
require participants to focus on their breath. Although participants were found to 
exhibit greater accuracy after a 4-week training period (trained in breath counting), 
this may only suggest that the act of counting breaths may have enhanced 
mindfulness itself, and was therefore confounding the measure.  
Furthermore, the breath counting study compared breath counting to 
measures of trait mindfulness and was more focused on mindfulness as a disposition, 
or among trained meditators, rather than state mindfulness among naïve meditators. 
Whilst this suggests that steps are being made to develop behavioural measures of 
mindfulness, at present, self-report may be the most useful way of measuring state 
mindfulness after a brief, single-session practice. Given the results of Experiment 2, 




self-report may not be detrimental to the outcomes, but could be strengthened with 
the support of a behavioural measure.  
$QRWKHUSRVVLEOHOLPLWDWLRQLQWKHSUHVHQWUHVHDUFKLVWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶WUDLW
mindfulness was not measured. Although dispositional mindfulness was not the 
focus of the research in this thesis, it may still be useful to obtain a measure of 
individual trait mindfulness before completing the brief, single-session practice as a 
baseline. Furthermore, Kiken et al (2015) found that linear increases in state 
mindfulness after each session of an eight-week course contributed to increases in 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶WUDLWPLQGIXOQHVV7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWLQFUHDVHVLQVWDWHPLQGIXOQHVVDV
achieved through brief practices like those used in the present research, may act as a 
top-up for LQGLYLGXDOV¶RYHUDOOGLVSRVLWLRQIRUPLQGIXOWKRXJKW6LQFHWKHSUHVHQW
research was primarily concerned with state mindfulness and its effects on changes 
in current behaviour or perception, a measure of trait mindfulness was not included. 
However, bDVHGRQ.LNHQDWDO¶V(2015) findings, this does provide an avenue for 
future research, especially since there is no research to-date that shows how long a 
mindful state lasts after a brief or single-session practice.  
A methodological issue with the use of online mindfulness is the relative lack 
RIFRQWURORYHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VXUURXQGLQJV$OWKRXJKSUHYLRXVUHVHDUFKVXJJHVWVWKDW
mindfulness practice can be more effective when participants are able to practice in 
their own environment (Cavanagh et al., 2013), in online research those surroundings 
are unknown to the researchers. This means that it is not possible to control for any 
distractions, or to really know whether participants are fully focused on the study. 
The experiments in this thesis aimed to overcome this by using embedded attention 




check questions to ensure that participants were properly reading instructions, and by 
using a control condition for comparison.  
Furthermore, during the audio participants were unable to skip through to the 
questions in the survey software, although this did not prevent them from looking at 
another browser window during this period. It may be useful in future studies to use 
mouse tracking software to check whether participants are moving around their 
computer during the task. Alternatively, something like the breath counting task 
could be embedded into practice so that participants must perform a count or an 
attention check task during the practice to ensure they are still paying attention.  
The control condition chosen for the experiments in this thesis was one in 
which participants were left with their own thoughts for 5-minutes. Although Wilson 
et al. (2014) found that participants did not like to be left with their thoughts, the 
study did show that those participants experienced enhanced mind-wandering. This 
suggests that the control condition in the present research may have been having the 
desired effect of creating a condition opposite to that of the experimental condition. 
Furthermore, although other studies have used book reading or audio 
book/educational recordings as control conditions, the practical implications of the 
present research are that a brief single-session practice could be used in day-to-day 
life and be used to enhance mindfulness before specific activities. Therefore, 
although it is unclear what online participants are doing during the audio, it was felt 
that this created a much more realistic environment, and even adds weight to the 
current findings.  
A final limitation that could be addressed in future research is the difference 
in experience of mindfulness by age and group vs. individual practice. Although 




these two factors were hypothesised to have influenced the results in the present 
research, an empirical investigation may be able to uncover possible costs and 
benefits for different groups of people practicing mindfulness, which in turn could 
aid our understanding of the different contexts in which mindfulness can and cannot 
be used. For example, mindfulness is now being used in schools (see Mindfulness in 
Schools Project), and in general practice is completed in classrooms (effectively in 
large groups). The present research found the effects of mindfulness to be limited in 
some group-practice scenarios, and thus it may be more effective to allow 
participants to practice individually before working in groups, but this may be 
specific to certain age groups (in the case of Experiment 2, 16-18 year olds).  
Social Judgements 
A potential limitation for assessing the influence of perspective taking may 
have been the manipulation used in Experiment 6. The instruction was included just 
before participants read he scenario about the ingroup vs. outgroup member, and 
DVNHGSDUWLFLSDQWVWRFRQVLGHUHLWKHUKRZWKH\ZRXOGIHHOLQWKHWDUJHW¶VSRVLWLRQRU
how the target would be feeling. This may not have been explicit enough in eliciting 
a change in perspective for participants, and perhaps further perspective taking 
training or more detailed instructions would be more effective (e.g. Hooper et al., 
2015b). In addition, the instructions may have caused an increase in cognitive load in 
some of the conditions (especially taking the perspective of an outgroup member) 
which may have diluted further effects. As highlighted above, it is as yet unknown 
how powerful the effects of 5-minutes of mindfulness are, and as such, although 
mindfulness may increase cognitive capacity, this effect may be limited by the 
brevity of the practice.  




A similar limitation could apply to the decision-making task that was used in 
Experiment 7. The task requires a number of steps, and for participants to complete 
the task individually, followed by as a group, which may increase cognitive load. On 
top of this, due to time constraints, participants were also required to complete the 
task in a very limited time. This may have been too cognitively demanding and 
weakened the effect of the mindfulness practice. The Experiment could be replicated 
with more time allowed to complete the decision task, or with a less complex task. 
Future directions  
By combining some of the limitations addressed above, it may be possible to 
develop an entirely new avenue of research on mindfulness in social contexts. Given 
WKHUHVXOWVRI.LNHQHWDO¶V(2015) study that showed state mindfulness contributed 
to trait mindfulness, it would be interesting to consider whether the 5-minute practice 
alone has any effect on trait mindfulness, and whether a repeated 5-minute practice 
would elicit the same increases in trait mindfulness as the sessions included in an 
eight-week course. If the brief, single-session, online practice were able to elicit such 
effects it could effectively be used to top-up participants trait mindfulness, or would 
be effective as an individual practice before a group of individuals are required to 
complete a task. For example, an investigation into whether practicing mindfulness 
alone before joining a group mediates emotional arousal and is then beneficial to the 
group scenario. This may attenuate the negative effect on cohesion and efficacy that 
was found in Experiment 7, and would then provide further evidence for the use of 
mindfulness in groups.  
With this in mind, it is also essential that future research begins to look at the 
length that a mindful state lasts. In order to better understand the limits and 




boundaries of brief mindfulness it is first necessary to understand whether the effect 
is robust enough to last the duration of carrying out tasks. Furthermore, whether this 
is related to the length of the brief practice. That is, do the effects last longer as the 
practice time increases, or is the relationship less linear? Furthermore, other methods 
of measuring and/or inducing mindfulness may last different amounts of time, and 
this may also depend on the task.  
First, it would be interesting to understand more about how different methods 
of mindfulness affect levels and durations of a mindful state. For example, the breath 
counting task (Levinson et al., 2014) may be inducing mindfulness, and having a 
more concrete activity like countingWKLVPD\KDYHDVWURQJHUHIIHFWRQLQGLYLGXDOV¶
mindful state. It may be easier to notice when the counting has lost sequence and 
therefore easier to return to than the more abstract task of focusing on the breath 
moving through the body (e.g. body scan practice). A new technique known as the 
Tetrad is thought to enable people to attain a state of mindfulness before beginning 
more traditional meditative mindfulness practice, by focussing attention on the 
physical task of balancing air bubbles in tubes (akin to balancing a spirit level). 
However, to date there have been no empirical investigations of this technique.  
Second, since the present research showed that a 5-minute mindfulness 
practice effectively altered automatic perceptions in attribution, but was not effective 
in improving group decision performance the nature of the task merits further 
investigation. Based on the results of the studies in this thesis, further attention could 
be given to different types of automatic processes, such as whether mindfulness 
reduces the use, or activation of, stereotypes. In particular, since the present research 
found that this was effective for attributions in an intergroup context, using group 




membership to investigate this effect would be very useful, as different group 
memberships have different strengths and effects on self-esteem (e.g. that one can 
have a stronger identity to one group than another). There is research to suggest that 
mindfulness reduced stereotype activation after mindfulness courses or social 
mindfulness tasks (Djikic, Langer, & Stapleton, 2008), but as yet research has not 
considered the effects of single-session practice.  
More importantly, since the results are limited and mixed, future research 
could look to examine the effect in the context of different decision tasks. As 
highlighted previously, mindfulness has positive effects on individual automatic 
decisions (Hafenbrack et al., 2014; Ostafin & Kassman, 2012), so future research 
could consider group performance on automatic decision tasks (such as the sunk-cost 
bias or insight problems), and individual effects in a non-automatic decision tasks. 
Another area that is associated with this is the investigation of mindfulness on 
decision tasks and person judgements in an applied setting. For example, in 
organisations, human resource staff make decisions based on limited applicant 
information which is subject to automatic processes such as attribution and 
stereotyping. Furthermore, such decisions are often made in panels or groups, and so 
the influence of mindfulness in this setting could be important for reducing bias and 
enhancing equality in hiring decisions. Other types of more social decision-making 
have been shown to be affected by mindfulness (e.g. Reynolds et al., 2015), although 
not necessarily in a positive manner. Further study is needed to avoid mindfulness 
being used as a cure-all in situations where it may have negative effects.  
Attention should be given to the different effects of mindfulness on different 
groups, such as across gender or age groups. Previous research has shown that 




mindfulness reduces the negative effects of stereoW\SHWKUHDWRQZRPHQ¶VPDWK
performance (Weger et al., 2012), however this was not compared to any changes in 
PHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFH7KHUHIRUHLWZRXOGEHLQWHUHVWLQJWRWHVWZKHWKHUPLQGIXOQHVV
alters performance for men under stereotype threat conditions. In addition, since 
children understand and apply stereotypes that lead to stereotype threat from a young 
age (Hartley & Sutton, 2013), an investigation of whether this also applies to 
children would be useful in educational contexts. In particular, this could have a 
great impact on educational attainment for groups who are stereotyped as 
underachievers (e.g. boys compared to girls or ethnic minority groups). Some 
research has already shown that mindfulness improves students grades at age eight 
and nine years (Bakosh et al., 2016), so mindfulness could have promising benefits 
IRUFKLOGUHQ¶VDWWDLQPHQWLQWKHDSSURDFKWR.H\6WDJHWDNHQDWDJH10 years) 
examinations. 
Finally, given the limited empirical investigation of mindfulness and 
perspective taking, and the results of the present research that show a potentially 
conflicting relationship, a better understanding of how mindfulness relates to 
perspective taking is necessary. At present, it is assumed that enhanced mindfulness 
is associated with, or leads to, enhanced perspective taking and that this has a 
positive impact on psychological well-being and interpersonal relationships. 
However, this may not be such a clear link. Further investigation is required to 
disentangle the two constructs. In a broader sense researchers need to be able to 
understand the processes underlying mindfulness and how it elicits effects. However, 
this may not be feasible in one line of research, and as such understanding how it 
relates to other, better understood processes could help to advance our knowledge of 




mindfulness. Bringing together research that investigates mindfulness and 
perspective taking with introspection (Fox et al., 2012) may assist this.  
Conclusion 
Research on mindfulness continues to proliferate various areas of cognitive, 
health, applied, experimental and social psychology. At present, there is still a 
limited understanding of how mindfulness impacts social psychological processes 
such as social judgements, particularly in person-judgement and group settings. The 
aim of this thesis was to add to this emerging body of literature, first by testing the 
efficacy of a brief, single-session online mindfulness practice, and then applying it to 
attributions and decision-making.  
The results of the experiments in this thesis showed that as little as 5-minutes 
of mindfulness practice is enough to elicit an increase in state mindfulness (Bishop et 
al., 2004) measured using the TMS (Lau et al., 2006). Furthermore, this increased 
level of state mindfulness was then found to reduce the propensity for the 
correspondence bias and the fundamental attribution error. This suggests that a brief, 
single-session mindfulness practice may be useful for attenuating negative automatic 
person judgements. The results from these experiments also uncovered a potentially 
conflicting relationship between mindfulness and perspective taking that merits 
further investigation.  
When applied to the non-automatic process of group decision-making, the 5-
minute mindfulness practice did not elicit an improvement in decision accuracy. 
Although there were methodological limitations to this experiment, the findings 
suggest that mindfulness may not have a positive impact on group dynamics and 
therefore may not be effective in group or team environments. It also highlighted that 




there may be a difference in the effectiveness or usefulness of brief, single-session 
mindfulness for automatic vs. non-automatic processes. This is an area that would 
also benefit from further research.  
The findings of this thesis explored the role of brief mindfulness in the 
context of social judgement, providing a starting point for future research to build 
upon. There is the potential for this brief, single-session practice to have beneficial 
applications to other contexts in which automatic processes underlie person 
judgement, but a lot of future research is still required to better understand how 
mindfulness works and in which situations it might have positive and/or negative 
effects.  
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Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Lau et al., 2006) (Experiments 1-6) 
We are interested in what you just experienced.  
Below is a list of things that people sometimes experience.  
Please read each statement and indicate the extent to which you agree with each 
statement.  
In other words, how well does the statement describe what you just experienced, just 
now? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all        Very much 
 
1 I experienced myself as separate from my changing thoughts and feelings 
2 I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling 
or changing them 
3 I was curious about what I might learn about myself by taking notice of 
how I react to certain thoughts, feelings or sensations 
4 I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily 
accurate reflection of the way thLQJVµUHDOO\¶DUH 
5 I was curious to see what my mind was up to from moment to moment 
6 I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having 
7 I was receptive to observing unpleasant thoughts and feelings without 
interfering with them 
8 I was more invested in just watching my experiences as they arose, than in 
figuring out what they could mean 
9 I approached each experience by trying to accept it, no matter whether it 
was pleasant or unpleasant 
10 I remained curious about the nature of each experience as it arose 
11 I was aware of my thoughts and feelings without over-identifying with 
them 
12 I was curious about my reactions to things 
13 I was curious about what I might learn about myself by just taking notice of 
what my attention gets drawn to 
Curiosity subscale: 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13* 
Decentering subscale: 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11* 
* Presented separately in Experiment 2 





Transcript of 5-minute mindful body scan practice (adapted from Mindful, 





1.0 Hi and welcome to the body scan practice. 
1.0 You can either do this practice sitting or lying down, this is an internal 
SUDFWLFHDVZHOODQGVR\RX¶UHZHOFRPHWRHLWKHUFORVH\RXUH\HVZKLOH
doing this practice or kHHSDGXOOJD]HWRZDUGVWKHIORRURULI\RX¶UH
lying down, a dull gaze towards the ceiling. 
12.0 So beginning by taking a few deep breaths 
19.0 <RXFDQXVHWKLVEUHDWKDVDQDQFKRULQWKLVPRPHQWWR« 
1.3 «MXVWJURXQGRXUVHOYHVLQWRWKHQRZ 
39.5 And so now bringing awareness to the feet 
1.8 And noticing sensations in the soles of the feet, the toes, the top of the 
feet, and up into the ankle joints 
1.5 $QGEULQJLQJDVHQVHRIFXULRVLW\WRWKLVSUDFWLFHDVLI\RX¶YHQHYHU
noticed these sensations before 
15.0 And shifting awareness up from the feet and ankles into the legs 
21.0 And shifting up from there into the hips 
21.0 And shifting attention up from there now into the torso 
2.5 Being aware of the back region 
1.5 the chest, the abdomen 
18.0 And being aware of the, now arms and the hands, choosing to shift, 
awareness to these areas 
21.0 And now in this space of awareness choosing to bring attention to the 
shoulders 
7.0 The shoulders are often a place of tension and stress. So, just being 
aware RIZKDW¶VKHUH 
4.5 And up from there now to the neck 
12.5 And from the neck to the face 
3.0 Noticing sensations in the entirety of the face 
12.5 And breathing in, breathing out, and releasing any awareness of the 
head and the face and the torso and arms 
2.5 And the hips and the legs and the feet 
1.5 And just coming back to the breath 
26.0 Bell Chime 
2.5 And as we come to the end of this practice 
1.0 Just acknowledging the choice of taking, this time out to deepen your 
practice 
1.5 Connecting with our bodies, is an act of self-care in this way 
 




Transcript of 5-minute control condition audio (adapted from Kabat-Zinn, 1990) 






1.0 Take a few deep breaths. 
1.0 Wait for further instructions before continuing. 
258.0 Take a few deep breaths. 
1.0 Wait for further instructions before continuing. 
 
  










1.0 First, take a raisin and hold it in the palm of your hand or between your 
finger and thumb 
6.0 Focussing on it, imagine that you have just dropped in from Mars and 
never seen an object like this before in your life 
4.1 Take time to really see it, gaze and the raisin with care and full attention 
4.0 Let your eyes explore every part of it 
Examining the highlights where the light shines, the darker hollows, the 
folds and ridges and any asymmetries or unique features 
5.0 Turn the raisin over between your fingers, exploring its texture 
Maybe even with your eyes closed if that enhances your sense of touch 
6.5 Now, holding the raisin beneath your nose, with each inhalation drink in 
any smell, aroma or fragrance that may arise, noticing as you do this, 
anything interesting that may be happening in your mouth or stomach 
8.2 Slowly bring the raisin up to your lips, noticing how your hand and arm 
know exactly how and where to position it 
Gently place the object in the mouth 
3.0 Without chewing, notice how it gets into the mouth in the first place 
Spend a few moments exploring the sensations of having it in your 
mouth, exploring it with your tongue 
12.0 When you are ready, prepare to chew the raisin, noticing how and 
where it needs to be for chewing 
2.0 Then then very consciously take on or two bites into it and notice what 
happens in the aftermath 
3.0 Experience any waves of taste that emanate from it as you continue 
chewing 
3.0 Without swallowing yet, notice the bare sensations of taste, and texture 
in the mouth and how these may change over time, moment by moment, 
as well as any changes in the object itself 
5.0 When you feel ready to swallow the raisin, see if you can first detect the 
intention to swallow as it comes up, so that even this is experienced 
consciously before you actually swallow the raisin 




7.0 Finally, see if you can feel what is left of the raisin moving down into 
your stomach, and sense how the body as a whole is feeling after 
completing this exercise in mindful eating 
6.5 Please take another raisin and go through the same practice as before 
4.6 Focus on what it looks like, what it feels like on your lips, what it feels 
like rolling around in your mouth, what it tastes like when you take a 
small bite of it 
3.0 What it tastes and feels like chewing it slowly and thoroughly, and 
finally swallowing it 
 





1.0 Please take one raisin and eat it 
1.0 Wait for further instructions before continuing. 
258.0 Now take another raisin and eat it 
1.0 Wait for further instructions before continuing. 
 
  




Appendix D  
Example of attention to detail task (Experiment 4) 
 
  





Attitude-Attribution paradigm essays (Experiment 4) 
For Nuclear Power 
A student in a speech class was assigned by a coin flip to write a paragraph in 
favour of the use of nuclear power. This is the resulting paragraph: 
µ7KHXVHRIQXFOHDUSRZHUVKRXOGEHHQFRXUDJHG7KHUHDUHPDQ\UHDVRQVIRU
having this position. For example, earth has a limited supply of coal and oil; the two 
natural resources that currently supply us with energy. Nuclear power plants would 
play a major role in energy production when coal and oil become scarce. Coal and 
oil burning plants pollute the air with excess carbon dioxide emissions in comparison 
to nuclear power, which does not contaminate the environment in any way.  Despite 
the popular misconception, the plants almost never experience any problems; if they 
do it is only via human error. And finally, significantly less fuel is required by 
nuclear power plants. For example one ton of Uranium will produce more energy 
than several million tons of coal and several million tons of fuel. For these reasons, 
WKHXVHRIQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVVKRXOGEHHQFRXUDJHG¶ 
Against Nuclear Power 
A student in a speech class was assigned by a coin flip to write a paragraph 
opposed to the use of nuclear power. This is the resulting paragraph: 
µ7KHXVHRIQXFOHDUSRZHUVKRXOGQRWEHHQFRXUDJHG7KHUHDUHPDQ\UHDVRQV
for having this position. For example, nuclear power results in the expulsion of 
radiation. This radiation damages cells within the body causing effects from sickness 
to death; indeed people are susceptible to illness even years after they have been 
exposed. Accidents in nuclear power plants are much more devastating than in 
normal energy plants, as was the evident from the famous case of Chernobyl.  
Nuclear power is dependent on Uranium, however Uranium is a scarce source, 
expected only to last for the next 30 to 60 years depending on demand.  And finally, 
not only do nuclear power plants take 20 to 30 years to build, but they would become 
an instant target for terrorist acts. For these reasons, the use of nuclear power plants 
VKRXOGEHGLVFRXUDJHG¶  





Correspondence bias (Experiment 4) 
To what extent does the writer favour or oppose the use of nuclear power? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very opposed       Very favourable 
 
False consensus effect (Experiment 4) 
To what degree do you favour or oppose the use of nuclear power? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very opposed       Very favourable 
 
Embedded attention check questions (Experiments 4-6) 
I am paying attention to this questionnaire- select only 'strongly agree/very much' 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly disagree/      strongly agree/ 
not at all       very much 
 
  





Perspective taking scale (Davis, 1980) (Experiments 4-6) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Does not describe me well      Describes me very well 
 
 
1 I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them 
both 
2 When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a 
while 
3 I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision 
4 It's rare that some issue is ever black and white. Usually the truth is 
somewhere in between 
5 I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of 
view 
6 Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in 
their place 
7 If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to 
other people's arguments 
8 It's often harmful to spend lots of time trying to get everyone's point of 
view. Some decisions have to be made quickly 
9 I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective 
  
  





Scenario manipulating ingroup/outgroup (Experiments 5 & 6) 
Please read the following information carefully: 
The following statement was made by a 29-year-old graduate of the University of 
California, named [Jamie/Jamal]. 
[Jamie/Jamal/he says (Experiment 6 only)]: 
³6LQFHFRPSOHWLQJDGHJUHHLQ'HQWDO3UDFWLFH0DQDJHPHQt at the University of 
California (achieving a 3.80 GPA) I moved from strength to strength.  I spent six 
PRQWKVDIWHU8QLYHUVLW\ZRUNLQJDVDQLQWHUQJDLQLQJYLWDOH[SHULHQFH,WZDVQ¶W
ORQJEHIRUH,EHFDPHDWHDPOHDGHUDWWKHµ6PLOH&HQWUH¶$IWHUWZR years there I 
PDQDJHGWRVHFXUHWKHUROHRIRIILFHPDQDJHUDWWKHµ1RUWK2UDQJH'HQWDO3UDFWLFH¶
working there for a total of three years.  Both of these roles gave me a fantastic 
opportunity to improve my leadership skills.  I think that the latter in particular made 
PHDPXFKPRUHUHVSRQVLEOHDQGHPSOR\DEOHSHUVRQ$IWHUZRUNLQJDWWKHµ1RUWK
2UDQJH'HQWDO3UDFWLFH¶,WKHQPRYHGWRµ:HVWHUQ'HQWDO¶DKXJHGHQWDOILUP0\
role here is of a business analyst, the pay is good and I am a valued member of a 
team. 
6LQFHZRUNLQJDWµ:HVWHUQ'HQWDO¶,KDYHGHYHORSHGVNLOOVRXWVLGHRIPDQDJHPHQW
experience, bolstering my CV.  However, I have yearned to return to a more 
management orientated role.  I think I am a natural leader, and I thrive off the 
responsibility.  Therefore, for the last few months I have sent out my CV, with 
covering letters, for over 50 job vacancies.  I carefully selected job titles that fit the 
role I desire, whilst making sure that the experience that I have had in the workplace 
matched that required to fulfil the position. 
Although I feel that I am a great candidate for all of the positions I have applied for, 
I am yet to receive one reply from the employers.  With my wealth of experience, I 
thought that I would have received some interviews for the positions, or at least 
replies to the emails I was sending.  Not hearing from anyone has left me frustrated 
DQGFRQIXVHG,GRQ¶WNQRZZK\QRRQHLVUHVSRQGLQJ´ 
  




Fundamental Attribution Error measure (Experiments 5 & 6) 
The situation was: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
µHQWLUHO\>-DPLH-DPDO@¶VRZQIDXOW¶            µHQWLUHO\RXWRI>-DPLH-DPDO@¶V FRQWURO¶ 
 
What do you think are the three most important reasons they thought explained why 





Locus of control scale (Bright, Kane, Marsh & Bishop, 2012) (Experiment 5) 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly disagree            Strongly agree 
 
 
1 A great deal of what happens to Jamie/Jamal is probably just a matter of 
chance 
2 Everyone knows that luck or chance deterPLQHVRQHV¶IXWXUH 
3 Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do 
with it 
4 Life is controlled by outside actions and events 
5 People are victims of circumstance beyond their control 
 
  





Perspective taking manipulation instructions (Experiment 6) 
When reading the following statement think about, and focus on, [your own/the 
RWKHUSHUVRQ¶V@SHUVSHFWLYH giving time and consideration to [how you would feel if 
you were/their feelings being] in this situation. 
Think about the possible alternatives [you/they] would have. [Put yourself in their 
shoes and] Consider alternative job options. Think about how this situation would 
make [you/them] feel about [yourself/themselves] and how [you/they] think others 
might view [you/them]. Consider how [they think] this might affect [your/their]  
future job applications and how [you/they] might feel about [your/their]  place in the 
job market. 
A clear understanding of the options [you/the other person]  would have will be 
helpful in ansZHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQVLQWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKHVXUYH\´ 
Locus of control scale (Bright, Kane, Marsh & Bishop, 2012) (Experiment 6) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly disagree           Strongly agree 
 
1 A great deal of what happens to Jamie/Jamal is probably just a matter of 
chance 
2 (YHU\RQHNQRZVWKDWOXFNRUFKDQFHGHWHUPLQHVRQHV¶IXWXUH 
3 Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do 
with it 
4 Life is controlled by outside actions and events 
5 People are victims of circumstance beyond their control 
 
Hostile and Benevolent racism (Ramasubramanian & Oliver, 2007) 
(Experiment 6) 
To what extent do you feel the following emotions when you are around [African-
American/Caucasian-American] individuals? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very much 


















Group decision-making task (Experiment 7) 
You will be completing a group task known as the desert island survival task. 
When you receive the information pack please read the instructions carefully.  
You will first be asked to complete the decision making task INDIVIDUALLY, 
without discussing your choice with your group members. 
After this you will have the opportunity to work as a group to come up with a 
GROUP DECISION. 
(High Anxiety condition) At the end of the decision making task, you will go back 
to N1.04 where you will stand up in front of the class to present your scores to 
the rest of the groups and evaluate your performance, and yoXUJURXS¶V
performance to see which group achieved the most accurate answer. 
(Low Anxiety condition) At the end of the decision making task, you will go back 
to N1.04 to register before you leave the session. The scores on the decision 
making task will not be compared to other individuals or other groups and the 
outcomes will not be evaluated. 
 
We are interested in how psychology students approach group work. How does 
this task make you feel? 
Calm  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Tense 
Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Relaxed 
Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Unsure 
  




THE DESERT SURVIVAL SITUATION 
A GROUP DECISION MAKING EXPERIENCE FOR EXAMINING AND 
INCREASING INDIVIDUAL AND TEAM EFFECTIVENESS 
The situation described in this exercise is based on over 2,000 actual cases, in which 
men and women lived or died depending on the survival decisions they made. Your 
µOLIH¶RUµGHDWK¶ZLOOGHSHQGXSRQKRZZHOO\RXUJURXSFDQVKDUHLWVSUHVHQW
knowledge of a relatively unfamiliar problem, so that the team can make decisions 
that will lead to your survival. 
When instructed, read about the situation and do STEP 1- WITHOUT DISCUSSING 
IT WITH THE REST OF THE GROUP. 
THE SITUATION 
It is approximately 10am, in mid-August, and you have just crash landed in the 
Sonara Desert in the south western United States. The light twin-engine plane, 
containing the bodies of the pilot and the co-pilot, has completely burned. Only the 
air frame remains. None of the rest of you has been injured.  
The pilot was unable to notify anyone of your position before the crash. However, he 
had indicated before impact that you were 70 miles south-south-west from a mining 
camp, which is the nearest know habitation, and that you were approximately 65 
miles off the course that was filed in your VRF flight plan.  
The immediate area is quite flat, and except for occasional barrel and saguaro cacti, 
appears to be rather barren. The last weather report indicated that the temperature 
would reach 110 degrees that day, which means that the temperature at ground level 
will be 130 degrees. You are dressed in light-weight clothing, short-sleeved shirts, 
trousers, socks and street shoes. Everyone has a handkerchief. Collectively, your 
pockets contain $2.38 in change, $85 in bills, a pack of cigarettes and a ballpoint 
pen.  
YOUR TASK 
Before the plane caught fire, your group was able to salvage the 15 items listed on 
the next page. Your task is to rank these items according to their importance to your 
VXUYLYDOVWDUWLQJZLWKµ¶DVPRVWLPSRUWDQWWRµ¶DWOHDVWLPSRUWDQW 




You may assume the following: 
1. the number of survivors is the same number as on your team 
2. you are the actual people in the situation 
3. the team has agreed to stick together 
4. all items on the list are in good condition 
STEP 1: Each member of the team is to INDIVIDUALLY rank each item 
DO NOT DISCUSS THE SITUATION OR PROBLEM UNTIL 
EACH MEMBER HAS FINISHED THE INDIVIDUAL 
RANKING. YOU WILL HAVE 5 MINUTES TO DO THIS. 
STEP 2: After everyone has finished the individual ranking, rank order the 15 
items as a team. Once discussion begins you cannot change your individual 
ranking.  
YOUR TEAM WILL HAVE 10 MINUTES TO COMPLETE THIS 
STEP.  
  




STEP 1- YOUR INDIVIDUAL RANKING 
You will have 5 minutes to complete this.  
Remember; DO NOT DISCUSS the task with other group members. 
ITEMS INDIVIDUAL RANKING 
Flashlight (4 battery size)   
Jack knife   
Sectional air map of area   
Plastic raincoat (size: Large)   
Magnetic compass   
Compress kit with gauze   
.45 calibre pistol (loaded)   
Parachute (red & white colour)   
Bottle of salt tablets (1000 tablets)   
1 quart of water per person   
A book entitled 'Edible Animals of the Desert'   
Pair of sunglasses per person   
2 quarts of 180 proof vodka    
1 top coat per person   
1 cosmetic mirror   
 
  




STEP 2- YOUR TEAM RANKING 
Once discussion begins you cannot change your individual ranking.  
YOUR TEAM WILL HAVE 10 MINUTES TO COMPLETE THIS STEP.  
ITEMS TEAM RANKING 
Flashlight (4 battery size)   
Jack knife   
Sectional air map of area   
Plastic raincoat (size: Large)   
Magnetic compass   
Compress kit with gauze   
.45 calibre pistol (loaded)   
Parachute (red & white colour)   
Bottle of salt tablets (1000 tablets)   
1 quart of water per person   
A book entitled 'Edible Animals of the Desert'   
Pair of sunglasses per person   
2 quarts of 180 proof vodka    
1 top coat per person   
1 cosmetic mirror   
 
  




BELOW IS THE OFFICIAL RANKING GIVEN BY A SURVIVAL EXPERT  
CALCULATE, AND RECORD BELOW, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN: 
1. YOUR INDIVIDUAL SCORE AND THE EXPERT SCORE 
2. YOUR TEAM SCORE AND THE EXPERT SCORE 
(High Anxiety condition) Remember; at the end of the decision making task, you 
will go back to N1.04 where you will stand up in front of the class to present 
your scores to the rest of the groups and evaluate your performance, and your 
JURXS¶VSHUIRUPDQFHWRsee which group achieved the most accurate answer.  
(Low Anxiety condition) At the end of the decision making task, you will go back 
to N1.04 to register before you leave the session. The scores on the decision 
making task will not be compared to other individuals or other groups and the 
outcomes will not be evaluated.  













1 cosmetic mirror 1   
1 top coat per person 2   
1 quart of water per person 3   
Flashlight (4 battery size) 4   
Parachute (red & white 
colour) 
5   
Jack knife 6   
Plastic raincoat (size: Large) 7   
.45 calibre pistol (loaded) 8   
Pair of sunglasses per person 9   
Compress kit with gauze 10   
Magnetic compass 11   
Sectional air map of area 12   
$ERRNHQWLWOHGµ(GLEOH
$QLPDOVRIWKH'HVHUW¶ 
13   
2 quarts of 180 proof vodka 14   
Bottle of salt tablets (1000 
tablets) 
15   
 TOTAL   
 
 YOUR SCORE TEAM SCORE 





Individual measures of group Identity, cohesion and efficacy (Experiment 7).  
Group Identity (adapted from Randsley de Moura, Abrams, Retter, 
Gunnarsdottir, & Ando, 2009) (Experiment 7) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly disagree           Strongly agree 
1 I feel strong ties with this group 
2 I feel proud to be a member of this group 
3 Belonging to this group is an important part of my self-image 
 
Perceived group cohesion scale (adapted from Chin, Salisbury, Pearson, & 
Stollak, 1999) (Experiment 7) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly disagree            Strongly agree 
1 I feel that I belong to this group 
2 I am happy to be part of this group 
3 I see myself as part of this group 
4 This group is one of the best anywhere 
5 I feel that I am a member of this group 
6 I am content to be part of this group 
7 I liked the group I was allocated to 
8 I had a lot in common with other members of the group 
9 I felt that I was similar to other members of the group 
10 I enjoyed being part of this group 
 
  




Group Efficacy (Experiment 7) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly disagree            Strongly agree 
All members of the group contributed to the discussion and worked well together  
The group came up with the best decisions possible 
Mindfulness Attitudes Scale (Cleirigh & Greaney, 2015) (Experiment 7) 
On this scale, please rate your attitude towards the concept of mindfulness. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
:RXOGQ¶WEH           Would be open 
open to the concept            to the concept 
 
If you marked 4 or less, indicating that the concept of mindfulness doesn't interest 










Mindfulness knowledge (Experiment 7) 
How familiar are you with the concept of mindfulness meditation practice? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all        Very much 
To what extent were you focused on the decision making task? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all        Very much 
 
 
 
